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MCMXXIX

A HISTORY OF THE LEAGUE OR SAINTE UNION

1576—1595

BY

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ST. JOHN'S COLLEGE, OXFORD

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INTRODUCTION

The League was the outcome of the prolonged Wars of Religion in a country which was overwhelmingly Catholic in mind, but in which the opposite party nevertheless maintained themselves on something like equal terms. Beginning as an association parallel to the Crown, to encourage the Court's active suppression of the Huguenots, it soon developed into a rival organisation, military and aristocratic. It was the rapid recovery of the Huguenots from the effect of the massacre which was the immediate cause of the League's existence; for the comparative failure of the massacre and the complete failure of the Catholic army to take La Rochelle provoked a feeling of exasperation amongst the party of action.

There existed too more than a deep suspicion that the King, or at any rate his mother, was not wholehearted in the matter. In point of fact, Henry III. was inclined to the League and to vigorous action for the first years of its existence, and only drew back when he realised how easily capable it was of being used in a treasonable manner by the Lorrainers. Catherine, on the contrary, ever disliked the League, and refused to further the schemes of a family whose real object no one but themselves knew, and whose personal hostility she had every reason to fear.

For her the question was neither Catholic nor Huguenot, but independence for her sons within their realm and, without, alliance with England. It is true that earlier, in the reign of Charles IX., the Huguenot, that is the Châtillon interest, seemed for a time to be the more dangerous, for the influence of the Admiral over the King was very great; but Catherine had not the slightest intention of merely substituting for it a Lorraine supremacy. Her object in the massacre was limited to the destruction of the Admiral, and a hope that the Châtillons and Guises might come to blows, in which case she would be able

to dispose of both factions. In fact, although the Queen Mother must bear much of the responsibility for inciting her son to that crime, it is true to say that indiscriminate massacre formed no part of her original scheme. If Maurevel's shot had been successful no massacre would have taken place. Catherine herself never admitted responsibility for more than three deaths ; but whoever lights a train of powder must not be surprised if an extensive explosion takes place. Catherine's consistent policy was peace, and it was only her personal unpopularity, as an Italian, which prevented her sons' subjects from appreciating its wisdom. Her political insight was keen, and she took no account of moral values. She made but two serious mistakes in her life : the massacre and her submission to the League at Nemours. It is important to remember that the Huguenots, in the intention of the Court, were not slaughtered as enemies of the Church any more than our English Catholics [1] were offered up to the outraged majesty of Elizabeth's church, but because they were insuperably in the way of the political schemes of the councils. England's policy took no more account of moral values than Catherine's.

France, we have remarked, was distinctly anti-Huguenot, but we should err if we proceeded to deduce from that fact that the League was popular. Apart from one province, Provence, and the northern and eastern districts, the League was never popular outside of Paris and the big towns. As soon as it became identified with the Spanish interest most would willingly, as it is part of this book's object to show, have been free of its power. But history proves, and the experience of our own day teaches, that alliances which are formed in times of need cannot always be dissolved at the wish of the party to whom they have become irksome. Such things pass from individual control ; they go, as

[1] The idea of killing men merely for the sake of religion was not popular even in the England of the sixteenth century, and at their trials our Martyrs were always condemned on the pretext of treason. It was the meanest of the Council's many dishonest tricks ; for to question a man, on his life, as to the Papal and Royal Supremacy was simply to condemn him on a matter of doctrine, no more and no less than if he were condemned on the dogma of Transubstantiation or Purgatory.

It was a trick of the Council then and has since become a blindness, for to-day honest men have great difficulty in realising that the Papal Supremacy is for Catholics a dogma neither more nor less than any other. It was the Papal question which caused persecution in the past, as to-day it makes unreal all questions of ' reunion.'

Schiller wrote, into the foreign and are at the mercy of sly and malicious powers not to be conciliated by human art.

The personal magnetism of the Duke of Guise could sway the masses, but no other of the Lorraine princes was in any way attractive and possessed none of the external qualities which gave fascination to the Duke. Even in his case it is hard to account for this popular enthusiasm. The French were intensely national and we do them no injustice if we say that they were anti-foreign all round. The Lorrainers belonged to a land which did not become French territory until nearly two centuries later, and the old French families detested them. France owed everything to her Kings, as M. Bainville in his *Histoire de France* well puts it, and the national sentiment centred on the King. This is proved by the rapid progress of Henry III. when he made war on the League, and complete success would have been his but for the knife of the fanatical Dominican. On the other hand, the feeling for and the tradition of Catholicism were equally strong. Catholicism and Royalism are historically inseparable in France, and the fact that the *de jure* King was a heretic gained for the League not only a fresh lease of life amongst its stalwarts, but even some credit amongst those who so long as the last Valois was on the throne saw no point in it.

The Wars of Religion, as distinct from those of the League, were not *guerres à outrance* for supremacy. It is impossible to think that the Huguenots ever aimed at that. It was for them less a matter of existence than of influence and they had considerable help from Catholics who opposed the Lorraine interest. These people were the nucleus of the *United Catholics*, *Royaux*, of our subject. The Huguenots, like the original Leaguers, were organised on an aristocratic and military foundation and represented interests apart from those of France, as a coherent and centralised monarchy. Both to a considerable extent represented feudal and provincial interests, and neither could be fitted into the absolutism which Louis XI. had instituted and along the lines of which France was destined to achieve her greatness. That much maligned monarch made modern France, and unless we keep in mind the earlier history of Provence, Burgundy, and Brittany a large part of the significance of the civil wars of the sixteenth century is lost. It is for that reason that I have rather

emphasised the history of the provinces during the troubles to the possible neglect of the capital, where, moreover, the League's activities are very familiar to all my readers.

One word as to sources. Unlike certain periods of history, the writer on the League is overwhelmed with the mass of printed stuff which exists. Never was an age, except our own, more at the mercy of oceans of ink than the Renaissance. These violent partisan tracts, whether Leaguer, Royalist, or Huguenot, have a great value, for they express what the respective scribbler really thought, whereas the correspondence of ambassadors and statesmen rarely expressed the mind of the Courts which they represented. The State Papers after all are our most valuable sources, but it is most important to realise that the meaning of many of them is the opposite of what appears. The correspondence of Sir Edward Stafford is most interesting for the close of Henry III.'s reign and has now been calendared up to 1588. Here we see a very able diplomatist corresponding, largely, with Sir F. Walsingham, an equally able man. Each was wholly unscrupulous, each disliked and distrusted the other, they did not even agree in policy and yet their efforts tended to the preservation of the Anglo-French alliance, according to the mind of the sovereigns of both countries. Whether dealing with the writings of the Tudor or Valois Court, or with those of the League, Mayenne and Spain, we must ever keep before our minds the matchless duplicity of the statecraft of the day. It was an English ambassador of the latter half of that century who was the first to describe a treaty as nothing but ink and parchment unless some solid advantage were attached to it.

In France, the archives of the *parlements* of the old provinces are most important and are in excellent order. After these, and a long way after from the point of view of the student in respect of accessibility and good order, are the Municipal archives of the old provincial capitals and certain other towns. Some of these, and especially those of the Chambre de la Ville at Dijon, are very valuable and illuminate much of the local activities of the League which would otherwise be dark ; for it is to be remembered that the registers of the Leaguer *parlements* were in most cases destroyed but sometimes only rendered rather illegible by order of Henry IV. There exists also a vast quantity of

memoirs and accounts of events in the town libraries of the capitals and in more or less private collections, the Méjanes at Aix-en-Provence, at Carpentras, Hyères, and Reims, to mention only a few.

Readers will find a bibliography of contemporary and early printed books and pamphlets which is the work of the librarian of the Sorbonne and myself, and is as complete as anything available, at any rate, in this country. It is hardly necessary to say that I have only looked at the merest fraction of these works. Most of the authorities referred to in the text do not figure in this bibliography.

MAURICE WILKINSON.

Oxford, *October*, 1928.

CHAPTER I

THE FIRST STAGES OF THE LEAGUE

FROM THE PEACE OF MONSIEUR TO THE TREATY OF BERGERAC

The immediate cause of the League was the explosion of anger on the part of the Catholics at the terms of the Peace of Beaulieu or of Monsieur, as it is usually known, May, 1576. This was not unnatural. All the objects for which they had striven were repudiated, all the results which had been gained were relinquished, and so far as this was possible the actual facts of St. Bartholomew were to be annulled. The people could not understand how the man who had taken a leading part in the massacre now condemned those acts and all who had taken part in them, thereby condemning himself and his mother.

From this time Henry lost the regard of the Catholics, who never again believed in his sincerity, but saw only the signs of fear in his subsequent encouragement of the League. The Huguenots likewise disbelieved in his good faith, and saw in his demand for the alienation of 200,000*l.* from the property of the Church nothing but a sign that the money would be used for a future war. Neither party had in reality taken the measure of the King, whose outlook was purely secular. The question of Henry's sincerity hardly arises. Like all the Valois, and for that matter, like his contemporaries, no such quality had any place in his political calculations; but he was still under his mother's influence and her inclinations were all for peace. In a sense she did seek peace. She had no regret for the massacre as such, which at the time seemed to promise an end to the perpetual civil strife and was, in a fashion, a peace measure; but with the changing circumstances, the refusal of the Huguenots to be exterminated, and the growing power of the Lorrainers, Catherine became convinced that the way of conciliation was better. She

was an incurable optimist. She always believed that each fresh scheme was to be the sure solution of her troubles. Her maternal instinct, laudable and natural, was incidentally in the interests of France. Her interests were purely family and dynastic, the peacefulness and material prosperity of her sons' reigns, especially was this so in the case of her favourite son, Henry III., so that peace was her master passion, and peace it was above all things that France needed. A foreigner, Catherine was without traditional party feeling in her son's kingdom, and she used the power which immunity from the national prejudices always gives to a clever person, to make all parties serve her ends. At times she underrated the strong national prejudices of a country so old as France and then, and then only, did she make any serious mistakes, and one of these was certainly committed at the Peace of Monsieur.

Amongst the private agreements and instructions which were tacked to this peace was one that assigned the town of Péronne to Condé. The towns of the Somme had been a source of trouble since the Burgundian times in the previous century, and Picardy was a restless district, and moreover was intensely Catholic. To propose Condé as governor was an act of folly, for it was a direct challenge to local sentiment. Jacques d'Humières,[1] one of the chief Picard nobles, was actually governor of Péronne and Roye and he resolved to prevent at all hazards the strong town of Péronne from becoming a centre of heresy to spread infection over a Catholic province. He caused the principal nobles of the district as well as the ecclesiastics and bourgeois of the towns of Picardy, Santerre, and Vermandois to assemble at a series of secret meetings. From these meetings two documents resulted; one primarily for the King relatively moderate and loyal in tone, and another far more outspoken and indeed containing scarcely veiled threats to the crown. Of these two manifestos, the first was addressed to the Catholic people of Picardy, and the second, which became known as the manifesto of Champagne and which caused Henry's displeasure, was addressed to the Catholic nobility of France; but it seems to have been first circulated in Paris. It may well be that this second manifesto was inspired by the Duke of Guise

[1] Marquis d'Ancre.

himself, for it had its origin in a district where the Lorraine interest was all-powerful, and was not really a result of d'Humières' secret meetings. In either case d'Humières' action was the occasion for the distribution of both the manifestos. From their appearance the League may be said to date.

It is true that leagues or semi-secret societies for the defence of Catholicism had been in existence for some time previously, but the League of Picardy was the first to concern the whole of France. Its progress was rendered more rapid by the existence of these societies in certain districts which afterwards became local working committees or branches of the League. Such societies were already in existence in Champagne under the Duke of Guise, in Guyenne under Blaise de Montluc, and above all in Burgundy, where Tavannes had founded his famous Confrérie du St. Esprit, 1567. This confraternity became the model for similar confraternities. In the same way, in its turn, the League of Picardy became the model for other leagues and before long was the League.

Jean de Saulx,[1] tells us that the Confrérie du St. Esprit was formed solely for the support of the Catholic Faith and the house of Valois, so long as that existed. Therefore, it could hardly have been directed against Henry of Navarre, for in 1567 there was no reason to suppose that all the three surviving royal brothers would die without sons. Tavannes was present though quite young at the inauguration of this confraternity at Dijon, and he is most anxious, when speaking of the later League, to clear his father, the marshal, from all suspicion of disloyalty during the time of the earlier society. The form of oath which the Viscount gives us supports his thesis ; but absolute secrecy was imposed on the members, except so far as the chief gave permission to the contrary. We must remember that the League was always a secret society, which in later years accounted for some of Sixtus V.'s hostility towards it.

The Huguenots, in opposition to this, had already an admirable system of organisation which in its turn possessed many of the features of secret societies. The degree of secrecy on either side depended on the fortunes of Leaguer and Huguenot. When either was successful in the field it could afford to come out into

[1] *Mémoires de Tavannes,* Edition Panthéon Littéraire, Paris, pp. 318 *seq.*

the open. The degree of secrecy was not very great in practice, for persons frequently changed their sides, or rather would drop Leaguer or Huguenot activities and become *royaux*, and vice-versa. A complete system of spies was common to all countries in the sixteenth century, and the Leaguer and Huguenot chiefs had their spies no less than the Valois government. We shall see a remarkable illustration of this, later on, in the person of the Lieutenant Criminel of the Prévôté of Paris: he was extremely good, though as an artist, inferior perhaps, to Sir Francis Walsingham.

This confraternity of Tavannes was said to have been a complete surprise for the Huguenots. I cannot believe it. We have to rely on the memoirs for such knowledge as we possess of this confraternity, for neither the registers of the *parlement* nor those of the *Chambre de la Ville* make the slightest allusion to the matter. Even the protests which the Huguenots are said to have made—*ils se pourvoyent au parlement et par tout pour esteindre ce commencement*—have left no trace in the deliberations. Tavannes was launched upon a course which did not enjoy the approval of either the King or the Queen Mother, and the secrecy enjoined by the oath of association may be reflected in the silence of the registers. In this case the *parlement*, which is improbable, and the *Chambre de la Ville*, which is more probable from all we know of its character, were accomplices. If we accept this view the whole matter was a less loyal and innocent affair than Jean de Saulx would have us believe; but it is more likely that the scope and definite constitution of this confraternity was much exaggerated by Marshal Tavannes' son, and that it had nothing like the importance, for contemporaries, which he aimed at giving it. The memoirs of Tavannes are very picturesque and are important for many matters of fact, especially for military history; but when the causes and motives of political affairs are concerned it is well to remember that the memoirs were written with a definite object.[1]

It is also said that the idea of a Catholic League[1] was first mooted to the young Charles IX. at Nancy, when he was on tour

[1] Tavannes began to write his memoirs in 1600 and an edition of them appeared in 1625. The disorder of their arrangement must strike any reader; the narrative, apart from its frequent philosophical reflections, is disjointed and glides from reign to reign and from event to event without the slightest regard for the sequence of dates. This confusion was made worse by the editors of the earlier editions, that is, any edition before the Petitot series. It

in 1564. Nancy, be it remembered, was the capital of Lorraine ;[2] but the conclusion of the Treaty of Troyes with England shows that the fact made but little impression on his or rather on his mother's mind. Tavannes, again, states that the ultimate inspiration of the League lay with the Cardinal of Lorraine at the close of the Council of Trent. The Cardinal about that time was much grieved at his brother's murder (Duke Francis of Guise) and certainly resolved in his own mind to wage a kind of vendetta against the Châtillons ; but his experiment in league making was confined to a general union of Catholic states for carrying out the decrees of the Council, and for bringing the progress of the Reformation to a standstill : in fact, the counter-Reformation. The Cardinal at the time of the Council was a Gallican, his ultra-Papal enthusiasm was only assumed when his credit at the Valois court was gone. The idea then was the formation of an alliance of Catholic states and princes, not the creation of the internal faction in France which we usually mean by the League. The conclusion of the whole matter is this : the League of Picardy was in its inspiration Lorrainer ; d'Humières' annoyance over Péronne was only the cause of its publication.

This tendency to form associations outside the royal power, in theory parallel to it but in practice easily capable of being used in opposition, was forbidden by the Edict of Longjumeau, 1568. It must not be supposed that the royal power, if consistently used in favour of the great Catholic majority, could not have stamped out Calvinism. Nothing would originally have been easier ; it was rapidly being done in Henry II.'s reign and only interrupted by his sudden death. The reason why edict after edict subsequently was issued, and on terms more favour-

has been said that the use made of the memoirs is a good test of the accuracy, or the reverse, of the knowledge of a student of history. The aristocratic temper of the author, his extreme outspokenness, his Leaguer enthusiasm, and his hardly concealed dislike of Henry IV are made abundantly clear. There are also some short memoirs written by Guillaume de Saulx from a strongly royalist standpoint. These are useful for events in Burgundy at the end of the League's existence.

[1] It was this idea of some Catholic League which got so badly on to England's nerves. The council, who were too skilled in European diplomacy, could not have taken it seriously ; but it served for frightening Elizabeth to do their will and to keep bright the flame of hostility to the Catholics.

[2] The Bishoprics, Metz, Toul and Verdun were the only territories in Lorraine which then belonged to France.

able to the Huguenots than their successes warranted, was solely because Catherine had no intention of allowing a Guise predominance merely on the ground of an abstract preference for Catholicism. It is, however, a fact that with constant respites and some favouring the Huguenots ultimately became the second power in the land, with whom the last Valois finally cast his lot.

Protestantism gained its strength when it attracted the Châtillons, the Condés, and even Monsieur (Alençon); when in fact some of the highest nobles saw in the religion as powerful a weapon for their interests as Guise found the League to be for his. There were amongst both Leaguer and Huguenot leaders men who were single-minded in their religion, but it is impossible to regard the Lorrainers as informed by any vital religion at all.

The spirit of the Peace of Monsieur was soon broken by the court in its qualified support of Catholicism and by the Huguenot princes in open acts of war in seizing the towns of St. Jean d'Angely, Agen, and La Charité.

The Estates, on which much was thought to depend, were due to meet this year, 1576, and before their convocation some Huguenots had found a remarkable document amongst the papers of a certain David, a lawyer at the *parlement* of Paris, who died at Lyons on his return journey from Rome. The sense of this extraordinary treatise was as follows. The house of Capet had usurped the throne from the heirs of Charles the Great and, far from being included in the Papal blessing given to the Emperor's posterity, fell under the curse incurred by those who ruin the Church. This they, the Capets, had done by inventing the Gallican liberties which were nothing else than heresy and a refuge of heretics. It went on to prove that the house of Lorraine was the real heir of the Carolings, and stated that the League would take up arms at a favourable moment and extirpate all heretics and their supporters. Amongst these were included the King and his brother. Next, the Duke of Guise, with the consent of the Vatican, would treat Henry as Pepin had treated Childeric, and all the Gallican liberties were to be annulled by the Estates. The Carolingian descent of the Lorrainers was the wildest fantasy, and even if true would not have brought the crown to the Duke of Guise; but there was more than enough in this paper to show how extremely dangerous the League

might become. The chiefs of the League were hardly prepared thus to show their hand and ridiculed the discovery, saying that it was a mere forgery of the Huguenots. If the matter had stopped at that point, neither Henry nor anyone else would have taken the matter seriously. David was an obscure man of bad repute, and the little we know about him makes his writings and his deeds of no consequence. If he had written it, it was the work of a crack-brained adventurer; again, it might very possibly have been a mere concoction of the Huguenots. In the latter half of the sixteenth century we are constantly on the look-out for forgeries. However, the matter proved to be more far-reaching.

St. Goard, the French ambassador to Madrid, sent Henry a copy of an identical memorandum which had been communicated to Philip II. from Rome, and the fact that it was Cardinal Pellevé, Archbishop of Sens, who had sent this historical treatise to the King of Spain showed the French sovereign how widespread and dangerous was the activity of the League. The question arises as to whether David's paper was inspired by the Cardinal or the Cardinal's by David. Clearly they were not independent genealogical essays. It is incredible that any Leaguer chief should have so far revealed his intentions or have trusted such dangerous secrets to a man so abject as David. Why should Pellevé have made a confidant of this obscure person? We can only suppose that David was supplied with a few ideas and sent to Rome to get talked about, and that the Cardinal, who was deep in the Guisard interest, liked what he heard and proposed the scheme in some more definite fashion so that it obtained some favour in the more Spanish circles of the Papal Court. By sending this memorandum to Philip the Cardinal showed how early in the time the League was prepared to accept Spanish help in furthering its schemes. What David proposed to do with his copy is far from clear. It may have been intended for the *parlement* of Dijon; quite as likely as not David may have contemplated making his fortune by revealing the scheme to the Conseil d'Etat in Paris.

Henry III. throughout his reign was confronted by two foreign dangers. On the one hand, Spain in the interest of the League, and on the other, the German Protestants in the interest of the

Huguenots. Spain was the more formidable danger, and the fear of Spain is the key to the mutual relations of England and France throughout the reigns of Elizabeth and Henry III. The German danger affected the popular mind more because their *reiters* and *landsknechts* were constantly seen on the battlefields of France. At this particular point Henry decided to get rid of the Germans by paying a large sum, 600,000 *écus d'or*, to John Casimir as compensation for his expenses. It was not an heroic method, but Henry between the League and the Huguenots had always one arm tied. The reasons why he did not put himself at the head of a really national and anti-League party until the last year of his life are various. He never liked heretics and the sight of German *reiters* actually fighting in France was a constant annoyance, whereas with the Leaguer views he was in some sort of sympathy. Not till some time later were the League and Spain openly against him. His mother's wishes, and she was ever against a definitely warlike policy, really determined his actions : nor was that altogether unfortunate for France up to the first Estates of Blois. In the long run it was disastrous that Catherine prevented her son from appealing to the natural military sentiment of his country and moulded his character as far as she could on the political maxims of her native Florence. This ultimately failed. In a country so warlike, where the nobles had vast powers, where the dislike of Italians was so intense, and where passions and fanaticism ran so high, the frail family bark was destined to be whirled hither and thither and finally overturned—*Rari nantes in gurgite vasto.*

It was a curious fact that of the three countries which political conditions brought into the closest relationship, France, England and Scotland, one should have been ruled by a woman and in the other two feminine influence should have been predominant. Between these three countries lay the barrier of religion. Doubtless the religion of Catherine and Elizabeth was of the same nature, pure formalism, but the more vivacious Queen of England could assume an enthusiasm for Protestantism which she never felt—and some forms of it she heartily hated—which Catherine could not put on for Catholicism. Neither Henry III. nor his mother could simulate enthusiasm, though both really disliked heresy, and the King at least took a pleasure in the rites and

ceremonies. It is a strange spectacle that of these Renaissance princes being forced to persecute by the machinations of their statesmen and the clamour of their subjects when, left to themselves, they would have been content with mere passive obedience. This brings us to the fact that in considering the history of this century it is important not to minimise the power of religion. Some writers insist too exclusively on the political aspect. That the chiefs of the parties used religion for their purposes and as the motive power of their policy is not to be denied; but that is merely a proof of the fact that it was religion which most powerfully swayed the masses. Of the nature and value of such a religion as that of the fanatical Leaguer or Huguenot, who will be wise enough to decide? The broad facts are clear. The League could not make France Spanish or ultramontane, but it did, in the long run, prevent a Protestant King from acquiring the crown on his own terms, and that simply because the religion of the vast majority made such an event impossible. So the absolute power of the Kings of France was stayed at the point of religion, if nowhere else. England and France, although the respective courts saw the necessity for close co-operation, were never without mutual suspicion and distrust because the one country was essentially Catholic and the other was every year becoming more wholly Protestant.

The bright and pretty town of Blois in which the Estates were to meet had seen many historic events, but in the year 1576 it was to witness the first act of the great struggle between the King and the League. The reign of the last Valois is full of events of importance in the constitutional history of France. During it, as we shall see, the most complete exposition of the laws of old France, the *Grand Ordonnance*, was compiled and the absolute Monarchy of Louis XI.'s creation which was shaken during the minorities after the death of Henry II. was re-asserted at the second Estates of Blois. Henry III. made his enemies tremble to an extent which Charles II. at Oxford never achieved, and once only, 1614, were the Estates ever again summoned. The lustre of the Bourbon régime makes us overlook how nearly the absolute power of the crown had gone during the Wars of Religion, and it would have gone but for Henry III., who worked for it, prayed for it, and sinned for it.

During the meeting of 1576 the Estates put forward and obtained partial recognition of claims which, if they had been accepted in sincerity, would have gone far to have altered the constitutional history of France, and to have given the Estates a power over the King of which our parliament did not dream for more than half a century later. The King and the Queen Mother arrived in state at Blois on November 17. In the case of many historic towns we have the greatest difficulty in reconstructing the scene as it appeared to the actors of past times. Nothing is more difficult, for instance, than to form a mental picture of the Edinburgh of Mary, or of the London of Elizabeth, but in the case of Blois, castle, except Gaston d'Orléans' frightful work, gardens, river, bridge, all look very much the same as they appeared to the deputies of the Estates. This charm, in common with all the towns of the Loire, is the possession of Blois.

The elections had taken place in the midst of great disorder. Everywhere the agents of the League had manipulated them so as to prevent any real freedom of choice. The fear of violence kept many away from the assemblies, and in some cases the notice of the date and place of the electoral meetings had only been given out in the parish church instead of being announced by the *baillis* or *sénéchaux*. This prevented the attendance of the Huguenots. So evident was it that the balance of power would dip strongly in favour of the Leaguers, who, it was known, intended to demand uniformity of religion, that the King of Navarre, Condé, and Montmorency (Damville) decided to send deputies to Blois, whose instructions were limited to protesting against the infractions of the recent Edict, against the interference of the Estates in the matter of religion, which should be reserved for a general and free council, and to demanding the postponement of the *séance* until general tranquillity had been restored to the country.[1]

Henry III. had already in the privy council decided on certain measures to propitiate the League and it was the Leaguers' subsequent lack of moderation which lost them their initial advantage. He recognised the associations of Picardy, Languedoc, Nivernais, Champagne, and Burgundy, but in the *Manifesto of Champagne* he substituted for the words, *l'exécution de la*

[1] *Mémoires de la Ligue*, vol. i. pp. 7 *seq.*

résolution prise par les états, the sentence, *l'exécution de ce qui sera commandé par Sa Majesté après avoir oüi les remonstrances des états*. This was a significant variation. He afterwards urged d'Humières to embody this phrase in the acts of the associations previously recognised.

The Orders divided themselves each into the customary twelve *bureaux* to draw up their *cahiers* for presentation. The struggle began in the *Tiers* between the *bureau* of the Ile de France, whose spokesman was Versoris,[1] and that of the Vermandois, led by Jean Bodin.[2] The first demanded that unity of religion should be enforced; the second that nothing be done which might lead to war. The irreconcilable attitude of these two *bureaux* caused the postponement of the articles dealing with religion. The *Tiers* of Burgundy drew up their *cahier* in a sense in which these two formulæ were combined, a piece of compromise not usual in any French assembly. On December 6 the *Séance Royale* took place in the Salle des Etats of the castle,

[1] Versoris was one of the most able barristers of the *parlement* of Paris; he was *plus catholique que le Pape et plus ligueur que la ligue*. Versoris is reputed to have died of grief after the murder of the Guises.

[2] This distinguished man was *procureur du roi* at the *bailliage* of Laon, and a native of Angers. His journal of the *Tiers* is printed in *Etats Généraux*, vol. 13, p. 212 *seq*. His best known work, *La République*, 1577, is only familiar to students. It has nothing in common with the fancy states of Plato or More, but is a plea for a reasonable state, monarchic by choice, free from violent religious passions, and with a national church. Bodin was not thinking of Elizabeth's, but an intelligent Frenchman of our period naturally favoured anything that seemed remote from the religion of the ultra-Leaguer or ultra-Huguenot. The work possesses merit in spite of Bodin's lack of penetration and his frequent confusion of thought and is essentially modern in many ways. We may say that *La République* leads to the *Esprit des Lois*. Bodin is for a reasoned stability at all costs and he has an abundant fear of anarchy. These are ideas also which come naturally to any thinking person in times of disruption. The idea is prominent to-day amongst the few who think. The *Franco-Gallia*, on the contrary, has clear republican tendencies. Hotman's disgust at the royal futility and the lack of governance made him oblivious of the danger of democracy in a country which was not and never has been suited to it. Again, Estoile's contempt for the Leaguer democracy was founded on his dread of anarchy, and even more due to the shocks which the Leaguer vagaries caused to his sense of religious propriety.

Bodin further wrote *Methodus ad facilem historiarum cognitionem*, in which he attempted to analyse the idea of progress. He was as firmly attached to a belief in astrology as were da Porto and Guicciardini in the previous century and Wallenstein in the following. Many intelligent men, including churchmen, had a kind of belief in this curious science. Bodin believed in witchcraft and sorcery (so often confounded in France with the real crime of poisoning) in which he was neither better nor worse than most of his contemporaries. The possibility of it was beginning to be doubted, but nearly a century was to lapse before Colbert forbade the *parlements* to undertake any further processes of witchcraft. See *Jean Bodin et son temps*, H. Baudrillart.

familiar to all visitors to Blois. The King's speech was moderate and aimed at exonerating himself and his mother from all responsibility for the troubles and made it clear that he preferred the way of conciliation, less from any conviction as to the merits of toleration than from the necessity of internal peace for France. There were present 62 deputies for the *Noblesse*, 104 for the *Clergy* 150 for the *Tiers*.

We now come to the most remarkable *séance* of these Estates. The three orders deliberated apart, according to custom, but not on the subjects of the requests to be made to the King, as was usual, but as to the kind of effect which these requests would have ; the idea being to prevent the Court from deciding at its leisure the effect which it would give to the *cahiers* after the dissolution of the Estates. The plan was formed of appointing twelve deputies of each order to discuss with the royal judges the articles agreed by the Estates. The joint decisions were to have the force of law. Epinac, Archbishop of Lyons, a pronounced Leaguer, stated before the commission that he had found a memorandum on the bureau which set forth that the King should beforehand give the force of law to all articles which might be agreed unanimously by the Estates. As for the others which were in dispute, these should be settled by the King, the Queen Mother, the Princes of the Fleur de Lis, and other privy councillors with twelve deputies of each order. This was adopted by the *Noblesse* and *Clergy*, and the *Tiers* gave their consent with the proviso that—*ès articles où l'un des états seulement avoit interest les deux autres n'auroient qu'une voix*.' The Archbishop of Lyons presented this astounding request to Henry in the name of the three commissions, adding that there was no intention of interfering with the sovereignty of the King. Let us realise the unheard-of pretensions. The Estates requested, to put it mildly, the King to accept for law anything on which the three orders might subsequently be agreed. It is true that the field was limited to things concerning the honour of God, the King's service, and public tranquillity : but what could be said to lie outside that scope ? Put into modern language, it would cover anything which might come before a modern legislative assembly, and no such body was recognised in old France. Even the omnicompetence of our own Parliament of to-day is not so crudely

expressed. The commissions had not the courage to propose this scheme on the responsibility of any individual, therefore they invented the story of the anonymous memorandum found on the bureau. They were bold enough to desire a revolution on which they were agreed in principle, but they hesitated to put it into a form which might have overawed the King. Henry replied, reasonably enough, that he could not bind himself beforehand to great unknown demands nor transfer the sovereignty from himself to the Estates. At the same time he was willing to furnish a list of his privy councillors from which the commission might choose a certain number who should advise on matters of state with the 36 deputies of the three orders.

Henry's real plan to surmount the difficulty was something different. His object was to so manage the Estates that their energy should be absorbed in the religious crisis, where unanimity was very unlikely, and thus cause them to forget the scheme for limiting the royal power. On November 19 the *Noblesse* voted for religious unity and for the repression of the Huguenot pastors and the noblemen who harboured them. The vote of the *Clergy* was obviously not in doubt, but it must not be supposed that the privileged orders were unanimous ; they were not, and quarrelled freely over matters of detail. The *Noblesse* had required that Huguenot ministers should be punished with death, but as for the rest of the Huguenots they were to enjoy liberty of conscience. The *Clergy* protested that they never required any measures which involved bloodshed, but neither could they assent to souls being lost without any effort to save them. There is something very equivocal about these propositions. What sort of liberty of conscience was there for people who had no pastors to minister to them ? It sounds like Elizabeth's charming invitation to English Catholics to believe what they liked, if only they would attend the parish church. The sixteenth century was ever tangled up in this ' liberty of conscience.' Of course every one has that. No King nor the Pope himself can say what is going on in the minds of those who are driven to church or temple respectively, but the English Catholics and the French Calvinists wanted a small practical freedom, *i.e.* the right of private worship. That the Huguenots acquired by many an edict, with interruptions ; but this modicum of worship

was never allowed to our Catholics for over two centuries. The clergy could of course invoke the secular arm, but the procedure in the French courts Christian was mild. The horrible severity often shown to heretics was in the royal courts. After all, toleration and repression were enforced by edict and the Church in France had no strong voice in the matter.

Probably the *Noblesse*, knowing that many of their order were Huguenots, did not wish for any encroachment on their privileges. They were indifferent as to the fate of the pastors, for none of them belonged to their order. In any case they were annoyed with the amendments of the *Clergy*, and suggested that a large proportion of ecclesiastical revenues would be better employed in the relief of the poor and the repair of churches. This was the time-honoured form of reprisal. The *Tiers* were unwilling to follow the privileged orders without discussion, and again began an acrimonious debate over all the articles of their *cahier*. On December 26 the *Tiers* voted on the question of religion. Normandy, Champagne, the Ile de France, Provence, Languedoc, the Orléannais and Picardy declared themselves in favour of forbidding the *religion prétendue réformée*, of banishing the ministers, and at the same time protecting its lay adherents from violence whilst they were being converted ' *par les meilleures et les plus saintes voies possibles*. Guyenne, Brittany, Dauphiné, Burgundy and the Lyonnais declared for religious unity if it could be brought to pass *par voies pacifiques et sans guerre*. Thus a majority favoured the projects of the League but with modifications ; whilst a strong minority were clearly opposed to them. This was an indecisive vote. *Who leaves the game loses it.* If the Huguenots and the United Catholics (*royaux*) had not been so sure that the victory of the League was a foregone conclusion, they would have had a very good chance of turning the scales. It is one of the many proofs which history and our own experience give that no party ever yet won their cause by abstention.

During all this, hostilities were in progress in the south with advantage to the Huguenots. This fact caused quarrels and bitterness amongst the deputies of the southern provinces who reproached each other for the troubles in Guyenne and Languedoc. Early in the new year Henry sent envoys to the King of Navarre and the Montmorency to order them to lay aside their arms

according to the clear wishes of the Estates. Failing that, the envoys were to attempt some composition.

Henry took the opportunity for a little reflexion. The manifest hostility of the Estates, that is the League, to the royal power had not yet shaken his preference for unity of religion nor reduced his dislike of heresy, but it had made him feel very uncomfortable. The question was how long would it be before his preference was shaken. That depended on the various influences that could be brought to bear upon him and above all his mother's.

So far the Estates had satisfied no one. The active Leaguers were disappointed, the Huguenots were openly hostile, and the court party full of distrust. The *Tiers* had displayed an unusual strength and were shortly to show more. The declaration in general terms against the Huguenots was not very helpful, but the crisis would occur when the vote for the necessary money was taken. Edicts and resolutions do not carry out themselves. The president of the *Chambre des Comptes* explained at length the financial situation to the three orders, and there was nothing encouraging about it. Large sums had been paid in advance, and the revenue was only 12 millions; there was an annual deposit of 11 millions interest on the existing debt. France, the richest and finest country of Europe, has never been solvent in the course of her history, and for reasons which do not belong to our study this insolvency has never had any terror for her population. All the same, the financial system of the old régime was its worse sin, far more than any active tyranny, and the post-revolutionary system is not much better. The *Noblesse* were only interested in the payment of the *gendarmerie* and cared not a jot about the other creditors of the King or the royal officials; consequently, their proposal to throw the whole burden on the *généralités* of the provinces was rejected by the *Tiers*. The theory was that the *Taille* was to be devoted to its primary object, the upkeep of the army. This plan had no attractions for the *Tiers*. The clergy also looked askance. They had made great sacrifices in recent times, something like 60 millions in 16 years, and quite lately the Pope, over their heads, had authorised the sale of church property to the extent of 50,000 *écus d'or* of income. They felt that it was all very well for the Pope to be so liberal to the crown at other people's expense,

but the clergy of France had reached a point where serious privation was likely to be felt. It must be remembered that the *concordat* had handed over the Church in France to the Pope and King between them, the King invariably getting the best of the bargain; but it may well be that but for the *concordat* the Valois would have broken with Rome like our Tudors, less out of love of change in religion than for the seizing of vast properties. Neither of the orders were inclined, for different reasons, to increase the King's power by voting large sums of money for purposes which they could not control, nor did they trust his manipulation of schemes of which no one but himself could see the end. Henry forbade any deputy to leave Blois before the *cahiers* were drawn up, and appointed January 17 as the day on which they were to give their replies to his discourse. The result of the financial discussion produced a *volte-face* in the *Tiers*. The Leaguer majority was reversed, Bodin and his following triumphed. It was decided that the orator should only demand the unity of religion *par doux moyens et sans guerre*. No further offer of subsidies was to be made and the *cahier* contained nothing but complaints about excessive taxation. Some nobles, including the Guises, promised to serve at their own cost for the duration of the religious troubles; they could have had but slight premonition as to the time these were destined to last. The *Clergy*, under pressure, agreed to pay for 4000 infantry-men and 1000 horse for six months. A plan of financial reform, or rather of financial juggle, was offered by Henry and the *Surintendant* to the *Tiers*, but the third order remained uncharmed. When the *cahiers* were finally presented on February 9, the *Tiers* had made no concession. There remained one expedient for the King. He summoned the three orders on February 20 and asked their consent for the sale of the proceeds of the domain up to a value of 300,000*l.* annual income in perpetuity. Again the *Tiers* stood in the way. The domain was merely for the King's use, not any King's private property, and could not be alienated without the consent of the nation. Here is another phrase very unusual if not hitherto unknown in the Estates. The *Tiers* were right. It was always desirable that a King *should live of his own*, it was in practice never done; but if the royal domain were to be tampered with the chances of so desirable a state of

things became infinitely more remote. As an alternative, the *Tiers* said that if the King's needs were so urgent he could levy a loan on the financiers, sell more of the Church property, or even help himself to half the incomes of the *Communes*. This last measure had been dreaded all through by the deputies of Paris, who alone had been in favour of acceding to the demands of the King. Catherine's never very warm Catholic sympathies were rapidly cooling, and she proposed to the council, after the Estates were adjourned, that the question of religion should wait until the next general council. This was somewhat premature and caused some outcry ; even her well-tamed son would not go to that length. On the last day of February the discussion was renewed in the Estates and both sides contended for their respective views with considerable heat.

The Duke of Montpensier, who had been on a mission with Biron to the King of Navarre, who was engaged in open warfare at the siege of Marmande, delivered a discourse to the three orders in which he argued in favour of toleration, at any rate for a time, to those of the new religion. Montpensier had been a furious opponent of the Huguenots, but after his quarrel with the Guises became more and more lukewarm for the League. He was soon to emerge as one of the leading *Politiques* or *Royaux*, as they were beginning to be called. The wish for toleration and peace coming from so unexpected a quarter must have produced a great effect on the Estates. This speech greatly pleased the *Tiers*, and was not unacceptable to the two other orders who did not wish to part with their money. So the majority became the minority, and the minority the majority. Champagne, Picardy, the Orléannais, and Languedoc alone stood out for the original proposal as voted on December 26. The last word lay with the King. Henry simply said that since the Estates had refused him money he could not carry out his intention of enforcing unity of religion, and therefore the matter of religion must be taken the last of all the articles of the *Cahier*. The reasons which led Henry to this conclusion are various and have been already brought out, but they may be reduced to three.

1. The certainty of the disloyalty of the League, revealed at first by St. Goard and made clear to his own eyes during the session of the Estates.

2. The refusal of the *Tiers* to grant money.

3. The influence of his mother and the opinion of those most devoted to the crown. The Duke of Montpensier's (Louis de Bourbon) change had a very great effect as had that of the Duke of Nevers later on in our history. It was fortunate for the King that there was something about the Lorrainers which made it impossible for any real French noble to work with them wholeheartedly. The Duke of Guise achieved popularity amongst the townsfolk of Paris, but even that was denied to the other Lorraine princes.

The Estates had proved that the League was less popular than he had supposed, which was welcome news to Henry; also that there was the making of a powerful control on the royal expenditure somewhere in the composition of the *Tiers*; this was unwelcome. Therefore he decided on using the League somewhat for weakening the Huguenots and then if possible to get rid of the League itself, and in the meantime to do without the Estates which had renewed the wish of those of 1560 for their being held at regular intervals. This was the policy to which he more or less adhered until the autumn of 1588. In these Estates a great constitutional change was nearly produced. The *Tiers* almost acquired the control of the purse. That might even have come to pass if the three orders had not been in watertight compartments, and had been able to unite for imposing their demands and reforms in common. The impossibility of of their doing so was shown by the eagerness of the *Noblesse* to vote the money for purposes which interested themselves and yet to throw the burden on the *Tiers*; by the *Tiers* in their proposal, after refusing the request of Henry relative to the alienation of the domain, to levy the money on Church property. The *Clergy* would always have followed a line of their own, but the other two orders combined might have obtained for the Estates a power over the King not unlike that which was finally gained by the English Parliament. Our constitutional history accidentally ran on other lines. Many became members of the Commons who in France would have voted with the *Noblesse*, consequently the Commons were not at all exclusively composed of the third order in the French sense. If we had followed on French lines, and up to the end of the Lancasters it was by no means clear

that this would not be so, a very large proportion of the Commons, such as the Knights of the Shire, would never have got there at all, but would have voted with the peers as *gentilshommes* in the French sense. We never knew anything of the *noblesse d'extraction*, a matter of birth, in respect of which every member of a family is as noble as any other, the actual head of it being indeed *primus inter pares* but no more. To this noble birth a King can add nothing ; he can of course increase a man's official status and wealth. We recognise such a thing socially, but it has never been accepted in our system of government. Now, it was exactly this idea of birth to which privilege was attached which wholly prevented the *Noblesse* from ever joining in the plans of the *Tiers* ; for the satisfaction of controlling the King would not be compensated by the inevitable result of themselves being in the long run controlled by the *Tiers*. The deputies of the *Tiers* were more numerous, and soon to be as wealthy, and in partnership the privileged order would soon have ceased to be privileged. For their personal aspirations war, whether Leaguers or Huguenots, as their inclinations directed, was the better way. The League in its early stages was clearly not a municipal and semi-democratic organisation as is frequently supposed. The hostility of the *Tiers* at the first Estates of Blois proves this. On the contrary, the League was drawn up in the name of the Princes and *Noblesse*, and it had a distinctly federalist and aristocratic tone. The means for gaining adherents and for keeping those whom it already had in obedience lack nothing of terrorism, and the whole was supported by a formidable religious sanction. The germs of a revolutionary movement, unsuspected by the authors, lurked in it. The obedience due to the King and his successors was implicitly limited to their submitting to the Estates ; but there was nothing democratic about this in intention. The Leaguers reckoned on the Estates being wholly at their disposal. The third article was childish. How could anyone seriously talk of the rights and ancient liberties which the Estates enjoyed at the time of Clovis ? As well speak of the rights of the Parliament of England during the reign of Ethelbert. The idea of inventing new liberties, as well as restoring those which never existed, was ingenious but the common trick of all in every country who aimed at innovation but professed the purest

conservatism. This article was certainly inserted as a bait for the masses, but it was a plagiarism from the *Franco-Gallia*; the idea had already been used by the Huguenots. The League was a military, aristocratic, and religious society which was intended to cover the whole of France. It is quite true that later on, when its power lay chiefly in the great towns, the League took on a very democratic character and the second and third articles were invaluable in other hands for this purpose; but such was not their original import and that interpretation was indeed contrary to the real wishes of the leaders. There was nothing democratic about the House of Lorraine. This change and the causes thereof will be traced in a later chapter.

Before closing this chapter a glance at the military situation must be taken. The intermittent state of war in the South was not of an important nature, but was mainly unfavourable to the Huguenots. Mayenne had the upper hand in the Charente Inférieure, and Montpellier, defended by the eldest son of Coligny and Thoré (Montmorency), was preparing to resist an attack led by Damville (Montmorency), who again inclined to the Catholic side. The family was always courtly, and owing to his long absence in the field he had probably not been informed that the King was now in favour of peace and toleration. Peace had in reality been concluded at Bergerac, September 17, 1577, a fortnight before La Noue appeared before Montpellier with the news that arms were to be laid down. The Peace of Bergerac declared, amongst other things, that all leagues and associations formed or to be formed under whatever pretext by either side were to be dissolved as prejudicial to the Edict of Peace. The Duke of Anjou had early in the year deserted his allies and had captured La Charité and Issoire, captures which were accompanied with great cruelty. At Blois the deputies from Paris had already left before the formal closure of the Estates and were busy organising the League in the capital.

CHAPTER II

THE LEAGUE AND THE PROBLEM OF THE SUCCESSION

FROM THE TREATY OF BERGERAC TO THE BATTLE OF COUTRAS

The two years following on the Treaty of Bergerac were a time of uneasy peace, which, abroad, was occupied by the Duke of Anjou's exploits in the Low Countries and at home by the quarrels of the Court favourites, usually known as the *Mignons*. Henry's idea of creating a party devoted to his interests was a reasonable one; for although he raised into high favour such worthless people as Villequier and François d'O, he also named Matignon, Biron, and d'Aumont, Marshals. These were capable soldiers devoted to the crown and all of them, Matignon especially, *grand et expérimenté politique*, subsequently proved of the greatest value to himself and his successor. Henry also founded the famous order of the *St. Esprit* at the end of 1578. This was a revival in a new form of a long extinct order created in the middle of the fourteenth century by an Angevin King of Naples.[1] The *St. Esprit* was a military order conferred on the chief nobles and captains and some diplomatists. Its primary object was to attract adherents of the Lorrainers and Huguenots to the King by the brilliancy of its status and the considerable privileges which membership conferred. Gregory XIII. was annoyed at the Peace of Bergerac and would not agree to the alienation of the possessions of the great abbeys and for the proceeds to be used for the endowment of the new order; consequently the success of the order did not fully come up to Henry's expectations. Nevertheless the *St. Esprit* remained the highest of the French orders

[1] The statutes of the Angevin *St. Esprit*, 1352, as well as Henry's *Confrérie des Morts*, and other rather queer penitential orders in which he took interest, may be found in *Mémoires de Castelnau de la Mauvissière*, Léonard, Bruxelles, 1731, vol. iii. pp. 41-50. There are many editions of the memoirs.

until all were suppressed at the Revolution. The Treaty of Bergerac made a convenient excuse, but no Pope was likely to agree to the spoiling of religious houses for the benefit of an order of chivalry.

The adventures of Anjou in the Low Countries had no particular effect on France. On the whole their effect was contrary to their object and reacted rather in favour of the League. Anjou crossed the frontier in July, 1578, and was welcomed by the Estates General as defenders of the liberty of the country; but Elizabeth had no liking for a strong French force in that land. She would almost have preferred a Spanish. After all, England was beginning to realise her strength on the sea, and the Spaniard could only be dangerous to her in that manner, whereas France was next door to Belgium, to use a convenient anachronism, and England's land forces were ludicrously inferior, as was her population, to France's. English opinion too was far from content. The Habsburg Burgundian connection in the Low Countries was traditional and the loss of Calais and the hard terms of the Treaty of Troyes were not forgotten: only the determination of Elizabeth carried through the alliance, aided by the influence of Catherine on the French side. In spite of the overwhelming strength of the army in the interests of the Estates General—there were Anjou and his Frenchmen, John Casimir with 20,000 Germans, and several English regiments—no results followed. If they had worked together the Spaniards would easily have been cleared from the country. The mutual jealousy of English, French, and Germans, was enough to wreck any expedition, but above all the perennial strife of the Belgians. Fleming and Wallon hated each other with a bitter hatred and forgot all about the Spaniards. In fact, the unpopularity of Spanish rule in the South Netherlands has been greatly exaggerated by most writers: it is true that in what we now call Holland the diversity of religion gave a really popular character to the later resistance of William the Silent. The towns of Flanders and Brabant, in the beginning, eagerly took up the reformed doctrines: the Wallons as passionately clung to the old; but the Flemish interest in reform did not last long. To-day matters are different. The Flemings are excellent Catholics and the Wallons anti-clerical. There are no Protestants. Anjou returned to France, in January 1579,

without having accomplished anything. Henry III. had been indifferent: if his brother should succeed in hampering Spain that would indirectly weaken the League and so be all to the good, and the prospect of his brother possibly not returning from the wars was not without its own attractions.

Henry's difficulty was always financial. It was only with extreme reluctance that the *parlement* registered some of his financial Edicts, and the provincial Estates gave much trouble. Those of Normandy even required that the taxes should be as in the reign of Louis XII. and that the royal officials should be reduced to the number then existing. This last was an attempt to obtain a more popular representation in the Estates and in no way a demand for economy. Their orator, Clérel, a Canon of Rouen, made a very bold speech to the royal commissaries.[1] The Estates of Burgundy went even further (their independence was a constant source of dread to Catherine) and demanded the complete observation of the agreement on which the province had been united to France at the death of Charles the Rash, and returned to the point most hateful of all to Henry, that the articles agreed by the Estates of Blois should have the force of law. These provinces, so open in their opposition to the royal will, were not those in which heretics most abounded, but were amongst the more Catholic of the kingdom. Henry was rapidly learning some curious truths about the League.[2] Ultimately the Estates became more docile and those of Normandy voted 300,000 écus for the *Taille*. The King promised to levy no more without their consent. At the same time he promised an *Ordonnance Général*, which had been under consideration for some time, to deal with various abuses and to establish greater security and order in his kingdom. This *Ordonnance* was published in May, 1579. The Clergy were no less discontented. A synod was held at Melun in the following month at which the Bishops complained of many abuses. They had certainly many real grievances on their side. The Decrees of the Council of Trent had not been published, contrary to the views of the Estates at Blois; over 800 abbeys were in the gift of the King and not more

[1] 'Remonstrances faites au roy par les députés des trois états de Normandie en l'assemblée d'iceulx tenue à Rouen le quinziesme de mars.' Bib. Nat., *Recueil de Fontanieu*, 157.

[2] *De Thou*, vol. iii. p. 677.

than 100 of them were occupied by regular abbots; all sorts of persons, many of bad character, held the rest *in commendam*, and 28 bishoprics were vacant and their incomes appropriated by laymen. We are so often accustomed to regard lay impropriation as one of the direct evils of Protestantism in a country, that it is important to notice the extent of this abuse under the Most Christian King, who was certainly an enemy of Protestantism and, in a fashion, a sincere Catholic. Henry issued an Edict, February 1580, dealing to some extent with these abuses, and enjoined archbishops to hold provincial councils every three years. It is most unfair to talk of the decadence or corruption of the Church in France, the Church was helpless; those who were to blame were Francis I. and Leo X. who made the Concordat of Bologna. After the Church affairs were thus somewhat improved, the *parlement* of Paris made serious efforts to put into effect the provisions of the *Grand Ordonnance* throughout the *ressort*. Disorders were quelled, brigandage, which was rife throughout France, was suppressed, and even some nobles were executed for their crimes. The *parlement* remained some months in the south-west of its *ressort* to restore order after the *Grands Jours* at Poitiers. There are 363 articles in the *Ordonnance*, and it is the chief embodiment of the law of old France. It was an excellent work and a real credit to Henry and the Chancellor,[1] but the times were too unsettled and the royal power too weak for the full benefits which were conferred by it to be realised at the time.

France in fact was on the verge of the seventh civil war. It has been noticed that the terms of the Peace of Bergerac were indifferently observed. The fault was as much on the side of the Huguenots as on that of the King. Henry's authority was not such that he could generally enforce his Edicts, but he

[1] The Chancellor at this time was Cheverny. The learned *président* Brisson, afterwards murdered by the Leaguers in Paris, undertook its compilation and publication. Philippe Hurault, a Breton, Count of Cheverny died in 1599, aged 71. He was a skilled and subtle diplomatist but not a statesman of high merit. His memoirs are valuable but not so illuminating as might be supposed, when we consider the number of years during which he held the seals. He began his journal in 1586 and continued it up to the end to within a few weeks of his death. It was written, apparently, for the interest of the family only. The memoirs were probably put into order and arranged by his son, the Bishop of Chartres, and were printed without the family's leave in Paris, 1636. Since then several editions have appeared.

was honestly opposed to war. Probably nothing much would have happened at the time, had not Henry unintentionally precipitated matters by writing to his brother-in-law to tell him that Marguerite was indulging in a very advanced flirtation with the Viscount Turenne.[1] This man, La Tour d'Auvergne, of a very high name and owner of vast possessions in the south-west, was the latest convert to Protestantism, and not the least. His rank was magnificent, his soldierly qualifications good, his morals poor. Marguerite was furious with her brother, but her husband, to whom jealousy was a weakness unknown, merely laughed at the information. It was probably true and amused him vastly. The Court of Nérac was, in spite of its Protestantism, more scandalous than the Louvre, where Henry III. maintained a dignity unknown to the jolly Béarnais. He felt it as an outrage to himself that his sister should become so conspicuous. Anyhow, the ladies of Marguerite's Court took up her quarrel and used all their powers of persuasion to induce Henry of Navarre and the courtiers to take up arms against the most ungallant King of France. It was a curious episode but it produced the seventh War of Religion, if it can so be called, *La guerre des amoureux* ; it was of a different nature from the earlier struggles. All that was best in the Huguenot party was opposed to it and many refused to take part. The brave La Noue and the towns of Languedoc with La Rochelle stood aside. The campaign so frivolously begun had, however, to be desperately pursued ; but its only real interest lies in the fact that during it the military talents of Henry of Navarre were first revealed. Up to this time he had only the reputation of a dissolute inconstant man, humane, no doubt, and a pleasant companion ; no one had taken him very seriously.

[1] The author of the *Divorce Satyrique* takes the extremely hostile, not to say scandalous, view of Marguerite's character ; Hilaire Coste was unduly laudatory. It is worth recalling a fact, somewhat overlooked, that ' Divorce ' in those days signified separation, and sometimes was loosely used for a decree of nullity ; it never signified what we mean by divorce. Marguerite's life was one of great difficulty, begun by an invalid marriage, and necessarily did not make for any high moral standard. She was a typical Renaissance princess of a favourable kind. Her memoirs are elegant in style and full of delicate thought ; they are beyond question the most perfect in literary form of the French memoirs of the period. They are a justification of her life, and are especially interesting as being a most intelligent attempt to answer the criticisms which she foresaw would be directed against her conduct. First printed by Mauléon, 1628. How much we would give for some memoirs of Mary Queen of Scots, which might enlighten the obscure parts of her married life.

Now matters were not going well for him and something striking had to be done. Henry therefore resolved on the capture of Cahors by a *coup de main.* This town was part of his wife's dowry but he had never been able to take possession of it. Cahors was a strong place abundantly supplied with munitions and defenders, as well as containing a violently Catholic population. It was under the command of the seneschal of the Quercy. To attack such a place with a force not the double of that of the defence seemed an act of folly to Henry's more experienced officers. Early on May 5, or late in the night of the fourth, 1580, the besiegers blew open the gates by means of bombs and poured in to the attack. A terrible struggle and slaughter took place in the streets, and the brave Vezins, badly wounded, was forced to evacuate the town with such remnants of his garrison as he could collect. Henry here first showed the reckless bravery and iron determination in the field for which he became famous. He was implored several times during the apparently hopeless attack to retire, but replied: *I will only leave this place as conqueror or dead.* It was indeed a revelation to all who might find themselves serving under or against him. Henry was a complex soul. Hesitating in council, indulgent to the point of weakness to men who again and again deserted him, wax in the hands of any woman, but in action one of the finest cavalry soldiers whom history presents to us. To play a waiting game was a constitutional impossibility to the Béarnais, all his energy and fire evaporated, and there are many such. The stroke, brilliant as it was, did not materially help the fortunes of the Huguenots: for Biron took Mont de Marsan and might have made Nérac itself untenable but for a fall from his horse, and La Fère surrendered to Matignon in September. This was Condé's town, but he himself was absent on a mission to Elizabeth to solicit help for the Huguenots. Elizabeth had many other matters on hand and the mission was a failure. She never liked Huguenots after the Havre fiasco, and laughed openly at Cecil's brothers in Christ. She did not approve of subjects in rebellion against their sovereign, and had long made up her mind, in view of the increasing danger from Spain, that good relations with the King of France were a necessity. Personally, she liked Catherine and her son. The sentiments of England and of a minority of

the Council were pro-Huguenot. The people were not interested in the divine right of the Valois and had not forgotten St. Bartholomew. Fortunately, the Queen persisted in her resolve to maintain the alliance, and when the Béarnais came to the throne as Henry IV, both sentiment and interest realised the wisdom of her policy.

In Guyenne the Montmorency cousins, on opposite sides, were playing at war and taking good care not to do each other any harm; but in Dauphiné Mayenne, taking advantage of the absence of Lesdiguières and of the divisions of the Huguenots, whose hearts, as we have seen, were not in the war, established the royal power or more truly the Leaguer influence in that province. Mayenne showed great moderation and really conciliated the people of Dauphiné, albeit that the majority were loyalist and many were Huguenots. Henry III. had no intention of allowing the King of Navarre to be crushed to the sole profit of the Guises, so he sent Anjou as intermediary, who also himself desired peace so as to return to the Low Countries, and peace was concluded at Fleix in November of the same year. The campaign ended with no credit to the Huguenots, with little to the King, but with increased prestige for the League. Never was a war more lightly brought on nor life lost in so meaningless a manner. Anjou was free to renew his enterprise in the Low Countries. The Estates General at Antwerp had resolved to get rid of their connection with the Habsburgs and to elect a new prince. The people of Ghent were in favour of the Queen of England, but the majority, with the support of the Prince of Orange (Holland and Zeeland reserved their independence under him) decided for Anjou; but not until July, 1581, was he proclaimed sovereign lord of the Low Countries at the Hague. Henry III. now was seen at his weakest. To the angry Spanish ambassador he professed himself unable to control his brother, as indeed he was; but he went further, publicly disavowing Anjou's actions in Flanders and forbidding the levying of troops for a scheme which he himself had sanctioned. It was time for Catherine to intervene. She induced her son to send a splendid mission to England to propose a marriage between Anjou and Elizabeth. This brilliant comedy saved the political situation and exactly suited the interests of both countries; for England

it removed an element of danger in Flanders by binding Anjou to Elizabeth ; for France it counterbalanced the League and the Spanish menace. Much has been written on this matter. We may safely say that Elizabeth had no intention of marrying Anjou, or anyone else, but she always enjoyed a flirtation, and acted so superbly that the English Council was taken in. On the Valois side the staging was less good. Elizabeth was wholly feminine and feline, never was there such a misconception as to regard her as masculine. The whole period was magnificently feminine, false, and feline, Queen Elizabeth, the Queen of Scots, Henry III. and their respective *entourages* move with the grace and ruthlessness of leopards over the scene. The only masculine characters were the French marshals and the splendid English pirates, but even these would be treacherous if they got the chance. Unless we realise that neither sovereign, statesman, diplomatist, nor courtier, ever thought of speaking or writing the truth, the history of the end of the sixteenth century is unintelligible. More, the success of our own country was due to the matchless duplicity of the Queen and Council, a duplicity which excited the admiration even of that grand master Henry III. himself.

In the same autumn, the King raised to the summit of power and glory two of his favourites, Joyeuse and La Valette. The first was made Duke of Joyeuse and the second Duke of Epernon : of both we shall hear much. The life of the former was short, but Epernon was destined to figure in an overpowering degree in the subsequent history of the League. Joyeuse was married to the Queen's sister, Marguerite de Vaudemont-Lorraine, amid scenes of unparalleled splendour and extravagance. The marriage festivities cost, it is said, 120,000 *écus d'or*. Epernon was given the governorship of Metz, Toul, Verdun, and Boulogne, and made Colonel-General of the infantry ; the younger sister of Marguerite was not old enough to marry Epernon at once, but Henry gave him the same marriage gift in advance, 300,000 *écus* to avoid causing any jealousy. It was not difficult to see how the wealth of France was squandered. Neither of these favourites were of the silly type which characterised so many of the King's friends, and Epernon, at any rate, was to prove himself a capable, hard, and vigorous man, the supreme aversion of the League.

Meantime, the treachery and folly of Anjou, now Duke of Brabant, in seizing Dunkirk and other towns to increase his powers and status, with which he was dissatisfied, and by attempting to surprise Antwerp, turned most of his new subjects against him, January, 1583. In view of the Spanish danger, and chiefly by the insistence of the Prince of Orange, whose astuteness showed him the advantage of a Valois connection, even in the person of so unsatisfactory a man as Anjou, matters were patched up. Anjou never recovered any of the credit which he previously had in the Low Countries and departed from them seriously ill, in June of that year. Within twelve months he died at Château Thierry, and only a month afterwards William the Silent was shot at Delft. The death of the worst Valois prince—Francis II. was a nullity; Charles IX. was a figure of tragedy; Henry III. had military and political ability when he chose to exert it—and the murder of William of Orange, one of the personalities of history, precipitated an immediate crisis in the political affairs of Europe.

We have already remarked how the whole political world moved in a maze of spying, plots, and impostures, and it is necessary to go back a little in point of time to unravel some of them.

In 1581 Portugal had been annexed by Philip II., and Henry III., angry at this, and probably advised by his mother, allowed a fleet, under Filippo Strozzi, to go to the help of the Pretender Don Antonio: there were also English adventurers. This expedition was destroyed off the Azores in June, 1582, by the Marquis of Santa Cruz, and just at this time an extraordinary plot was revealed to the King of France by his brother. A certain Salcedes, a Spaniard, had offered his services to the Duke of Brabant, alleging that owing to his father's death during the St. Bartholomew massacre he was the sworn enemy of the Guises. The Prince of Orange, who learned that Salcedes had all the same been seen with the Duke of Parma, put Anjou on his guard. Salcedes was arrested at Bruges and voluntarily made a most amazing statement. He said that Guise had employed him to spy on Strozzi's fleet and to give information about it to Philip; that the Duke of Nemours was in league with the Pope and Savoy to seize Lyons; that the Leaguers had agreed to let Parma take Calais and so cut Anjou off from France; that nearly all the

governors of the towns and provinces were in a vast Catholic conspiracy, amongst them the grand favourite Joyeuse, and that he himself had undertaken to surprise Dunkirk. At the order of Henry III. Salcedes was sent to Vincennes; he was there tortured and repeated his statement, retracted, was again tortured and once again admitted the truth about Spain and the League; this was what the King wanted, but before his execution in October once more retracted all his statements. When considering this and other conspiracies, it is well to remember that most governments, and especially England and France, maintained an army of spies, most of them broken men who were ready, if need be, to betray their employers. Perhaps an evil conscience caused nervousness; anyhow, it is also remarkable to notice the extreme gullibility of these governments in respect of conspiracies. Evidence in such cases was always obtained under torture. This does not necessarily invalidate the evidence, but from our point of view necessarily shakes our belief in its trustworthiness. Salcedes was no exception. He had a bad history and had been condemned for coining by the *parlement* of Rouen, but had escaped. In his revelations there was much that was improbable. Few if any Leaguers would wish to hand the crown over to the Duke of Savoy, and we may be sure that the Pope would not as an Italian sovereign desire an immense increase of the power of Spain and Lorraine, and we can hardly believe that Joyeuse was in league with the enemies of Henry. In fact, the King used him, not long after, as a sort of trump card to secure his credit as a champion of Catholicism to the disadvantage of the League. Furthermore, we know that several governors and at least four of the marshals were faithful to the King. Salcedes had doubtless been concerned in a Guise plot. He may, very possibly, have been partly instrumental in the disaster off the Azores, but he invented his accusations wholesale; partly in the hope of pardon and partly, if all else failed, to so minimise his own importance that he might hope to escape. Henry III. believed the Spanish and Leaguer part of the business and the relations between France and Spain grew sensibly worse. If Salcedes had not finally retracted he ought, according to the rules of the game, to have escaped death; but perhaps the offence of coining was remembered, and in any case Henry may have thought him better out

of the way : *morte la bête mort le venin.* Philip, whose schemes, whatever they were, had been interrupted by these disclosures now approached the King of Navarre. He was told that if he would go no further in the cause of heresy but would confine himself to his temporal prospects he should have nothing but favour from the King of Spain. Philip realised that the problem of the succession was acute. Navarre played with the proposals, thanked the messenger and feigned a sort of acceptance ; but he sent Maximilien de Béthune, afterwards destined to fame as Sully, to the King of France to disclose the intrigues of Spain. The League and Spain were drawing closer and closer together, but the formal alliance was not yet. Meantime the two favourites were at the parting of the ways. Joyeuse inclined to an extreme Catholicism, Epernon to the side of the Catholic royalists (*royaux*). This was not unfavourable to Henry ; Epernon was a stouter staff on which to lean. After Navarre's disclosures to the King, Epernon was sent on a mission to Nérac.[1] The proposals of the King were that, in return for his recognition as the heir of France Navarre should come to the Court and abjure his religion. The King of Navarre was urged by his Catholic adherents to comply with an invitation so manifestly in his interests, but the more

[1] Epernon was received at Pamiers by Navarre in the presence of Ferrier, a learned jurist, who had been a French envoy at Trent, and now had leanings to Calvinism, of Roquelaure, a Catholic noble, and Marmet, a pastor. Epernon pointed out how Henry's interests lay in his reconciliation to the Church ; how he had always been moderate in his views and had respect for Catholic ecclesiastics ; how he had declared to Montpensier that he would renounce Calvinism at once, if he were to be convinced of serious errors in that creed ; how that no one would think another change of belief curious, it was a kind of thing that went on incessantly, and how that the Huguenots were comparing his conduct after St. Bartholomew very unfavourably with that of Condé Navarre hesitated, and appealed to the three councillors. Marmet threatened him with eternal loss if he were again to abjure Protestantism ; Roquelaure, with unanswerable common sense though with little spirituality, said that between the assurance of the fairest crown on earth and endangering that prize for the sake of a creed only thirty years old there could be no hesitation. Ferrier gave more diplomatic counsel. He pointed out that there was no immediate hurry, and that if Navarre abjured Condé would inevitably take his place ; in which case Navarre would lose all Huguenot support and at the same time become contemptible to both zealous Catholics and *Politiques.*

Besides serving his master, Epernon had other aims. He was not sure that the ultra-Catholic party would not gain the day, and in that event he hoped to find a position in Navarre's service. At this date Navarre and Epernon were friendly, possibly because both were Gascons, but after the failure of his mission, Epernon had a poor opinion of the Béarnais. In spite of his facile nature, Henry IV maintained his strong dislike of Epernon, who was often useful, in a manner which is strange to us.

zealous Huguenots were naturally all against it. Perhaps Henry now for the first time began to seriously consider the idea and its final necessity may have dawned upon his quick brain. For the time, however, he rejected the proposal, whilst assuring Henry III. of his loyalty and of his readiness to fight against his enemies. They were even more the enemies of himself.

The death of Anjou had in fact made the question of the succession a burning one. It was certain that Henry III. would have no children and nothing now stood in the way of a heretic King. Navarre was as yet unwilling to put himself under obligation to the King of France as his recognised successor because by the Salic Law no other candidate was possible. In the same way James VI. showed a certain independence of Elizabeth because no other than the son of the Queen of Scots was possible on the throne of England. The key to much of the future history is found here.

Henry of Navarre determined on relying on his strength alone to enforce his rights and Henry III. never really intended any other than the Béarnais to succeed him. All the same the prospect of a heretic King was more than mere prejudice; the idea of the Most Christian King being a heretic was something utterly repugnant to all the traditions of the monarchy, and if such a matter can hardly be called *constitutional*, the Catholicity of the King of France was certainly fundamental. This had been asserted by the Estates of 1576. No one in fact had ever dreamed of the contrary, and had not St. Louis laid it down in his *Perpetual Edict* that heresy caused a prince of the blood to forfeit all his rights and privileges? It was by descent from a younger son of St. Louis that the Bourbon claim rested. The younger branch had seemed so remote from the throne that, quite apart from heresy, no one had ever thought much about it. Only the very improbable event of all Henry II.'s sons dying without boys could bring it to pass, and the improbable had now happened, at least virtually, and the question was all-absorbing.

The necessity of Catholicism for the King of France and the Papal power over temporal sovereigns were not the same thing in substance, though the League chose to confound them. Gregory XIII., a very wise and distinguished Pope, always said that the League would get no Bull or Brief from him until he saw

more clearly what its game was. In another connection we decided to waste no time over Clovis and his contract with his 'Estates,' and now we will refuse to follow the Leaguers in their arguments about Clovis and St. Rémy. Anything can be proved by letting the imagination loose in such remote times about which very little is known. It did not affect the mass of Frenchmen to any extent but was greatly appreciated by the stuffy professors of the Sorbonne. Still, the League was on safe ground when it declared that a heretic could not reign. Moreover, popular passions were much stirred at the idea of the Huguenots being all powerful, and the folk had visions of sacked and desecrated cathedrals, the pride of ages. Stories of the frightful cruelties, by no means false, perpetrated on harmless Catholics where the Calvinists had the upper hand,[1] were circulated from mouth to mouth, and disseminated wholesale, with improvements, by the agents of the League. The Catholics may or may not have known of the tolerant and humane nature of the Béarnais, and they had every reason to fear the fanaticism of many of his followers. The question of the views of the majority, which would weigh most heavily nowadays, did not trouble the sixteenth century to any extent. Even in the heyday of the League democracy, a few years later, the right to power lay not in a numerical superiority but in the intensity of Leaguer principles. Democracy is merely the tyranny of a vulgar caucus in the place of the tyranny, if tyranny there be, of a sovereign who at least has the instincts of decent behaviour, the accumulated tradition of centuries.

As the death of Anjou brought on an immediate internal crisis, so the murder of William caused a foreign. All that part of the Low Countries which since 1832 we call Belgium returned

1 See the little known *Acta tumultrum Gallicanorum* of which only three copies are known to exist. It is of a composite nature. Two separate parts are put together by an editor. The first part has been proved to be a letter from Samerius, Father Samrée, S.J., to the provincial. The second part remains to be traced. *Analectes pour servir à l'histoire ecclésiastique de la Belgique*, 3rd series, viii. xxxviii (in the whole collection), Louvain, by Father A. Poncelet, S.J., 1912. M. Hauser published the 'Acta' in *La Revue Historique*, tomes cviii. cix., 1911-12. His translation is not free from faults and he is in error in his guess as to the authorship; but it was brought before the public then for the first time. It will be found in the Bodleian, and in the Acton Library at Cambridge bound with other pamphlets under the title: *Illustria Ecclesiae Catholicae Trophaea.*

definitely to the obedience of the Church and the Habsburgs. A very different spirit was found in Holland and that solely on the ground of diversity of religion. Maurice succeeded as Stadtholder of Zeeland and Holland, and the united provinces offered its sovereignty to Henry III. It was a momentous choice. Acceptance meant war with Spain and a clear understanding with the League. A war against Spain, now as later, would have rallied all but the extreme Leaguers, who were in any case irreconcilable, but Henry hesitated as was his custom. Catherine urged him to accept, almost the last time when her foresight in her son's interests was unerring. Subsequently, when she advised him to come to terms with the League at Nemours, her good judgment failed her. Henry made feeble overtures to the united provinces and the Huguenots. He even authorised a general assembly at Montauban and again published his Edict against leagues and associations.

Whilst Henry was hesitating, the League was beginning to assume the form in Paris in which it became so dangerous. It was organised in perfect secrecy and none but those who could be trusted had as yet any idea of its extent. Charles Hotman, not to be confounded with his brother François, Launoy, a Canon of Soissons, Prévôt, curé of St. Séverin, and above all the notorious Boucher, curé of St. Benoît, began the work. All the city was divided into sections, over each of which a leader was appointed. La Chapelle Marteau, afterwards leader of the *Tiers* at the second Estates of Blois, the procureur Jean Le Clerc (Bussy) and Louchart all had their quarters. Campans was put over the Cité, the procureur Crucé over the quarter of the University, Le Maistre, president of the *Enquêtes*, took in hand the *parlement*, and the president Neuilly gave his attention to the *Cour des Aides*. Here we find already several of the men who played a prominent and infamous part in the excesses of the League. Mention must here be made of Poulain,[1] the *lieutenant criminel* of the *prévôté* of Paris. He is a somewhat mysterious character who seemed to be implicitly trusted by the League and revealed all its secrets to Henry III. The information was priceless and enabled

[1] The narrative of Poulain is useful for events from 1585 to the barricades. He left Paris the evening of May 11 and joined the King: Poulain seems to have been more or less in the company of Henry until the end. Estoile, vol. iii. pp. 345 *seq.* Edition Lemerre, Paris, 1888.

the King on many occasions to forestall the designs of the League and, probably, to save his life. Le Clerc and Mayneville, a *gentilhomme* of the Duke of Mayenne, appear as the moving spirits of the League in Poulain's journal.

In the provincial towns the League appealed but slightly to the country folk, similar organisations were formed and Guise and his agents were active amongst the nobility of the country. The League was already showing a democratic tendency which was displeasing to the Lorrainers, but they had to make the best of it. Guise had no easy task. His family had the disadvantage of being only doubtfully French and it could never rely on the continued support of the pure-blooded French aristocracy. Nor could the Guises be whole-hearted in Philip's interests. The ties of blood bound the Lorrainers to Mary of Scots and their fortunes were founded on the championing of France against the Habsburgs: first in the defence of Metz against Charles V., and again in the taking of Calais from Philip and Mary. Philip himself did not desire to see Mary's claim to the two kingdoms made good; she represented far too much French interest. He much preferred some ill-defined scheme for establishing a purely Spanish interest in England, and early in Elizabeth's reign conceived the idea of marrying her, thus continuing the rôle which he had played during her sister's reign. Now this fact was well known at the Tudor and Valois Courts and made the most of. However much the Guises may have been sincere in their wish to help Mary, they never got the chance. Henry would not risk his alliance with Elizabeth. The unhappy lady was abominably treated by the monarchs of France and Spain as much as by her own cousin; but the English Catholics, who were prepared for extreme measures, looked to Spain rather than to the Guises, for they realised the almost hostile attitude of the Valois Court. Now the danger of Elizabeth allying herself yet more closely with Henry III. forced Philip to come to direct terms with the League. The result was the Pact of Joinville,[1] January, 1585, which gave the League a definitely Spanish base. Guise, however, managed to keep Philip out as a positive candidate for the throne of France by the extraordinary device of substituting the aged and dotard Charles, Cardinal of Bourbon,

[1] *Corps Diplomatique*, Dumont, vol. v. pp. 411 *seq.*

as King instead of Henry of Navarre if the latter persisted in heresy after Henry III.'s death. Such a remarkable scheme could never have been seriously meant by its author, and Guise's aim was merely to exclude Philip and gain time for the Béarnais. Henry of Navarre and Henry of Guise stood for irreconcilable ideas, but there was no personal dislike between them. They had common tastes in the sport of hunting, they hunted women equally persistently, and both were devoid of anything approaching bigotry. In the case of Guise this may sound strange, but it is literally true. Amongst the many motives which swayed the Guise brothers religion was entirely absent. The other articles of the Pact engaged the signatories to root out heresy and gave Béarn and French Navarre to Philip. The old Cardinal bound himself in advance to cease from 'all unlawful navigation' of the Indies, thus abandoning all America to Spain.

Soon a great embassy came to Henry III. from the Netherlands, urging him to accept the sovereignty with twelve towns offered as security and 100,000 crowns a month, part of which were guaranteed by Elizabeth. She was thoroughly frightened by the series of plots which her Council professed to have discovered: she had driven out the Spanish ambassador Mendoza, who certainly had exceeded his diplomatic privileges, and prepared for open war with Philip. All her dislike of seeing the French in the Low Countries had vanished and Henry III., whose interests, anti-Spain, anti-Leaguer, coincided with her own, seemed to be her only shelter from the fast gathering storm. Personal likes always weigh very strongly with a woman; she had admired Henry when Duke of Anjou, and had been moved by his prowess at Jarnac and Moncontour. If he had not become King she might far more probably have married him than Alençon. All contemporaries are agreed that the last Valois possessed considerable charm and dignity. An English ambassador and suite arrived in Paris, February 1585, to once more exhort the King of France to pull himself together and accept the Dutchmen's offer, and at the same time he was presented with the Garter. Henry accepted the insignia of the order with great ceremony at the Church of the Augustinian Canons. Great was the scandal amongst the zealous Catholics. Mendoza threatened (he dealt largely in threats) the King with his master's

wrath if he helped the heretic rebels, and required him to give up those who had taken refuge in France. Henry III.'s reply was worthy of his exalted position and showed a flash of his natural dignity. The Netherlanders, he said, were not rebels but an oppressed people ; a King of France never trembled before threats and dangers, and France, as Mendoza knew, was ever the refuge of the unfortunate. This last sentence referred also to Mendoza's expulsion from England and rankled in the proud Spaniard's mind. All the same, Guise and Mayenne's forces were ready for the field even to the services of a large body of Swiss, without whom no French army was regarded as complete ; but the Royal forces were ill-prepared and in disorder. On March 31 a manifesto was published at Péronne [1] in the name of the Cardinal of Bourbon, but not signed by him. The Dukes of Lorraine and Guise were called lieutenants-general of the League. Next month Henry III. replied to this insolent manifesto in a singularly inept and unsatisfactory declaration composed by the secretary Villeroy. Both sides prepared for war and the League spread like a devouring fire over the whole of France.

Brittany, as much irritated by Henry's misrule and waste of money as animated by Leaguer sympathies, followed the Duke of Mercœur. Verdun and Toul were delivered to Guise by their inhabitants, but Epernon's garrison at Metz resisted. Lyons joined the League at the instigation of Mandelot, who had a private grudge against Epernon. The whole of Champagne and nearly all Picardy, Normandy, and Burgundy did not hesitate ; it was only in the west and south that the King retained some authority. In Guyenne, Matignon prevented any rebellion and kept Bordeaux firmly in hand, and in the neighbouring province of Languedoc Montmorency rejected all the offers of the League, whilst Marshal de Joyeuse kept in order the capital, Toulouse. This was done with difficulty, for Toulouse was fiercely Catholic and ultimately became a Leaguer stronghold. Marseilles under one of its consuls, La Motte Dariès, and a captain Boniface

[1] *Mémoires de Nevers*, Paris, Louis Billaire, vol. i., p. 641 *seq.* A full declaration of the causes which have made the Leaguers sign this manifesto is given. Also a lengthy and apparently complete list of the Leaguers. Much of it is fictitious at that time, though many who figure in it were Leaguers later on.

broke loose and massacred some Huguenots and *Politiques*, and others who were suspect, and invited the Provençal Leaguer chief, de Vins, to occupy the town. Many of the townsfolk who distrusted these two men, and fearing further violence, managed to communicate with the *Grand Prieur*,[1] the governor of the province, at Aix. He sent a force to restore order and the insurgent leaders lost their heads. The Duke of Nevers, who was rapidly cooling on the League, was watching events from the neutral town of Avignon and before long abandoned the League and retired to Rome, whence he became one of Henry's most valuable adherents.[2] Louis de Gonzague, besides being the cousin of a saint, was a remarkable man. His discourse on the military situation in 1572 went far to check Charles IX.'s enthusiasm for adventure in the Low Countries; he was deep in the council of the massacre and yet saved many during it; he pointed out to Catherine the absurdity of the Anjou (Alençon) marriage scheme; on the same subject he wrote a memorandum for Sir F. Walsingham in which he traced the origin of the Anglican Church and admitted that, for mainly political reasons, the Valois would remain Catholic as the Queen of England Protestant; he was not ignorant of the determination of Henry III. to get rid of the Guises, and his embassy it was which made the Pope, Clement VIII., realise the necessity of coming to terms with Henry IV. The Duke and his wife were good Catholics and founded many charities in the Nivernais. Nevers, Epernon, and Mayenne in wholly different ways and for totally diverse motives did more than any others to prevent the League from becoming all-powerful.

In April Gregory XIII. died and was succeeded by Sixtus V. He likewise had a poor opinion of the League and even its religion seemed not to be beyond suspicion; a good Italian, he had no wish to increase the power of Spain. Latterly he regarded the League with more favour, for the contumacious heresy of Henry of Navarre was patent. Meantime, the fortunes of the League

[1] The Grand Bastard (of Orléans). This title was frequently given to an illegitimate son of France. It carried no spiritual functions with it.

[2] Nevers' own explanation of his entry into and abandonment of the League is to be found in his letters to Henry III from Rome. *Mémoires*, p. 745 *seq.* In December 1588 he was strongly anti-Leaguer and a vigorous supporter of an expedition to recover Saluzzo.

in Burgundy were balanced. The Viscount of Tavannes, Jean, joined the League, but the Count of Charny, who had saved Burgundy from massacre in 1572, kept Beaune and Chalon for the King, and the Count of Tavannes, Guillaume, also adhered to the *royaux*. Henry III.'s resources were now not so insignificant; he had many companies of Swiss in his pay, Elizabeth offered him 6000 men, and the Venetians, who were ever anti-Leaguer, a large sum of money. He gained some successes. Aumont and Epernon forced the Leaguers of Orléans, under Entragues, to raise the siege of Gien. In Poitou the Duke of Montpensier, with Huguenot help, broke up the newly recruited troops of the League, and Joyeuse drove the Duke of Elbœuf into Normandy when he attempted to effect a junction with the Leaguers of Centre. His foes had, however, the advantage which always results in war from a sudden and unexpected stroke. The Huguenots showed a lack of political sense and did not in the least seize the situation. Their interest was clearly to rally to the King of France, as indeed Navarre always desired, to overthrow the League, and, that done, either from gratitude to obtain or by pressure to extort a genuine edict of toleration. Many Huguenots, however, and amongst them some very honourable men, disliked the King even more than Guise. They did not forget how Henry had been one of the organisers of the massacre, and now appeared as a sort of treacherous friend to them, whereas Guise's attitude was clear and consistent. The King was well known for duplicity and Guise had a wholly undeserved reputation for frankness, and after all he and he alone had been determined for years on the death of Coligny. Guise was not a man of blood, but few of the prominent characters of that century were so except when interest strongly pointed to violence.

Henry III. was urged by the *royaux*, and chiefly by Joyeuse, to take the wind out of the sails of the League by a vigorous and successful campaign against the Huguenots. There was a good deal to be said for this plan, for it must always be remembered how unpopular a minority the Huguenots were. There was much more to be said for Epernon's plan of arriving at peace and order by joining with the moderate Huguenots and together making short work of the League. Du Plessis de Mornay, one of the wisest of Navarre's adherents, a rigid Calvinist but a man of worth,

wrote a pamphlet in which he exposed the absurdity and treason of the schemes of the Guises. He said a good word for Epernon, and insisted on the King's good intentions ; but for this too many were interested in the perpetuation of strife. Here is the explanation of the long duration of all wars civil and otherwise. Epinac, the Leaguer archbishop of Lyons, replied to de Mornay to the effect that everyone knew that the line of Charlemagne was extinct, and that the house of Lorraine were debarred by the Salic Law from the succession. We are not told what the Duke of Guise said about this giving away of his claims by his partisan. Henry of Navarre also issued a well-timed declaration at Bergerac in which he said that if only freedom of worship were allowed, the King had no reason to fear that he would not receive the service due to him from all his subjects indifferently. The Leaguer chief asked Henry III. to publish an edict in favour of unity of religion and to execute it by means of the forces of the League. There was yet time for wiser counsels. Henry had at least as good an army as the League, and though the towns were more strongly Leaguer than in 1576, the military caste was not, as we have seen, over anxious to take up arms against their sovereign. Especially Epernon and Guillaume de Tavannes urged upon him a vigorous offensive ; but his mother and the chancellor Cheverny and the secretary Villeroy frightened him by calling attention to the dangerous situation in Paris, which was true, and to the great strength of the Leaguer forces, which was an exaggeration.

At Nemours, in July, 1585, where the Guises had their head-quarters, the King gave way. Soissons was to be given as security to the Cardinal of Bourbon : Châlons, Toul, Verdun, and St. Dizier to the Duke of Guise : Dijon and Beaune to Mayenne : Dinan to Mercœur : Boulogne to Elbœuf, and Rue to Aumale. It was a fatal programme. On July 15, 1585, at St. Maur, Henry issued an edict proscribing the exercise of the *religion prétendue réformée*, revoking all previous edicts of toleration, and declaring that henceforth there would exist only one religion in France. The news spread consternation amongst the Huguenots, and it was said that Navarre's moustache turned white from anxiety. Henry III. had thrown away his last chance of independence and bound himself hand and foot to his enemies ; a bondage

from which he was only to be released by the tragedy of Blois. In August, Henry sent envoys to Nérac who were accompanied by the curés of St. Séverin and of St. Germain l'Auxerrois, who, even if the mission had been more conciliatory, would not have inspired confidence. Navarre was required to give up the cautionary towns and to suspend all exercise of the *R.P.R.*; there were also vague hints of a future council. Henry of Navarre was ready to meet Catherine for conferring, the two got on well together, and naturally had nothing to say against a council; but his reply, though in his usual respectful and courteous style, was a refusal to submit to the King's edict. Partly owing to this refusal of Navarre, partly to the happy result of the conference of Nemours, Sixtus V. decided on a step about the policy of which he had many misgivings. This remarkable man of obscure origin was a wholly religious Pope of exemplary life, a true Pontiff of the Counter Reformation in his wholehearted horror of heresy. He had no liking for rebellion against a lawful sovereign and had no better opinion of the League than his predecessor, but we must remember that Navarre was a relapsed heretic; although his conversion must be regarded as forced and insincere. Suddenly, September 9, Sixtus issued a Bull[1] declaring that Navarre and Condé were both incapable of succeeding to the crown of France, taking away their estates, and releasing the subjects of the former from their allegiance. The Pope was high principled and zealous, but, as is often the case, in matters so political a more worldly man, a Leo X. or an Alexander VI., would have avoided a clear pitfall. Moreover, there were the consequences of the Bull against Catherine of Navarre and St. Pius V.'s one against Elizabeth which might have served as a warning. This act was certain to produce a violent reaction in France. Henry III. sent the Bull to be registered; he realised that the *parlement* of Paris would refuse and took no steps to enforce obedience. A king could always overcome the *parlement's* resistance, if he chose, in the long run. The *parlement* refused with unmistakable vigour and declared that the Bull deserved to be burned in the

[1] *Mémoires de la Ligue*, vol. i., p. 214 and p. 244 for the reply. The most capable, and violent, upholder of the Bull was Louis Dorléans, a barrister at the *parlement* of Paris, who wrote under the name of the *Catholique Anglois*. Cf. 'Le parfait mesdisant par Lois d'Orléans, avocat en la Cour; imprimé nouvellement à Paris à l'enseigne du Catholique Anglois.' Estoile, vol. iii, p. 107.

presence of the dignitaries of the Gallican Church ; they offered to resign *en bloc* rather than register. An amusing sequel was the finding of a somewhat scurrilous reply purporting to come from Henry of Navarre and addressed to *Monsieur Sixte soi disant Pape*, pasted up on one of the churches in Rome. Sixtus admired courage and, much as he detested Navarre's and Elizabeth's religion, was in sympathy with them in their attitude to Spain. This squib was not the work of Navarre nor of any Huguenot but that of Pierre de l'Estoile, the author of the invaluable diary, a Gallican and royalist.

It is time to glance at the military situation. Up to a certain point the Huguenots were successful. Lesdiguières had occupied Embrun and Montélimart, and Condé had cleared Poitou of Mercœur's troops and was engaged in the siege of Brouage, which must have fallen, when he took it into his head to relieve Angers. This was a fatal error. The attack failed and Condé found himself menaced in the rear by Joyeuse, on the front by Mayenne, and on the flank by Biron and Epernon. Condé's forces had no chance of success and simply melted away as a snowball. The Prince himself with a few men reached the Norman coast and fled to Guernsey. The Huguenot power in the west had vanished like a mist. Mayenne proposed and actually began a serious campaign in Guyenne, but he required support, and Henry always distrustful of the Guises and, seeing a ray of sunshine caused by the effect of the Papal Bull, resolved on a different plan. This was to form three independent armies, a curious piece of strategy, but most illuminating as to the suspicions which Henry III. entertained of the League and his own supporters. One army in Saintonge under Biron, a second in Dauphiné under Epernon, and a third in Languedoc under Joyeuse. Their disconcerted action, for none would work with the other, produced the weirdest results ; but Joyeuse hated his two colleagues and was drawing nearer in sympathy to the League. Henry could only retain him by giving him a chance to shine above the rest. Joyeuse showed some energy ; he took Marvéjols and sacked and burned the place and then went south into Languedoc to join his father, the Marshal, against the Montmorency ; but the campaign, though prolific in ravages and loss of life, had not a single compensating feature of military

gain. Henry III.'s conduct was curious and contradictory. He was half playing for safety and half feebly attempting to free himself from the meshes of the League. He refused the wish of the Nuncio to accept the disciplinary decrees of Trent, to the satisfaction of the *parlement*; he renewed the edict against the Huguenots; he received the deputies of the Protestant Swiss cantons and entered into relations with Rosny. It was time for Catherine to intervene. In July, 1586, an armistice for Saintonge was agreed by Navarre and Biron, and preparations were made for an interview between the Queen Mother and Henry of Navarre. This took place in December at St. Bris (Charente). Catherine was now in poor health and indeed had only two years longer to live, and to cross the distracted land of France, surrounded by hostile Leaguers, to entrust herself to the Huguenots irritated by her son's recent edict was an act of no small courage. It was the proof of her real love of peace. Catherine deserves a much higher place in history than that usually given her. We cannot turn her into a wholly amiable character, but that would be less wildly wrong than the imagination of romantic pseudo-historians. Rosny had previously pointed out to the King that if Navarre were to change his religion it would afford him (Henry III.) no real help, for the Huguenots would no longer follow their leader. There lay a whole world of difference in the expediency of conversion between the time when he was only King of Navarre and later when he was King of France. Nevers, who was present [1] (he was now in France actively on Henry III.'s side), tells us that Navarre never positively refused the invitation of the Queen Mother to alter his religion; he only wished for enlightenment and the finding of a free council. In the meantime he refused to discuss any plans for the future which were contingent on the King's death. Catherine and Navarre came to no conclusion other than the purely domestic one of her consent to the separation of Navarre and Marguerite, who had now entirely left her husband. Some compromise on the matter of religion might have been achieved, but early in the year the news of the execution of the Queen of Scots, and the dangerous situation thereby created in Paris, recalled the Queen Mother to the capital. The news of Mary's death raised the popular excitement to the

[1] *Mémoires de Nevers*, vol. i., p. 767.

boiling point. This was fanned by a picture, made by order of Madame de Montpensier, representing the tortures of priests in Elizabeth's realm, which was exhibited in the cemetery of the Innocents. Henry III. promptly ordered its removal. It is interesting to observe the attitude of the Court and folk in two tragedies. After the massacre the English people, at least in the south, were wild with grief and anger, Elizabeth and the Court indifferent. After Mary's death the Parisians were insane with sorrow and rage, Henry and the Court unmoved. The necessity of the Anglo-French alliance explains both events.

Madame de Montpensier, sister of the Guises, was an extraordinary character and in many ways was the life and soul of the Paris League. Outside the city her influence was small. She was very pretty, of a masculine courage and determination, and like her elder brother possessed considerable charm, for she too exercised an immense control over the mob. In other respects she was a fanatic Catholic and ready to go to any lengths. Her conduct was at times so extravagant that it seems that she must have been hysterical. She exercised a peculiar fascination for the clergy, and boasted that her following of curés and religious was as effective as the armed array of the League. She was not far wrong. The fanaticism of many, though by no means all, of the clergy of Paris was one of the greatest assets of the League. Catherine de Montpensier was animated by a truly feminine spite against Henry III. and she pursued him with remorseless hatred and unwearying invective, the reasons for which we can only surmise. In modern days, Madame de Montpensier would be one of those attractive restless women who sit on every committee and are ready for any work except that which lies in their own homes. The execution of the Queen of Scots may have had Cromwell's excuse for the judicial murder of Charles I., but it seemed then, as it seems now, an outrageous act, performed moreover in an underhand fashion as though its authoress were frightened and ashamed. Elizabeth was in fact both. She did not like meddling with a sovereign, still less cutting off her cousin's head ; on the other hand, she had really been frightened by the Babington plot, which was real enough, but only recently has it been discovered how small was the actual danger.[1]

[1] *The Babington Plot*, Fr. H. Pollen, S.J., Scottish Hist. Soc.

The Council knew of it for months. The death of Mary seemed a way of safety, unless it produced a Catholic reaction, and many of the Council had pestered the Queen to sign the death warrant for a long time. In justice to Elizabeth, we must remember that she, and she alone, had for years stood between Mary and death. Elizabeth had no reason to fear active hostility from Henry III.; his interests were too much hers and, indeed, for long past the unhappy Queen had been more or less of an embarrassment to the Valois Court. All this time, too, Elizabeth was taking the measure of Philip II. in the Netherlands where he was formidable and on the sea where he was not, and was learning to fear him less.

In Paris the execution of Mary no doubt gave the last touch to the revolution against the Valois. It seemed to give force to the Guise stories of the horrible danger which threatened Catholics if the Huguenots were allowed to exist, and, since any weapon was fair to use against their King, by taking advantage of his known indifference to his sister-in-law's fate, the Leaguers spread it about that he had actually suggested her death to the *infamous Jezabel*, his ally. This Guise and the leaders must have known to be false, whatever the more ignorant folk believed. Henry had in fact sent Pomponne de Bellièvre[1] to see what could be done to save her, but his mission was performed with no energy. Now was the opportunity for the League of Paris, not wholly Guise's, to take advantage of the popular fear and fury and to turn itself into the vast organisation for mischief which it almost immediately became. We have henceforth to deal with a real municipal demagogy. This new phase was essentially a town organisation and had little in common with the original declaration of Péronne. The scheme was to form a federalised democracy of towns, the smaller towns under the direct control of their provincial capitals, and the whole under the direction of the League in Paris. The fatal flaw in this scheme was that, so soon as success in the field failed the League, these federalised towns were cut off from communication with each other and from the heart in Paris. This organisation in Paris must be reserved for description to the next chapter.

[1] He had the reputation of a slow man devoid of energy. '*La lentitude, plaisante comœdie, par Monsieur de Belièvre.*' Estoile, vol. iii., p. 101.

Nicolas Poulain continued all this time to send valuable information to the Chancellor. He divulged a scheme for opening the gates of Boulogne to Aumâle, so that Epernon's garrison was able to seize the *prévôt de la maréchaussée*, who was in league with the enemy, and to receive Aumâle himself with cannon shot. In March, 1587, he revealed a far more important and widespread conspiracy organised by the leading Leaguers in Paris. It was nothing less than the seizing of the arsenal, the Châtelet, and the Louvre. The chancellor, the *premier président*, de Harlay, the *procureur général*, La Guesle, and the chief officials were to be killed as well as a great number of real or suspected *Politiques*. The King was to be taken and either killed or kept in confinement. The whole plot seems to have been a sort of dress rehearsal for the Day of Barricades in the following year. It would be unwise to give complete credit to the *lieutenant criminel*'s hair-raising plots. He may have improved on them and his subordinates may have been imposed upon, but doubtless a real danger was present. Henry took the news seriously. A few miscellaneous people were captured and tortured into admitting whatever was required and troops were brought into the city to guard the threatened spots. The Leaguers perceived that their plot had leaked out and Mayenne hastily left Paris. It is characteristic of Henry that he did not attempt a more active course of repression, or at least to secure Mayenne. Such was Epernon's advice, but he was unable to return to the capital in time to stiffen the King's resolution.

We now have to describe the Battle of Coutras, October, 1587, and the events which led up to it.

Henry III.'s grave danger, in the field, lay in the possibility of a junction between Navarre, Condé, and Turenne, who were active in Poitou, with the German mercenaries of John Casimir of the Palatinate. The Pfalzgraf at the last minute had scruples as to attacking his neighbour the Duke of Lorraine, and the command was given to a Prussian, Fabian von Dohna. Thereupon, Joyeuse left Paris for the west in May with a strong force, and the King himself, whilst his favourite was preventing Navarre from crossing the Loire, established on the same river with the main army, waited for the matter to develop. The political aspect was far more in Henry's mind than the military. He

seemed likely to come out master in any event. If Joyeuse beat the redoubtable Henry of Navarre, great credit would accrue to the King and the League would take a wholly secondary place. If the Germans entered France, it was probable that the brunt of the fighting would fall upon Lorraine, outside Henry's kingdom. Even if these Germans were to win, it would not be a wholly unmixed misfortune; for Guise and the League would be ruined, and the national feeling of the French could be trusted to make them unite with the King to drive out the foreigners. The contrary happened: it was Joyeuse who was defeated and killed at Coutras in October; it was Guise who won a crushing victory over the Germans at Auneau in November of the same year.

The design of Navarre, Condé, and Turenne, strengthened with all the Huguenots of the south-west, was to effect a junction with the Count of Soissons, Condé's brother, who had raised some thousands of Huguenots and *Politiques* of Beauce, Normandy, and Anjou. Montpensier was with the King. So all the Bourbons were out against the League, Catholic or Huguenot according to their inclinations: it was clear that the *old fool*, the Cardinal of Bourbon, was simply spoiling the prospects of them all. The junction was effected, but the joint armies did not feel strong enough to attack towards the north and join hands with von Dohna. Therefore they adopted an alternative scheme of pushing up the valley of the Dordogne and joining Montmorency for a decisive campaign in the region of the Allier. Matignon had strong forces round Bordeaux, and it was Joyeuse's plan to trap the Bourbon army, for it was not wholly Huguenot, between his own and that of the Marshal. The two hostile armies followed parallel routes for some thirty miles; the fortress of Coutras stood in the way, and in spite of some indecisive actions round it the Huguenots were unable to cross the Dordogne. Matignon had given rendez-vous to Joyeuse at Libourne for October 22, but Navarre arrived an hour or two earlier. Joyeuse left La Roche Chalais at night and the Bourbon army found themselves shut into an angle formed by the Isle and the Drôme, two small but fairly deep streams. Any unfordable stream or canal is a formidable obstacle to an army. It is doubtful whether or no the tactics of Joyeuse are to be blamed. He had an excellent army,

well equipped, which included all the choicest youth of the Court, men of courage and skilful horsemen. These were most anxious for the attack, and it is never wise to damp the enthusiasm of Frenchmen. The Bourbon side was no less brilliant.[1] In fact, all the very choicest blood and spirit of France were to be found in those opposing forces. If Joyeuse had waited for the Marshal victory was certain,[2] but meanwhile Henry of Navarre might have declined battle and made good his retreat. It is recorded that before the battle was joined de Mornay exhorted Navarre and the princes to repent of their scandalous lives which might bring disaster and to pray. This was done by Navarre and the Huguenots, whose cavalry broke into the fierce psalm : *they came round me like bees and shall be extinct like fire in the thorns for in the name of the Lord I will destroy them.* The battle opened with a general discharge of artillery, but it was the Huguenot cavalry which in the furious mêlée won the day. It was Navarre's own arm and seems to have been heavier in equipment and horses than the royal cavalry.[3] The whole battle was over in little more than an hour and ended in the complete rout of Henry III.'s army. The Bourbon princes are entitled to much of the credit of the victory for their incomparable dash and bravery. The royal army lost about 2700 men and the whole of their treasure and military stores ; the Bourbon-Huguenot losses were slight. Nor were numbers the most grievous loss of the royalists. Few battles have taken such a heavy toll of the

[1] These, with Navarre, commanded the three squadrons of heavy horse. The two light were led by de Vivans, La Trémouille, and Turenne. The infantry were in charge of Vallirault, Parabelle, and Rieux ; the artillery of Clèremont d'Amboise.

[2] *Ce mesme jour arriva un gentilhomme de la part de M. le M. de Matignon, qui asseuroit M. de Joyeuse que s'il vouloit encores attendre trois jours à donner la bataille qu'il le joindroit avec* 300 *bons chevaux and* 1800 *hommes de pied. . . . M. de Joyeuse le renvoya aussi soudain avec peu de résolution sur ce sujet, ne désirant que led. maréschal eust part à l'honneur qu'il croyoit s'attribuer particulièrement. 'Mémoires des troubles arrivés en France avec les voyages des sieurs de Mayenne au levant et de Joyeuse en Poictou.'* By François de Racine, Sr. de Villegomblain, and published by his nephew Rivandes de Villegomblain. The best account of Coutras.

[3] Joyeuse had 15 companies of gendarmerie, St. Sulpice in command, three squadrons of light horse, the regiments (foot) of Tiercelin, Villeluisant, that of Picardy, and three companies of Champagne. See also an account of the campaign, with documents, from a Swiss point of view, in *Ludwig Pfyffer und seine Zeit*, vol. iii., pp. 244-257, by A. von Segesser. Berne, 1882.

flower of the youth of a splendid Court.[1] These young soldiers, and Joyeuse above all, came to the battlefield as to a wedding, decked in splendid costumes and glittering with jewels. Strong contrast to the sordid warfare of our own day. The blood-stained and miry ground was covered with the fairest objects that the art of the weaver and the goldsmith could produce. The Duke of Joyeuse was shot after he had offered to surrender. This barbarous act badly tarnished the glory of the victors. Navarre showed his accustomed humanity in stopping, so far as he could, the slaughter of the fleeing enemy and dismissed all prisoners without ransom. He was of course wholly guiltless of the murder of Joyeuse. Such was the day of Coutras. In spite of the overwhelming victory the military advantage to the victors was slight. Indirectly, the political results were momentous for France.

Meantime the German auxiliaries had assembled at Sarrebourg, at the end of August, and their entry into Lorraine only helped to increase the passions of the League in Paris. Contrary to the King's hope, no fighting of consequence took place in Lorraine and the strangers advanced into the heart of France. Their general von Dohna, with the *reiters*, took up his headquarters at Auneau, near Chartres. The Huguenots were commanded by the Prince of Conti, a young man, whose lack of experience did not improve their prospects. Guise fell upon Auneau, November 24, at dawn: the surprise was complete. All within were killed or captured with the exception of von Dohna himself, who, with a handful of *reiters* and Huguenot cavalry, cut his way out. The Swiss in the Huguenot pay deserted the same day.[2] The victory of Coutras was more than neutralised. The wretched German mercenaries, whose escape was cut off to the north, were hunted across France, easterly, right through the difficult country of the Vivarais. They accepted the offer of Henry III. to return home in safety and never again to enter France under arms. They crossed into Franche Comté to regain Alsace; the Duke

[1] There were killed, besides Joyeuse, St. Sauveur his brother, the Counts of Luze, Aubijoux, Graffot, Bellegarde, St. Suplice, Tiercelin, Tillac, la Bastide, captain of the guard. Prisoners: St. Luc, Montigny, Cypierre, de Sansac, de Mareuil, Rochefort, Villegomblain (our authority), Montsoreau, and the Marquis of Marguelé. De Laverdin, Joyeuse's lieutenant, the Baron of Lux, and the Marquis of Villaine escaped with a few others.

[2] Dr. Segesser draws attention to the ill-will which was always prevalent between the Swiss and German mercenaries. See *ante*.

of Guise and the Marquis of Pont à Mousson [1] were after them. The Lorraine princes refused to observe the conditions of the King, when outside the French border, and all Franche Comté was strewn with the wreck of the German forces. The Lorrainers even invaded Montbéliard, which depended on the Duke of Württemberg, and for long ravaged the country with fire and sword.[2] The atrocities committed by the Lorraine princes are terrible to read, but it took the heart out of the German Protestants for a long time, and more than avenged the invasion of Lorraine. In truth, throughout the perennial fighting along the north-east border of France, whether in religious or other warfare, French, German, and Lorrainer have an equally bad record. Henry III.'s efforts to outbid the League had woefully failed, and the credit of the Guises amongst the Catholics never stood higher. *Saul has killed thousands but David tens of thousands*, said the fanatics. There was some truth in this.

[1] One of the Lorraine princes, son of Claude, daughter of Henry II. and the Duke of Lorraine.

[2] Segesser, vol. iii., pp. 270, 271. Davila, vol. i., pp. 549 *seq.* *Mémoires de St. Auban*, 61. 40-100.

CHAPTER III

THE TRIUMPH OF THE LEAGUE

THE DAY OF BARRICADES AND FLIGHT OF HENRY III

We must now retrace our steps a little to consider the form of the League before following its fortunes as it reached its zenith. The League was now a democratic organisation of a sort, and such an organisation could only have had its origin in Paris. Municipal independence, ever since the day of Etienne Marcel, had been dear to the hearts of Parisians, in which they were very likely right.[1] Where they did wrong was their pretence, in the sixteenth century as in the nineteenth, to give the law to the whole of France. There was strong discontent with the King and his extravagant administration, and above all Paris was fiercely Catholic. The five chiefs of the quarters, Compans, Crucé, La Chapelle Marteau, Le Clerc, and Louchart joined to themselves eleven others, so that every *arrondissement* had now its captain. Drouart, a barrister, Rolland of the mint, Michel, *procureur au parlement*, Michelet, sergeant at the Châtelet, La Bruyère, the *lieutenant particulier*, Louchard, an auctioneer, Le Leu, a process server, Senaut, clerk of the register, Paccart, a tin worker, Gilbert, a butcher, and Ameline. These with the original five constituted the famous *Sixteen*. Behind them and equally powerful with the citizens were the Churchmen, Prévôt, Boucher, de Launoy, Hamilton, Lincestre, and Santeuil. A *gentilhomme*, M. de Mayneville, was agent and intermediary of the Duke of Guise and afterwards of Mayenne. It is clear that here was a heap of rascality to be masters of the largest town of Europe. Mayneville was the sole *gentilhomme* and he was not one of the *Sixteen*. La Chapelle Marteau and La Bruyère were

[1] *Mémoires de la Ligue*, vol. ii., pp. 270 *seq.*

the only men, apart from the curés, of any position; the rest were insignificant, many of them the very lowest of the people. The number of lawyers in the League was remarkable. Every revolution likes to have them, for they are useful to give an air of respectability to its acts.

Early in 1588 the noble chiefs of the League were at Soissons. Henry forbade their entry into Paris; he was alive to that danger, but seemed to ignore the other peril under his very windows. Moreo, a Spanish agent, came to Soissons in April and offered Guise, in Philip's name, 7000 men and 300,000 écus, a definite help which he could not obtain elsewhere. Philip further proposed to withdraw his ambassador from the Court and accredit him to the League. Guise agreed, this was the first clearly treasonable act on the part of the Lorrainers. Henry made a show of offering an alliance to Spain, but he had already undertaken to give help to Elizabeth in the case of invasion. The whole Catholic world was on tip-toe of expectation at the preparations for the Armada, which seemed to them sure to realise their fondest hopes. As a matter of fact the Armada had not the most remote chance of success from the day of its sailing, but it has pleased Protestant tradition to regard its defeat as something miraculous. The *Sixteen* approached Guise and gave him proofs of the very strong forces which they could muster in Paris. It must not be supposed that Guise felt altogether easy at committing himself to the *canaille* of Paris. He did not, and such formed no part of his original scheme; but he saw the possibilities of the new move and trusted, not without reason, to his capacity for controlling the mob and maintaining some sort of order. At Nancy, the Lorraine princes had drawn up a request, or rather had presented a demand, to the King, requiring him to associate more closely with the League; to get rid of various officials whose names were given; to publish all the decrees of Trent, and to establish the inquisition (Spanish). It was a nice programme, the acceptance or refusal of which was equally dangerous to the King. Henry hovered between the counsels of his mother, who hated Louis de La Valette, and those of La Valette himself. Epernon was in fact disliked by most of the Court, for, unlike the pleasant and liberal Joyeuse, he was grasping and overbearing. Epernon's counsels were, however, the safer way, for it was

now too late for the milder measures which Catherine always preferred. Epernon was literally smothered in honours. Already Governor of the Boulonnais, Metz, and Provence, he was now given the government of the Angoumois, Saintonge, and the province of Normandy, as well as the post of Admiral of France. These measures only caused a maximum of irritation to the League and a minimum of advantage to the King, for Henry did not act on Epernon's energetic proposals. From this time dates the special aversion felt by the League for Epernon. Jean Louis de Nogaret de La Valette was a Gascon *gentilhomme* and first owed his high position to his youthful good looks which attracted the King. He soon showed ability and determination combined with an all-devouring ambition. He became the ablest and most formidable opponent of the League and he will occupy one of the chief places in the future course of this history. In character he was cold and selfish, a formal Catholic, and apart from Henry himself no one seems to have liked him. His ambitions fortunately coincided on the whole with the interests of France. He served Henry III. faithfully and also his successor. Henry IV., however, disliked him intensely and would not have employed him except for necessity. Epernon died at the great age of 89. His brother, Bernard de La Valette, also a faithful servant and soldier of Henry III., was a different and pleasant character.

In April, some kind of plot to seize Paris, in which both Aumâle and Guise were concerned, was discovered by Poulain and frustrated by the guard which was set by Epernon. The favourite left for his government, Normandy, soon after in accordance with a plan arranged between himself and Henry. Normandy acted as a base of communication with England through Dieppe, which was anti-Leaguer throughout. At the same time Henry brought up the Royal Guards into the suburbs and the Swiss into the city; simultaneously he sent Pomponne de Bellièvre to the Guises to forbid their entry to Paris. Catherine's perspicacity had left her in her old age, for she told Bellièvre not to deliver the King's message in all its acerbity, apparently still hoping for a reconciliation. Between the two Bellièvre was puzzled, but he was so accustomed to follow the orders of the Queen Mother that he delivered the order in a form which

encouraged the Duke to persevere, and he entered Paris by a side route. Henry now took a decided step, and sent the *grand master*, La Guiche, to utterly forbid the Duke's entrance. Guise entered by the Porte St. Martin, May 9, and never met La Guiche.

When Guise was recognised the masses received him with delirious joy and he was lodged in Catherine's own apartments. The extraordinary enthusiasm and, to all seeming, affection which Guise inspired is one of the most curious features of the time; even his bitterest opponents, the Huguenots, felt some kind of fascination. It is difficult to account for this. Guise was a tall and handsome man and, like all of good birth, showed unfailing courtesy to those with whom he came into contact; but at heart he was mortally cold, without enthusiasms as without beliefs, and wholly devoid of the true *bonhomie* which appeals to the normal Frenchman. The three Henrys were on about the same level morally, and their different charms were alike mainly superficial. Henry heard with fury the news of the Duke's arrival and saying that he should die for it refused to see him. Therefore his mother, now fully realising the danger, took Guise as it were under her protection to the Louvre. The tragedy of Blois was nearly anticipated by seven months. The King almost resolved to have the Duke murdered, in which he was vigorously supported by Alphonse d'Ornano and an Italian priest, strange recommendation for a Churchman, but he would not resort to violence in his mother's presence and the chancellor and Bellièvre were both against it. '*I forbade you to come*,' said the King to Guise. The Duke replied that he had only come to demand justice from his enemies. Was he thinking of Epernon? It was more probably from the necessity of saying something plausible. He further said that he would not have ventured if he had received express commands to the contrary. Henry turned furiously on Bellièvre, and said that if he had not given his orders to the Duke he would find his head in danger. Even Guise's courage failed and he turned pale and sat down abruptly, forgetful of the King's presence and of everything except his own danger. Catherine managed to draw her son apart, but we do not know, though we can guess, what she said to him, and Guise, seizing the opportunity so afforded, retired from the

royal presence. The next day he called with a strong bodyguard and was fairly well received, but on May 11 Henry gave him a very cold reception.

Henry had in fact decided to occupy the most important points of the city with his troops and then and there make an end of the League. How far the King's plans went is not a matter of certainty, but the following measures were taken the same evening.[1] The *surintendant* d'O was in charge of the arrangements but did not hold the military command. The French and Swiss guards numbered some 6,000. Of these some were posted at the Louvre; some at the Porte St. Honoré; the bulk of Gallati's Swiss were at the Innocents; Biron had a regiment in the Ile de la Cité, which commanded the Pont St. Michel and a bridge called the Petit Pont. D'O himself was stationed before the Hôtel de Ville. The French guards took charge of the Bastille, instead of the veterans who usually mounted guard, and the artillery of the state prison was trained on the Rue St. Antoine. It was a comprehensive scheme of defence, but the weak spot in d'O's plan lay in the disposition at the Petit Châtelet. This was in charge of the city companies of the *Prévôt des Marchands*, who were considered reliable, but at heart they were Leaguers. The *Grand Prévôt*, an old and feeble man, was left at the Châtelet. His was a position of rank and prestige, but the charge of the police of Paris at that date was actually in the hands of the Prévôt's *lieutenant général*. Poulain, in his reputed character of Leaguer, though able to reveal plots, could not, except at the risk of his life, attempt any active demonstration in Henry's favour.

All these preparations naturally caused a sensation and the citizens began to get uneasy: they murmured especially against the introduction of the Swiss. People left their ordinary callings and procured arms furnished by the *Sixteen*, and began to draw chains across the streets and to throw up barricades at the more commanding points. These preparations show a more military mind in the background than that of any ordinary

[1] Excellent account in Segesser, vol. iii., pp. 313-340. *Mémoires de Cheverny*, pp. 103-112. Edition Petitot, Paris, 1823, Vol. 36 of the series, *Mémoires relatifs à l'histoire de la France*. *Mémoires de la Ligue*, vol. iii., p. 316. Estoile, vol. iii., pp. 135-147. *Histoire très véritable de ce qui est advenu en la ville de Paris du 7 May au 30 Juin*, by one of the *échevins*, probably St. Yon.

citizen. Feeling themselves safer as the barricades rose, the populace began to abuse the royal guards and especially the Swiss, threatening to cut them in pieces. During the earlier part of the *Day of Barricades* Henry was in far the better position ; but partly through weakness and partly from a real wish to avoid bloodshed in the capital, he allowed his advantage to be wasted. Biron, Aumont, and Captain Crillon were sent to withdraw the troops towards the Louvre, but a collision had already occurred in the Marché Neuf between the Leaguers and the Swiss. Ornano and d'O attempted to retire them by the Pont Notre Dame, but the Swiss were set upon with weapons and missiles flung from the roofs of the houses. Several were killed and the remainder crying *miséricorde* and even *Vive Guise* were disarmed by de Brissac. D'O and Ornano brought through the French guards in safety to the Parvis Notre Dame but at some risk to themselves ; they admitted that never before had they felt so much afraid. The Swiss in the city showed a very poor spirit in contrast to those at the Louvre. That was the danger of mercenaries. When taken off ground with which they are familiar and exposed in a strange place to warfare wholly foreign to their drill and traditions, their courage is likely to evaporate. In this case matters were complicated by religion : the royal Swiss were mainly Catholics and they hardly felt at ease in opposing the people of the largest Catholic town in the world. It is impossible to regard the Swiss as cowards, all their history proves the contrary, but the Swiss mercenaries have from time to time suffered from this sort of demoralisation. In fact the whole system was unsatisfactory and remained a blot on Swiss institutions until our own times. Of course there are many examples of exceptional bravery and devotion shown by the Swiss troops, as in 1567 and 1793. The rest of the soldiers at the Place de la Grève and at the Innocents were in equal danger, but Guise himself saved these. Throughout the day he was a moderating influence. He was probably amused and pleased at his complete control over the mob as he walked about unarmed except for a riding whip. It was truly remarkable ; a Paris mob is not easily managed. The people, stirred up by de Brissac, in the quarter of the University erected barricades in the Place Maubert, where La Rivière, one of the most truculent Leaguers, cried out

to them to hasten to the Louvre and seize the person of the King. In the evening the Chevalier d'Aumale, a man with an evil reputation, went to extricate d'O and Ornano from the crowd by which they were beset in the Parvis Notre Dame. It was well for their safety that he did so; for d'O was specially hated by the populace, partly for his habits and his extortions, and partly because they suspected him of being responsible for the display of force. Ornano, a rough-and-ready soldier, was less disliked. Against Crillon there was no less animosity than that felt for the *Surintendant*, for *le brave Crillon*[1] was a swashbuckler, insolent beyond the bravos of the time, and had insulted the Parisians and their women in the foulest of terms that very morning. All night the tempest raged in the city without, however, any actual attack on the Louvre taking place; but Paris was entirely closed, all the gates except the Porte St. Honoré being in the hands of the Leaguers. At that time the *Prévôt des Marchands*, de Perreuse,[2] and the *échevins* came to Henry and explained to him the situation, the danger of massacre and destruction of property, unless he did something to appease the people. Henry promised to withdraw his guards to seven leagues from Paris. Meantime the Porte St. Honoré was lost, for de Meru, whom the King sent, was refused passage by the citizens on guard there, and at the same time Guise admitted to Catherine, who implored his aid, that he was no longer able to control the mob. Barricades were being thrown up against the Louvre, and de Brissac, reinforced by the University men, was on the point of attacking the palace. Guise refused to go to the Louvre and see the King, as was not perhaps surprising.

Whilst his mother was detaining the Duke in conversation, Henry decided to flee from Paris by the Porte du Louvre, the only exit now left, which he accomplished in safety, taking with him d'O, Montpensier, Biron, Cheverny, Villeroy, Brulart, the Cardinal of Senoncourt, Poulain and a few others, with some guards and Gallati's Swiss, about 4000 all told. He went by St. Cloud, where, looking back at the city, he swore never to

[1] Louis Balbe de Berton. *Uomo feroce e ardito e per molte cagioni nemico di Guisa.* Davila, vol. i., p. 631. He was born at Murs in the Comtat Venaissin and died at Avignon. He took part in all the fighting of the time, including Lepanto, and began his military career at the taking of Calais.

[2] *Auquel la peur faisoit faire tout ce qu'on vouloit,* Estoile, vol. iii., p. 110.

re-enter it except as conqueror, and passed on to Chartres next day, where he was well received by the folk.[1] He was destined never again to enter his capital.

On May 20 he was joined by Epernon. Thus the King of the first country of Europe was hunted from his capital and reduced henceforth to the condition of being little more than King of Touraine. *Miserable condition*, wrote Estoile, *indeed for a King in which to be ; but worse in the long run for the usurper on whom the just vengeance of God was to fall as the sequel of the tragedy.* The success of May 12 launched the League on its triumphal course, and it remained the real master of France, excepting such places as were occupied by the royal forces, until Henry IV.'s reconciliation.

Two days later the Bastille surrendered and Le Clerc was installed there as Leaguer governor. On the same day Sir Edward Stafford, the English ambassador, who was there to offer Elizabeth's help and condolences to Henry III., replied with courageous words to the Duke of Guise, who had offered him protection since Henry had gone, to the effect that since he was in Paris for his mistress's business with a King between whom and his Sovereign there existed alliance and friendship he would accept no other protection than that afforded by Henry III. The *Prévôt des Marchands* was arrested and lodged in the Bastille, to some extent for his own safety, for the mob would have torn him to pieces, albeit a most harmless and perfectly useless person. Guise told the Queen Mother that if she wished for his release it should be done ; but if she desired his safety, M. de Perreuse would be far better off in the Bastille than in his own house. Some time later, when people's spirits were less excited, the *Prévôt des Marchands* was released. In his place was elected Pierre Clausse, seigneur de Marchaumont, to whom Elizabeth had given the sword for knighting Sir Francis Drake on the *Golden Hind* at Deptford. He refused to have anything to do with a Leaguer

[1] Henry showed his annoyance at the supposed Leaguer sympathies of the town by keeping de Gauville, *lieutenant au bailliage*, on his knees in the mud whilst reading the town's address of welcome. There is a curious story of a fire said to have been started by order of the King in a house adjoining the lodgings of Guise. This latter episode belongs to the time of Henry's second visit to Chartres. *Histoire manuscrite de Chartres*, by Souchet, a canon. Bib. du Chapitre. Quoted by Eudel du Gord in his *Fragments Historiques*, p. 371, Paris, Firmin Didot. See Document Q.

provostship, and the notorious La Chapelle Marteau accepted the office. Guise also visited the Palais de Justice, the day after the King's flight, and saw the *premier président* and the other *présidents* of the *Grand' Chambre* and urged them to continue their functions and recognise the change which had been brought about. In other words, to serve the League and abjure their allegiance to the King of France. It was then that Achille de Harlay, the *premier président*, anti-Leaguer but fervent Catholic, gave his oft-quoted reply, '*My conscience is bound to God: my services are at the disposal of my King, and my life, it seems, is in the hands of evil men.*' Guise, himself a man of remarkable courage, was abashed, and is said to have afterwards declared that in all the dangerous positions in which he had been he had never seen courage to equal that man's. Andrew Lang says truly of another country, Scotland, but it is equally applicable to the France of the League—'*Rare are good men, few and far between are the good deeds, there is not one that doeth good.*' So it is worth while to pause a little over such a shining example of virtue. We shall not meet with half a dozen in the course of this history.

During the *Day of Barricades* there were present two strong and opposing influences, the Count of Brissac, who was prepared to go to any length, and Guise who was not. It is difficult to explain the Duke's attitude. He was now sufficiently a rebel to incur the King's undying enmity and yet he had practically allowed his escape. Did he count on Henry being so crushed and so helpless that he would consent to any terms that might be offered him? Or did Guise refrain from capturing the King out of regard for the Queen Mother with whom he was in frequent communication? Probably the latter is the truer explanation, coupled with the fact that Guise shrunk from the bloodshed and scandal which must have resulted in the event of an attack on the Louvre. An assassination or two troubled the Duke not a whit, but to wholesale bloodshed he was not inclined.

Meanwhile at Chartres Henry III. was considering the situation which was not reassuring. He sent an explanation of past events and a justification of his conduct to the provincial governors and towns as well as to the chief Sovereigns. To Philip he complained of the activity shown by Mendoza in treasonable doings;

so Elizabeth was not the only one to complain. The Leaguer *président*, Neuilly, attempted to spread the rebellion at Chartres, and an extraordinary and meaningless play of the Passion of Our Lord was performed by some Capuchin friars. This disgusted the Bishop de Thou, uncle of the historian, and many others who were present and did not much impress Henry himself. On May 24 Mayneville arrived with the proposals of the nobles and city of Paris for negotiation with the King on the following basis. To deprive Epernon and d'O of all their offices, to take the field against the Huguenots of Guyenne whilst Mayenne fought them in Dauphiné, and to return himself to Paris. Henry partly complied. He dismissed Epernon from the government of Normandy and transferred it to Montpensier, and Bernard de La Valette was sent to the admiralty, leaving Epernon to enjoy his other offices. The King further ordered the Estates General to meet at Blois in September and engaged himself to abide by their decisions. Guise had got possession of Meaux and Melun, two of the keys of Paris, and the Cardinal of Guise had seized Troyes in the Leaguer interest; but neither the Guises nor Paris were included in the King's compromise. Amongst the towns of the north there was but little hope for the King. The Duke of Nevers kept Amiens and Abbeville in some sort of obedience, but he admitted how wholly unreliable they were, and of the rest only St. Quentin, Calais, and Boulogne were anti-Leaguer. On the other hand, Tours and Lyons both asked the King to establish himself within their walls, but Henry preferred to try Normandy. Accordingly, in June, he arrived at Rouen, an almost wholly Leaguer town, and was fairly well received. Dieppe and Caen were royalist, but for some reason, probably owing to their distance from Touraine, Henry did not visit the second town of Normandy. At this point Henry in appearance gave way completely to the League and sent Villeroy to Paris to offer to Guise the lieutenancy general of the kingdom. A treaty was published at Rouen, known as the *Edict of Union* (mid-July). Henry agreed to all the propositions of the League as well as binding himself and his subjects never to obey any heretic prince, declared rebels all towns and individuals who would not sign the League, and engaged himself to crush without peace or armistice all the forces of heresy. The

sole thing which he refused was to return to Paris, instead of which he went back to Chartres. There he gave a friendly reception to the Duke of Guise, to the Leaguer *Prévôt des Marchands* and the *échevins*, and even to the Cardinal of Bourbon. Mayneville was admitted to the Council of State, and to Nemours was given the government of Lyons, a town which, it will be remembered, had loyally offered itself to the King only a few weeks previously. Henry actually ordered the local authorities at Angoulême to prevent Epernon's entry to the town. Thus did the King clothe his enemies with power and his friends with confusion. The mayor of Angoulême brought in some soldiers of the League and fell upon Epernon's guard, but Epernon was not the man to let himself be easily overcome. His lieutenant brought help from Saintes and for over a day and a night the Duke maintained a desperate resistance. Finally, on the approach of the troops of the King of Navarre the town thought better of it, and decided to leave Epernon in possession of his governorship. Epernon had long been in correspondence with Navarre, although he hesitated to definitely ally himself with the Huguenots. Bernard de La Valette in Dauphiné had no hesitation and allied himself with Lesdiguières, Navarre's lieutenant-general, against de Vins and the Provençal Leaguers. Thus the two Valettes in the face of open discouragement from Henry III. made a stand for the crown which was to have far-reaching results.

It is important to separate Henry's policy in May and June from his policy after the destruction of the Armada; but never, as I suppose, was he genuine in his profession of devotion to the League. It was impossible after the insult of the barricades, but until the Armada had gone to the bottom the menace of Spain seemed nearer than the help of England. At the news of its loss Henry could hardly conceal his joy and even Paris was full of bitter squibs on the collapse of the *Armée d'Hespagne qu'on appeloit l'Invincible*. Even before this event Henry was planning the overthrow of the League and the destruction of the Guise influence. He certainly had no definite ideas of their murder at Blois or at any other place, such matters are never arranged long in advance, but the correspondence of the Duke of Nevers to the Cardinal of Bourbon is significant in which he warns him that, *il n'y a de l'apparence à cela*, *i.e.* the reconciliation to the

League, and, *il faudra bientôt que le Roy traitte les Catholiques comme ses plus grands ennemis.* Nevers does what he can to warn the Cardinal, but clearly says that he must not expect that he himself will do anything but work for the King. Still more plainly, he quoted the Pope as grieving over the danger in which the Cardinal may soon be. *Que je crains que ce pauvre homme n'ouvre les yeux que quand il sera tombé dans le précipice et ne se repente lors que sa repentance ne sera plus de saison.* This is almost prophetic and is based on Nevers' knowledge and put into the mouth of Sixtus to give a hint to the Cardinal. Similarly, Nevers constantly urged on Henry III. energy in France, reliance on Elizabeth, and above all clear speaking in Rome. *La politique est la seule science qui a cours. Si vous estiez le plus fort vous seriez le plus saint et le plus catholique ; si vous ne cessez d'envoyer des demandeurs et des supplians vous y aurez moins de crédit que les hérétiques mesmes.* Elizabeth sent Thomas Bodley on a special mission to the King with offers of help which he received gratefully, but said that he had so much encouragement from faithful subjects that he doubted not but that he would be able to punish his enemies. The regular ambassador's (Stafford) despatches likewise make it impossible to think that Henry was other than set upon the ruin of the League. In August, the King took another step which has been regarded as a further concession to the League, but which was in reality a measure against it. Five ministers, the chancellor, three secretaries of state, and one *conseiller*, were dismissed.[1] These had been much trusted by the Queen Mother and were fairly reliable, but could not be trusted to break seriously with the League. In their place were put François de Montholon as chancellor, an excellent man, and Revol and Rusé Beaulieu secretaries of state. These, it is said, on the advice of Epernon.

[1] Villeroy and Bellièvre amongst the secretaries.

The chief allegations against Villeroy were : 1. That he had too much credit and authority. 2. He opened letters and packets without the King being present, and wrote letters and instructions to the governors of provinces on his own responsibility. 3. He revealed many state secrets to the League. *Mémoires*, Villeroy, pp. 91-93.

Mémoires, Cheverny, p. 114. His explanation of his dismissal and of Montholon's appointment is not clear. He seems to record only the current version of the reasons for dismissal and appears to be keeping back the inner causes of the change. In the same way (p. 92) he mentions his justification of the Edict of Nemours, which we should much like to know, but does not give it.

Two events may be more conveniently followed at this point, though slightly out of their chronological order, for both reacted on the King's prospects during the second Estates of Blois. One was the affair of Saluzzo, the other the general assembly of the Huguenots at La Rochelle.

Charles Emmanuel had since his accession designs upon the Marquisate of Saluzzo,[1] one of the few abiding gains of the French crown as the result of the Italian wars. The Duke of Savoy had inherited his father's, Philibert Emmanuel, scheme of policy as well as his ability and vigour. In appearance he was weak and puny, as is not uncommon amongst the Savoys; but he also possessed their insatiable ambition, an indomitable spirit, and unwearying energy in the battlefield and in the chase. He offered his services to Guise, but in return required the cession of Provence and Dauphiné as well as the Marquisate. The dismemberment of France formed no part of the plan of the Lorrainers and Guise refused. Nor were the Savoyard's efforts to come to an understanding with Henry III. any more successful. Suddenly, at the end of October, 1588, the Duke attacked Carmagnola, the chief town of the Marquisate. It made little or no resistance, either owing to the treachery of its commandant, La Hitte, or to its lack of supplies. La Hitte was certainly badly placed: he was between the Huguenot danger of Lesdiguières and the Leaguer danger of Mayenne. Four hundred cannon fell into the hands of the Savoyards and within a few days nothing remained of the French possessions beyond the Alps. The *noblesse* and military caste were much upset at this disgraceful loss and Louis d'Angennes said that it was necessary to give up all internal hostilities to concentrate on an attack on Savoy. Even the arch-Leaguer de Brissac thought it well to give approval to this advice. This seemed in favour of Henry and likely to distract the attention of Frenchmen in general from the League to a foreign war, and indeed it is a proof of the bitterness of the religious divisions that this idea of a war did not attract the country to an extent which such a scheme usually did. It brought little profit to Henry. He himself could not be made to forget his

[1] Henry in 1574 had by treaty given up Pinerolo to the Duke of Savoy, an act which whetted the Savoyard appetite. This is regarded as Henry's initial mistake. On the other hand, Pinerolo and for that matter Saluzzo belong geographically to Piedmont.

loss and sent an ultimatum to Charles Emmanuel in December, but by that time the possibility of a foreign war was gone.

The General Assembly at La Rochelle in November was made necessary by the confusion and discontent into which the events of the past year had thrown the Huguenots. By the death of Condé in the previous spring at St. Jean d'Angely they had sustained a great loss. He died very mysteriously and suddenly. Of course any sudden death aroused suspicion in those days and medical science was, in our sense, unborn. There was talk of poison, and one or two of the prince's entourage were executed on the charge of being employed by his wife, one of the Trémouilles, to poison him. She was actually confined for some time. The suspicion seems absurd; her ways were not to be wholly praised, and Condé was an extremely jealous husband, but for her to resort to such measures seems a crime out of all proportion to the object to be gained. Condé was a great loss, whole-hearted in his religion and detesting all vices, a rare feature amongst the great of that day, brave and devoted to his party. He was not, however, without ambitions of a very high order, and would very possibly have sought to usurp Navarre's place as the latter cooled on the matter of religion.

The King of Navarre presided over the Assembly. It demanded freedom of worship, a national council, and the restoration of all goods confiscated by the Edicts. The religious aspect of the Assembly was secondary to its political. Navarre himself was unpleasantly surprised at the anti-monarchical tendencies. The federalist spirit was no less manifest in the Huguenot Assembly than in the Leaguer Estates.[1] Ultramontanism and extreme Calvinism seemed to be alike in their political reaction and lent themselves equally well to decentralisation. This Henry of Navarre feared every bit as much as Henry of France. The Béarnais was no democrat. Furthermore, it was plain that his tolerant and indifferent spirit was giving offence to the zealous Huguenots and that his intentions with regard to Rome were beginning to be suspect. Henry accepted

[1] Both Huguenots and Leaguers stood for something other than the traditional royal authority. France had attained national unity early in the history of nations and in some sort this sentiment was incarnate in the person of the King. The opposition of Leaguers and Huguenots to this ideal is a very real but general reason for the failure of both.

and possibly proposed the idea of a council of twelve without whose advice he would not act. This council was to consist of six deputies elected yearly from the provinces where the Huguenot interest was strong. That is, the two Languedocs, not that there were many in Upper Languedoc, Guyenne, Dauphiné, Poitou, Saintonge, and La Rochelle; five were to be chosen by the biennial General Assembly, and the other member was to be the King's chancellor. Montmorency, the head of the United Catholics, *royaux*, was invited to form a similar but mixed council of the two religions. These proposals were agreed and carried out with vigour. This Huguenot demonstration of force considerably neutralised the diversion caused by the question of Saluzzo.

The King, the Court, and the Guises arrived at Blois in September, but the opening of the Estates was put off until the arrival of the Count of Soissons, who had left Navarre to attach himself to the King of France. The preliminary business began on the 15th, but it was not until October 9 that the *Séance Royale* took place. The League here attained its greatest power and at that level it continued, though it sustained two great blows in the near future, until the battle of Ivry.

CHAPTER IV

THE SCHISM OF THE PARLEMENTS

FROM THE SECOND ESTATES OF BLOIS TO THE MURDER OF HENRY III.

In this chapter we deal with two dramatic events; but its more important task will be to explain the hopeless disintegration of France in all departments of the administration caused by the action of the League, which I call the *Schism of the Parlements*.

The second Estates of Blois, owing largely to their tragical ending, have a place in history to which they are hardly entitled.[1] Their proceedings are of far less interest than those of 1560-61 or 1576 in respect of the development of French institutions. They were a clearly rebel body which drove the unfortunate King from one position to another until he turned savagely on the authors of his troubles. The claims advanced were solely in the interest of one party and that not of a truly popular, still less democratic, nature. Let us not forget that the *Tiers* did not represent the people; there was no rural representation in it, and it was literally a *bourgeois* body almost in our modern socialists' sense. At these Estates the *Tiers*, far from being a moderating influence as in 1576, were frantic for most extreme measures against the heretics, including Navarre and the highest nobles. On the contrary, the *Noblesse* would not press the case against the King of Navarre and the Montmorency cousins notwithstanding that only two of importance, Louis d'Angennes and Beauvais Nangis could be styled *Politiques*. Still, to proceed against Montmorency, the head of the United

[1] Journal of Nevers during the sitting. Also for the contradictory advice of Catherine, the princes, lords, and chiefs of the council as to whether Henry should make war on the Reformed or come to terms with them. *Mémoires*, Nevers, vol. i., pp. 179-290.

Catholics, as a heretic, was too outrageous a measure even for many Leaguers.

The *Clergy* were well represented at the opening *séance*, 134; for the *Noblesse* 104, and for the *Tiers* 190. These last were largely composed of lawyers of varying status and municipal officials. The Cardinal of Guise was elected spokesman for the *Clergy*, the Count of Brissac, of barricade fame, for the *Noblesse*, and La Chapelle Marteau for the *Tiers*. Each of these names was a complete programme in itself. There were some contested elections to be first cleared up and we can imagine what sort of freedom of vote there existed in Paris and in the larger Leaguer towns.

It was resolved to begin by asking the King for three measures. 1. To suspend the recent increase in taxation. 2. To refuse the renewal of the lease for the *Gabelle*. 3. To cease creating new offices. Some of these sound strangely modern to our ears. The *Clergy* then proposed to renew the request to the King to republish the *Edict of Union*, so that this sworn to by the Three Orders should be regarded as a fundamental law. The *Tiers* eagerly agreed, the *Noblesse*, we may suppose that the obvious democracy of the League was beginning to make them think, hung back. Henry agreed to the three proposals but utterly rejected the *Oath of Union*; finally that matter was referred to the *Séance Royale* for October 26. At that sitting the Duke of Montpensier, the Count of Soissons, and the Cardinal of Vendôme sat on the lilies, but their presence on such an occasion can only be regarded as a triumph for the League rather than as support to the King. Henry spoke shortly and after him Montholon, who laid stress on the good intentions of His Majesty and his firm resolve to abolish financial abuses. The speeches of the Archbishop of Bourges, de Sennecy, a Burgundian *gentilhomme*, and La Chapelle Marteau followed for these respective Estates. The spokesman of the Order was not necessarily the member who orated. The King's reply was full of dignity. He admitted many faults in the administration which would be improved and declared his known hostility to heresy. Turning to another subject, the indignity of the barricades was boiling in his mind, he spoke of his sadly diminished authority and added that the religious troubles of the kingdom would have been composed had it not been for the measureless ambition of some of his

subjects. Finally, he called upon the Estates to help him loyally in reforms in his kingdom and household; saying that they would be responsible before God and the country if they did not trust him and further his intentions to the utmost of their power. It was a reasonable and well-balanced speech, but the Estates were bent on discord not on harmony. The Guises were far from pleased, as parts of the King's speech seemed to be aimed at them. The Cardinal in particular was so annoyed that he roused up the *Clergy* to complain, and the Archbishop of Lyons was deputed to remonstrate with the King. Henry, protesting that he meant no ill, withdrew the obnoxious passages. He farther proposed to add to the two *fundamental laws* a third, the protection of the people sworn to in his oath. This was to clear up the situation caused by the King's expression, *all other fundamental laws concerning his authority and the obedience due to him.* The Edict of Union, in spite of the hitch caused by the *Noblesse*, was ultimately voted by the Three Orders. The *Noblesse*, ignoring the protest of the *Tiers*, somewhat secured their position by tacking to the oath the sentence; *without any derogation of the rights and immunities of the Order.* The Three Orders got to work on their *cahiers* when the *Tiers* asked this question, should the Orders proceed by supplication or by resolution? This conundrum was voted to be an abstract matter by the privileged Orders and it was thought better to await developments. The *Clergy* induced the two other Orders to ask Henry to declare Navarre guilty of *lèse-majesté* and consequently liable to confiscation of property. Henry objected on a point of order, and by the intervention of the *Noblesse* the matter was reserved for the *cahier général.* At the end of October the affair of Saluzzo intervened to cause a considerable diversion, as has already been described. The financial debates of November were even more violent and Henry was driven from concession to concession. The *Tiers* were bent on the reduction of taxation, although d'O pointed out that 27 millions was the minimum cost at which the government could be carried on, and even resolved to depart from Blois if the reductions, those set out at the earlier *séance*, were not allowed by the King. The *Clergy* and *Noblesse* agreed, provided that the prospects of war against the heretics were not jeopardised. Even Guise found this attitude of the

Tiers to be over-strong: all his plans would be shipwrecked if the Estates were dissolved without any conclusion being formed. However, he would have failed to have brought them to reason had not Henry yielded and given up eight millions of taxation, of which three millions concerned the *Taille*. The Orders next attacked the treasurers and the Court functionaries. They demanded a list of the state councillors so that they could cut out the names of those who were not agreeable to them. The King tried every expedient but in vain.

On December 9, the question of the condemnation of the King of Navarre was again brought up: Henry would not hear of it until Navarre had again been summoned to adhere to the Oath of Union and renounce his religion. The *Clergy* maintained that Navarre was a relapsed heretic, as was known to all, and that any further summons was unnecessary. This resolution was conveyed to the King by the Archbishop of Embrun and twelve deputies of each Order. This was, we suppose, the last straw. The attitude of the Guises became more and more menacing and intolerable, and there was little doubt but that it was intended to finish the work begun at the barricades, and to reduce Henry III. to complete impotence.

News of this kind was sent to Henry by Epernon with elaborations, such that Guise intended to have himself made Constable by the Estates. Many thought that these secrets were divulged by the Duke's relations and even by the Duke of Mayenne and the Duchess of Aumâle; but others consider that the revelations, though probably true enough in the main, were inventions of Henry's council to impress his danger on the King and to urge him to strike while there was time. If so, they succeeded. Doubtless, the possibility of ridding himself of the Duke by violent means had been present to the King's mind since May, but it was only lately that it had recurred with increasing force until it became a fixed idea. Just as Catherine and her favourite son had been possessed with the idea that Huguenotism was incarnate in Coligny and without him would disappear, so now Henry's possession was the idea that the League was incarnate in Guise and his brother the Cardinal and could not survive their end. Both had an element of truth but were in practice unfounded assumptions. Even now, alone, he might possibly have shrunk

from it, but there were present in his entourage many men of determination. All we know for certain is that the plan took a definite form on December 18. On that day, Henry asked Rambouillet, brother of Angennes, Beauvais Nangis, and Marshal d'Aumont to concert some plan to save him. They asked for time, and returned with Maintenon, Louis d'Angennes, who had been so anxious to avenge the attack of the Duke of Savoy, Alphonse Ornano, and the secretary Revol. The possibility of arresting and trying the Duke of Guise for treason was dismissed as impracticable, as indeed it was, and most of them were in favour of assassination. It was necessary, however, to find others to actually perform the murder. These were Larchant, captain of the guard, Entragues, late Leaguer governor of Orléans, the Entragues were famous for being in every scandalous affair, St. Maline, Montséry of the *quarante cinq*, and Loignac, *gentilhomme* of the bed-chamber. Crillon is said to have refused to take part, but as a matter of fact he performed the negative though important act of cutting Guise off from his retinue on the outside staircase of the castle. Guise was told that the King would receive him early the next day, ostensibly to give way to the demands about Navarre. The Duke could hardly have been unaware of his danger and many warnings came to him, and several attempts were made to prevent him from visiting the King. His last night was spent with Madame de Noirmoûtier, a famous beauty, and she implored him once more to take care. It is unnecessary to repeat the oft-told story in all its dramatic details ; they are familiar to all and especially to those who have visited Blois, where the scene of the tragedy remains unaltered. On December 23 Guise was murdered in the narrow passage leading to the King's *cabinet neuf*, whither he had been summoned : the Duke was entirely unarmed and there were twenty armed men between him and Henry.[1] Guise was stabbed by

[1] Miron's *rélation* is as good as any account of it. St. Maline's blow was probably fatal ; Miron gives the name of the Duke's last assailant as Sarriac and introduces another des Effranats, about neither of whom is much known. It is not important.

There is a little known account of the tragedy in *Raccolta d'alcune scritture pubblicati in Francia nel principio degli ultimi moti di quel regno.* It is dedicated to Marcantonio Martinengo, and printed by Comin Ventura at Bergamo, 1593. The author speaks of fulfilling a promise to relate the death of the Guises and states that his story is *trasferendolo dal latino e cosi come giace da Iansonio Dovomense Frigio nel suo noncio c'ha fatto delle cose avvenute in Francia e nella*

Montséry and St. Maline, and perhaps Loignac dealt the final blow. He fell dead at the foot of the King's bed, he had such vitality that he dragged himself and his assailants into the room, without saying more than: '*My God, I am dead, have pity on me.*' Thus perished Henry of Guise at the age of thirty-eight, one of the most remarkable figures of his time, who has become a kind of legendary figure in romantic history. His character and aims have been, it is hoped, made fairly clear in these pages, and the worthy Estoile regarded his end as the just judgment of God. He was one of the worst, but certainly not one of the basest, of the men who throve in intrigue, lived on strife, and perished in blood. As for the King, his own folly and duplicity had brought him into a net the meshes of which no ordinary measures could break, and perhaps in the case of a rebel so undoubted and so powerful his assassination may be regarded as a justifiable execution.[1] It may be urged that such an argument would justify the death of Mary Queen of Scots, but it is not so. She was a crowned sovereign, responsible to no one on earth, whereas the Duke of Guise was merely a rebellious subject. Some of the murderers were actuated only by personal hatred of the Duke, but some, at any rate of the contrivers, d'Aumont, d'Angennes and Ornano, were faithful and honourable soldiers.

Henry went down to his mother's room and cheerfully told her what had been done. Catherine was horrified, less probably at the crime than because her quick intelligence told her of the disastrous results which might ensue to her son. Her

Belgica e in altre parti dell'Europa ancora. It is full of detail, even to the tapestry on the walls. There are the usual discrepancies as to those who were consulted before the deed and their views. Guise is represented as falling to a general onset of all the *homicidarii*. The writer is wrong in supposing Brulart to have been the secretary who was in the King's confidence. It is written from a strongly Leaguer standpoint. *Cosi quel fiore e colonna de Catholici di Francia nell'istessa camera del re fu ammazzato.* It is probable that the Duke never reached the *cabinet neuf* but was killed in the passage; about that two different stories are told. Very little is known of the author, but he is no doubt identical with 'M. Jansonii Mercurius Gallo-Belgicus sive rerum in Gallia, Belgio, etc. ab anno 1588 usque ad septembrem anni 1592 gestarum nuncius.' Colon. Agripp. ap. G. Kempenfern. 'Nuncius' has here nothing to do with 'envoy'. Simply, the Mercury or Newsletter of Jansen. They were published in Latin in France as they came out and Comin bound them together in three parts. The copy which is here quoted is in the Royal Library at Windsor.

[1] On the subject of this murder and that of Henry III. and similar cases, there is a large quantity of opinions of casuists and philosophers. Many of them are very clearly discussed by Lord Acton in his introduction to Burd's *Machiavelli*.

mind rallied, although she was very ill and had indeed only a few more days of life. She told Henry to make sure of Blois, Orléans and any other town possible, to seize Mayenne, and to write to Pisani, the French ambassador at the Vatican. All which things and many others Henry did, but the attempt to capture Mayenne was in vain.[1] Henry also sent the news to Nevers,[2] and a former *Prévôt des Marchands* was sent with explanations to Paris, a dangerous mission. Epinac and the Cardinal of Guise, who were sitting in the council room, had heard the commotion overhead and realised its significance. They attempted to go to the rescue but were arrested by d'Aumont. The *Grand Prévôt*, Richelieu, with the archers went to the Hôtel de Ville where the *Tiers* were sitting and ordered the arrest of the *président* Neuilly, Campans and Leroy, as well as that of La Chapelle Marteau. Brissac was taken into custody and Bois Dauphin, another hero of the barricades. The more distinguished Leaguers were made prisoners in the castle by Entragues and Larchant ; the Prince of Joinville, a boy, now Duke of Guise, the Duke of Elbœuf, the Duke of Nemours, the mother of Nemours, and most important of all, from his nominal headship of the League, the Cardinal of Bourbon. Many other Leaguers, bishops, nobles and members of the *Tiers*, managed to escape before the town gates were closed. There remained the question of the prisoners' fate. The Cardinal of Guise had no chance, but it was not so easy to find men willing to kill him. Those who made nothing of the murder of Guise shrank from the sacrilege of killing his brother. They were religious men of a kind. On the 24th the Cardinal was hacked to pieces by some of the French guards.[3] All the rest were spared, and several sooner or later regained their liberty. Epinac was in danger for a time, but Henry relented, partly at the intercession of the Archbishop's nephew, the Baron of Lux. Henry then ordered the trembling Estates to complete

[1] See Documents A and H.

[2] Nevers was at the siege of La Garnache at the time. Before the arrival of Henry's letter the Duke received notice 'in an unknown hand' of the Guises' murder, so that he might be ready for emergencies. Nevers knew more about it than would appear. *Mémoires*, vol. i., p. 681. The anonymous correspondent was the secretary Revol. Henry's feebleness after the events at Blois is criticised by Nevers.

[3] See Documents B and R.

their *cahier général*, but they were too terrified to do more than draw up a few phrases which might please the King. The leadership of the *Tiers* fell to Etienne Bernard of the *parlement* of Dijon, a moderate and distinguished leader, under whose guidance confidence reappeared since the disappearance of the fanatical Chapelle Marteau. No more business was done and the Estates were dissolved on January 16. Many of the deputies returned to their towns, where they worked actively in the cause of the League.

On January 9 Catherine died. The emotions of the time had been too much for her feeble health. She, like Guise, is a legendary figure. All sorts of marvels and crimes have been woven round her life, and she suffered from the unpopularity of all Italians. In reality she was a cold passionless woman, whose interests lay wholly in her children's welfare. Catherine had no objection to other people's vices but was herself devoid of them, and cruelty was foreign to her nature. Towards the end of her life her mental powers failed, but throughout her prime she worked for the benefit of France in two ways; internally, to diminish the evils caused by the wars of religion, externally, to cripple the Habsburg power. Her aims were to a great extent those which were followed by Henry IV., and brought to a more perfect realisation by Richelieu. She is the central and in many ways the most interesting figure of three reigns.[1] If Henry had now adopted the course which he took in the following April the history of France might have been altered. He seems to have been deceived by the submissive attitude of all around him and even of Paris, which feared for the safety of its deputies at Blois. He tried a conciliatory manner and released Bois Dauphin and de Brissac, but he kept prisoners Neuilly and La Chapelle Marteau.

A frenzied outburst of rage and grief swept through Paris on the confirmation of the rumours of the death of the two brothers, which continued to increase as the day went by. The wildest scenes of disorder and fanaticism took place, curious in themselves, but described at length by Estoile and familiar to all. De Harlay and several *conseillers* were lodged in the Bastille, and the sight of these magistrates being marched in their robes through the streets to prison must have impressed

[1] Catherine de Medici, *Quarterly Review*, April, 1911, by E. Armstrong.

all the onlookers with the utter collapse of the King's authority. In his place was installed Bernabé Brisson as *premier président* of the Leaguer *parlement*, who, although he found the acts and rebellion of the League to be contrary to his conscience, yet from fear of his life accepted the office, thereby prolonging his days for just two years. At the same time he drew up a solemn protest that he had been constrained by force and had it duly witnessed by notaries. On January 20 the herald, Auvergne, came from the King bringing command to all the courts and to the *Prévôt de Paris* and the royal officials to no longer exercise any jurisdiction but to come out and join His Majesty. It was a courageous act on the part of the herald and his life was in danger, but he was dismissed in safety with insults to himself and his master. This was a formal declaration of war on the League which speedily replied. The Sorbonne freed the people from all obedience to Henry III., caused his name to be omitted from the offices of the Church, and declared that it was lawful to take up arms against him as a tyrant. This was the pronouncement of the highest theological authority in France. The University and its quarter was the most fanatical of all Paris. The extraordinary series of processions now began. Children and young girls, men and women in the bitter cold, clad only in their chemises or shirts and bare-footed, paraded the streets led by their curés and accompanied by members of the courts and others who should have had more sense. These all carried torches and at intervals the lights were dashed to the ground to the chant of '*So may God quench the race of Valois*'. In all these vagaries Madame de Montpensier was the leader and inspirer. She had now, of course, the grief for her murdered brothers; but her Leaguer fanaticism was older than that and she had quite separated herself from her husband.

Mayenne and the male leaders of the League were less foolishly occupied. He left his government, Burgundy, in mid-January, and was received with acclamation at Reims, Troyes, Vitry, Chaumont and Sens; but Langres under its energetic mayor and bishop refused the League. It became the one and only royalist stronghold, for it is naturally a very strong place, of any importance in eastern France, though Châlons and St. Ménehould, places of minor importance, were on the King's side.

D'Aumont was unable to keep Orléans from the League, for he was afraid of being isolated there by Mayenne, whose near approach spread consternation at Blois. Undoubtedly he could have forced the town, but made sure of Chartres instead and thence re-entered Paris, February 12, where important work was to be done. Charles de Lorraine was henceforward the head of the League and soon to be lieutenant general of the realm of France. His leadership was less successful than that of his late brother, although in his time the League attained its greatest power. Heavy in mind and body, he possessed none of Guise's power of fascination and he had misgivings as to his sister's sanity. He wholly hated democracy and the rule of the mob; he was very uneasy under the tutelage of Spain, which prevented him from ensuring the victory of the League when that was possible; he grew to loathe the *Sixteen*, and his morals, for the head of the ardent Catholic party, were deplorable. He was a fair soldier, a man of courage, haughty and violent in temper, apt at intrigue, self-seeking, wholly false, but no active deeds of cruelty can be imputed to him and he was not without sympathy for the sufferings of the country folk. He was eminently the *Solvent of the League*:[1] Mr. Armstrong's words as the epitome of his career cannot be improved. On February 16, Mayenne, Nemours, Chaligny, Aumale and other eminent Leaguers with representatives of the courts and bodies of Paris and the *Sixteen* met in the Hôtel de Ville to consider the formation of a general council of union, which should include representatives of every order in the city, and finally it was decided to form a council of *Forty*. This was composed of Mayenne himself president; three bishops, Senlis, Brézé, and Meaux; seven *gentilshommes*; twenty-two burghers, including Neuilly, who was prisoner at Amboise; La Bruyère; Crucé; five curés, St. Benôit, St. André des Arts, St. Séverin, St. Jacques la Boucherie, St. Nicolas des Champs, and the Canon Launoy, all of whom we have heard before. Senault was appointed secretary and so great was his credit amongst the masses that he wielded an authority out of all proportion to his status or merits. Mayenne was not so pleased with this arrangement as he was expected to be, and to balance

[1] *French Wars of Religion*, E. Armstrong. *Correspondance de Mayenne*, MS. at Reims, privately printed 1860, very important.

the too democratic nature of this council he added fourteen others, amongst them Jeannin, a *président* of the *parlement* of Dijon, a really distinguished and moderate man, and Hennequin, the fanatical Bishop of Rennes, as well as the Villeroys, who were now in the service of the League. Mayenne departed for Rouen, where we will leave him for the present to turn to the administrative revolution caused by the League in the provinces of France.

It is convenient to take Dauphiné and Guyenne first because, thanks to the loyalty of their governors, the League got but little hold in either. In Bordeaux the Leaguers were a not inconsiderable party and they managed to seize St. Julien, but Matignon fell upon them and put them to flight. He expelled the most factious from Bordeaux and the Jesuits. It is strange to see that prejudice at work in all countries. In France the Society was unpopular with the curés and the University of Paris, Gallicans all, and Frenchmen are always suspicious of anything which originates outside France. Matignon, as one of the United Catholics, was certainly Gallican and his outlook was secular. The towns of Agen, Blaye, and Périgueux, always strongly Catholic, escaped him. Blaye in particular was to be a constant source of danger to the royalists in the future, for it was a fortified town on the Gironde below Bordeaux. The province of Guyenne suffered much, but later in time, from Spanish machinations and the help that Philip sent to the Leaguers there. Matignon and his son, the Count of La Roche, were two of the most consistently loyal supporters of Henry III. and his successor. Similarly, in Dauphiné, the presence of the Huguenot soldier Lesdiguières and La Valette the royal governor, aided by Ornano, prevented anything but minor disturbances.[1] In Provence it was otherwise.[2]

[1] There was some trouble at Grenoble. In May 1589, the Leaguer partisans Fontclaire d'Auriac and others seized on the town and drove out Ornano. The secretary Fresne Forget then went into Dauphiné to arrange a meeting before Ornano and Lesdiguières, who agreed to help one another with their respective troops. Shortly afterwards Fontclaire was injured at the capture of Moviac and killed by order of Ornano. Albigny, a cadet of the house of Gordes, then took charge of Grenoble for the League, but in the following year the townsfolk, who were never Leaguer in sympathy, arranged a surrender. Lesdiguières accorded them a good capitulation and the town was occupied by the arquebusiers of Gouvernet 'de la Religion,' Baron and afterwards Marquis of Oraison. Grenoble gave no more trouble. *Histoire de Lesdiguières*, by L. Videl, the Constable's secretary. Paris, P. Rocolet, 1638, pp. 84-106 *seq.*

[2] For details as to the later history of the League in Provence, see *The Last Phase of the League in Provence*, by myself, Longmans Green, 1911.

For various reasons the League was exceptionally vigorous in that province, partly owing to the ultra-Catholicity of the folk, partly owing to the latent resentment which the Provençals felt at their subjugation to Paris, and partly owing to the popularity, greater than elsewhere, of the Leaguer *Noblesse* who favoured local interests. Immediately after the tragedy of Blois, Provence threw over all allegiance to Henry III. and the *parlement* declared for the League. This was an unique case, for though most *parlements* became Leaguer in the course of a month or two, it was always owing to external pressure. Pertuis, Manosque, Toulon, and Brignoles were the only places of any size which remained royalist. The activities of de Vins had alarmed La Valette nearly six months previously and he now attempted, with indifferent results, to cope with the rebellion. Miramas and Beurre he secured but let Aix slip from his control whilst on a sort of tour of inspection in the province. Before the actual explosion he saw clearly how matters were going and had begun to make Pertuis the royalist centre by attracting thither what small loyal elements were to be found in the courts and amongst the officials. It was in the previous June that de Vins took possession of Aix by a *coup de main* with special enthusiasm amongst the youth of the town : here he was joined by the Count of Carcès, de Bézaudun, and the Countess of Sault. These with de Meyragues were the all-important Provençal Leaguers.[1] In October La Valette approached Aix and on the way his troops did a good deal of destruction. This was a fatal mistake and made many Leaguers, for La Valette's troops were composed of 'foreigners,' *i.e.* not Provençals with a good sprinkling of Huguenots, and they should have been on their best behaviour if they did not wish to create further trouble. On March 3 Mayenne wrote to the *parlement* to encourage it in its good resolution, adding that this resolution (to adhere to the League) was followed by nearly all Christendom, which was a mere figure of speech. It is interesting to notice that he ascribed his part in the League as mainly due to the vengeance owing to his brothers, *tuez inhumenement pour la seule cause de la relligion.*[2] Neither plea can possibly be accepted, but the events at Blois increased his

[1] Hubert de Garde : Jean de Pontevès : Chrétienne Deguerre : Claude de Alagonia. [2] See Document S

Leaguer zeal. In April two letters came into Provence, one from the King to La Valette proclaiming rebels and guilty of *lèse-majesté* all those who remained in the Leaguer towns and requiring all loyal subjects to repair to Pertuis for justice; the other from the *parlement* of Paris to that of Aix requesting all the magistrates to sign the Act of Union. In May the Royalist fraction of the *parlement* and other officials, legal and financial, were transferred to Manosque. Pertuis was too near Aix to be wholly safe. In June La Valette began an extensive campaign by taking Forcalquier and afterwards Montjustin, which was sacked and burned. Beaumont and other places surrendered to him. La Valette, now reinforced by the Marquis of Oraison, the leader of the few local Huguenots, attacked Hyères, for the surrender of which he had to wait until he could bring up his heavy guns. The subsequent entry of the Duke of Savoy changed the whole situation and belongs to a later period.[1]

In Burgundy, the news of the death of the two Guises at first made little stir and the *parlement* received Henry's letter of explanation very well;[2] so that at a solemn *séance* it was resolved to maintain the King's authority in the province. There were strong Leaguer elements in the *Chambre de la Ville*, the municipal body, and the situation changed immediately after Mayenne's arrival. He was at Lyons at the time of his brothers' murders and escaped the efforts of Ornano to detain him. He hurried to Chalon, where he was admitted to the citadel by Madame de Lux,[3] who was in charge during the absence of her husband at Blois. Early in 1589 Mayenne entered Dijon and *brought with him the ruin of the country*. Many notables who were suspected by the League were put in prison, and the castle was entrusted to a certain Franchesse,[4] devoted to the Lorraine interest. In that capacity he remained until the town was surrendered to Henry IV., and he and his guards materially helped to overawe the inhabitants. Mayenne made no long stay;

[1] See Document T. [2] See Document C.

[3] Her husband, Edmond de Mâlain, Baron de Lux, was one of the chief Leaguers in Burgundy.

[4] This man, long supposed to have been an Italian captain, was Jean de Boyault, Seigneur de Franchesse in the Bourbonnais. M. Drouot in his *Notes sur la Ligue en Bourgogne* has proved this fact beyond a doubt. His *L'Affaire La Verne*, and *Reddition de la Ville et du Château de Dijon* are likewise important for understanding the collapse of the League in Burgundy.

he left as his lieutenant in Burgundy the Baron of Fervaques ;[1] he was succeeded, in April, by de Montigny, who in turn was superseded by the Baron of Sennecy,[1] who remained in office until May, 1592. The last of these captured Ornano and took him to Auxonne, but released him for 40,000 écus ransom. It was Fervaques who organised the rebellion. In Dijon as elsewhere there was a *Conseil*, a secret body which represented the *Holy Union*, as the League called itself ; these local *Conseils* were the counterpart of the Paris *Forty*. They naturally varied in composition. That of Dijon was rather aristocratic and contained some distinguished names. Denis Brullard *premier président*, the Abbot of Cîteaux, the Dean of the Sainte Chapelle, de Montmoyen, de Villepêle, and Etienne Bernard whom we have seen at Blois. Those who were not of sufficient rank for the *Conseil* got elected as *échevins* and, as usual, these aimed at reviving the old municipal independence. It was the policy of the League to make much of the town authorities as a set-off to the latent royalism of the supreme court. The *Chambre de la Ville* organised a system of espionage and all who were at all suspect of *politique* tendencies were liable to some persecution. Towards the end of January de Fervaques entered the Palais, and seating himself at the bureau gave an address to the effect that he now represented Mayenne and desired his commission to be duly recognised by the court. He protested that he had no aims other than the service of His Majesty and his duty to Mayenne, the Duke was still the legitimate governor of the province, and the preserving of order and tranquillity. Henry, who was not sure that with a little care he would not be able to attract Mayenne to his side, made no sign ; but in February he issued letters patent to declare Mayenne and Aumale guilty of *lèse-majesté*. Fervaques returned to the Palais on March 22 with a different story. In spite of his intention to carry out the objects as related, he saw that the town had a threatening appearance and that there was danger of bloodshed, which he had so far prevented, therefore he had brought certain articles of union which the municipality had wished to see. All the same, as they were not quite to his taste, he had modified them in a most harmless manner and would leave them on the bureau,

[1] Guillaume de Hautemer, later Count of Grançay. Claude de Baffremont.

and he hoped that the court would find them to be agreeable.[1] The next day he came again to press for the immediate signing of the articles and for swearing to the union: the articles amounted to a repudiation of Henry III. and the recognition of Mayenne and the League alone. From timidity in most cases rather than from inclination the magistrates swore to observe their terms. The royalist fraction under the *président* Fremyot, a loyal and single-minded man, withdrew to Flavigny, which with Semur and St. Jean de Losne were the only places of any size which remained royalist. After this Henry issued letters patent to forbid the *parlement* of Dijon to exercise any functions and to require all loyal subjects to betake themselves to Flavigny for the purposes of justice.[2] Thus the schism of the *parlements* was as complete in Burgundy as in Provence. For those who lived in Dijon or Flavigny the schism was no great evil, but for the inhabitants of the villages the situation was most unpleasant. If they resorted to Dijon they were liable to be treated as traitors if caught by any of the royal officials, if they slipped away to Flavigny they were liable to persecution by the Leaguers. This was probably the best alternative, for the League was far more potent here than the King and you incurred less unpleasant penalties by annoying the League than by running the risk of high treason.

In Languedoc the excitement after the events at Blois was more intense than elsewhere in the provinces, that is to say in Upper Languedoc. In Lower Languedoc Montmorency had control, and the chief towns, Montauban, Montpellier, Nîmes, and Alais were Huguenot. At Toulouse scenes of terror and bloodshed were enacted; in these the town authorities, as ever, were the most fanatic. Toulouse was always an extreme Catholic centre and had in the past given, as it was in the future to give, manifest signs of its intolerance. The arrival of the Bishop of Comminges and the deputies of the *Tiers* of Toulouse from Blois, combined with the decision of the Sorbonne, served to increase the popular frenzy (January 25). The *Capitouls* (Mayor and Corporation) renounced their allegiance to Henry and removed his portrait from the *Capitole* (Town Hall). The *Avocat Général*, Daffis, complained of this as seditious and

[1] See Document D. [2] See Document E.

requested the *parlement* for a ruling. Opinion was much divided, but the *premier président* made every effort to maintain the royal authority. It was to no purpose. The mob, composed of various elements, including, it is deplorable to have to record, several religious and seculars, would not wait to hear the decision. They invaded the Palais and captured the *premier président*, Duranti, and after a short delay Daffis, who had temporarily saved himself. These were shut up in the priory of the Jacobins (Dominicans) and many others, real or suspected *Politiques*, were arrested. On February 10 the furious mob, but no Churchmen was amongst them, broke into the priory and murdered Duranti and Daffis on the spot. To add to the outrage the body of the *président* was hung on the gallows and at his side the King's portrait. It was a horrible crime and shows the lack of sense so often manifest in a crowd. Duranti was a man of honesty, a good scholar, and very popular with the people before he showed his loyalty, for he was a zealous, even an extreme, Catholic and a bitter persecutor of the heretics. The Bishop of Comminges was then made governor of the town *voce populi* and did not seem to have been ashamed of it. Albi, Narbonne, Castelnaudary and the other chief towns were secured for the League; the few royalist members of the *parlement* and some other officials betook themselves to Carcassonne.

In Normandy no such terrible scenes took place. Mayenne made full use of his opportunity at Rouen and the *parlement*, though by no means anxious as a whole to do so, accepted the League. Rouen was, however, shortly to become one of the most fervid of Leaguer cities. Henry declared the *parlement* to be transferred to Caen, which with Alençon practically alone maintained the King's authority in Normandy. In Lower Normandy, some time before, a formidable *Jacquerie* had broken out. This was a peasant movement directed quite as much against the seignorial rights as against the King; but it was skilfully worked up by the agitators to take on a purely Leaguer form in the course of a short time.

In the *ressort* of Paris, except Touraine, matters were almost hopeless from the first. On March 12, Henry III. summoned the artillery, the *ban et arrière ban* of the *Noblesse* and every person of whatsoever degree who was loyal to him to repair to Tours,

and thither were transferred the *parlement* of Paris, the *Chambres des Comptes*, the *Cour des Aides*, and the whole administrative machinery. He did not find his following any too numerous, but the *Noblesse* began to arrive and Epernon sent a large force of soldiers. D'Aumont took some of these and drove de Brissac out of the town of Angers; the castle had been holding out all the time. The chief towns of the Loire were therefore secured for the King. Elsewhere there was nothing left in the whole *ressort* of Paris excepting only Boulogne, Calais, and Compiègne, and Clermont in Auvergne. All the great cities of Champagne, Picardy, Ponthieu, Brie, Auvergne, of the Orléannais and the Bourbonnais were solid for the League. It is true that Henry of Navarre was active in Poitou: he surprised Châtellerault, Niort, Argenton, and Thouars, but for the moment, that is the early spring of 1589, this can only indirectly be said to have been in Henry III.'s interest, however probable the alliance between the two Kings had become.

We must turn to Brittany. Here, Mercœur, a timid but ambitious and self-seeking man wholly in his wife's pocket, devoid of his cousin's gifts, had decided to act against the King from whom he had received countless favours. His wife, a descendant by the Penthièvres of the old Dukes of Brittany, had urged him to this. The aims then of Mercœur were separatist, but he served well enough for the purposes of the arch-Leaguer Bishop Hennequin and the religious elements, always very strong in Brittany. But Rennes the capital, in spite of its Bishop, did not continue on these lines. When the *parlement* received the letters patent in which Mercœur was proclaimed guilty of *lèse-majesté*, it drew the townsfolk to the royal side with the help of the local *Noblesse* and recalled the royal governor. Thereupon the Leaguer elements withdrew to Nantes, where they maintained a rival *parlement* to the very end of the League. Between these two towns incessant but unimportant hostilities were maintained. Brest, extremely important for its strategic position and its naval and military stores, and Vitré also remained for the King, but Dol, Dinan, St. Malo, and the rest were lost. The revolt in Brittany, as to a less marked extent in Provence, had a character apart from the League elsewhere. It was largely a real separatist movement based on the desire for local autonomy,

a recollection of the not very distant time of the province's independence. The exactions of the central government were more resented in Brittany than in France strictly so called. The Bretons, owing to their race and speech and the isolation of their country, naturally more pronounced three hundred years ago than to-day, have always remained a people apart. In a mild way, we may compare the history of Cornwall to that of Brittany in respect of their relations with the rest of England and France.

In the case of a civil war, a writer is usually expected to draw conclusions from the geographical and political divisions of a country. That has been a favourite, if somewhat unprofitable, occupation in the case of our own civil war of the next century. In fact, in France, the sympathies of the whole country were Leaguer and the isolated exceptions prove little beyond the fact that an individual governor was loyal and strong, as in the case of Bordeaux, or popular, so that the folk would follow him, as in the case of Vitré. That equally applies to England. The towns of the Loire do form a fairly solid block which seems a geographical exception ; again we have a parallel in the eastern counties of England solid for the Parliament. In the case of the Loire, we must remember that that country was the favourite residence of the Court, and the interests of the countryside were in favour of maintaining the royal connection with Touraine. Moreover, such power as Henry III. had was concentrated in that district and a rising was not a very easy thing. As a matter of fact, Tours itself contained a good many cryptic Leaguers ; but the great political strength of the League certainly lay north of the Loire.

It is an exaggeration to say that Henry III., after January, 1589, was only King of Blois, he had many other resources; at the same time the larger half of the kingdom had completely slipped from his control. The royalists and Huguenots were insensibly but necessarily drawing together.

Du Plessis de Mornay and Rosny came to Tours and on April 3 a provisional treaty to last a year was concluded between the two Kings. It was agreed that Navarre's army should be employed at Henry III.'s command and liberty of worship allowed wherever Navarre passed ; at the same time he was to respect the Catholic religion. The fall of Vendôme hastened Henry's

resolution and Sixtus V. was causing him trouble. The murder of the Duke of Guise caused no particular difficulty, but the death of the Cardinal was another matter and the Pope refused absolution. Epernon entered Blois and on the same day, April 21, Saumur was given to Navarre as one of the cautionary towns agreed on in the Treaty. Epernon's army was spread along the Loire from Saumur to Beaugency, when that part of it under the command of the Count of Brienne was attacked by Mayenne near Amboise. Navarre came to the rescue and crossed the Loire, whereupon Mayenne fell back on Vendôme. Henry of Navarre took up his quarters at St. Symphorien, the suburb of Tours on the south bank of the Loire. Henry III. issued a fresh declaration against Mayenne and the chief Leaguer towns. Then he sent a message to Navarre to come and see him at Plessis les Tours; this was in answer to the Béarnais' own proposal for an interview at St. Symphorien. It was clearly better so. The King of France could hardly be expected to go to Navarre's headquarters and St. Symphorien was moreover exposed to sudden raids and none too safe. Still, the King of Navarre had to make a momentous decision; to deliver himself practically alone at Plessis into the hands of a man to whom honesty was unknown seemed a great risk to many of the Huguenots and probably to himself. On the other hand, it was a great chance for securing his position and his cause and Navarre was not a man to shrink from danger. Still there was some delay; finally, largely, it is related, owing to the insistence of Châtillon, the Admiral's son, the Béarnais crossed the river and went to meet the King of France, who was walking in the park of Plessis. The crowd was so dense that it was some time before a way could be cleared for the two Kings. Navarre seemed much moved; he fell on his knees before the King of France weeping copiously, he had a great facility for tears, and Henry III., with a grace which rarely failed him, raised him up and the two passed into the castle amidst the cries of *Vive le Roi, Vivent les Rois.* Complete harmony existed henceforth between the two and their respective armies. It was a dramatic but wholly natural *dénouement.* The Béarnais had never been keen on fighting the King of France on principle and still more from interest. Everyone knew now that he was the future King of France. The

League was the common enemy of the two Henries and with their united strength its end was very near. The last Valois always intended the first Bourbon to succeed as a matter of legitimism ; from his own principles as well as in Henry of Navarre's interest he would have preferred him to have returned to Catholicism, as was inevitable in the long run.

Navarre afterwards went towards Chinon to assemble his troops and a few days later Henry III. incurred a great danger when he went to inspect the positions at St. Symphorien. The troops of the League under the Chevalier d'Aumâle were lying in wait just beyond the suburb and the King was actually walking into their lines when he was stopped by a peasant who recognised Henry by his violet coat. He had just time to draw back when the enemy furiously attacked the suburb and drove the royalists on to the bridge over the Loire. D'Aumale, as was his wont, committed every imaginable and some hardly to be believed atrocities at St. Symphorien. In this action St. Maline was killed, and his head sent as a special trophy to Paris. Henry of Navarre arrived the next day and the danger was over. Mayenne did not press the attack on Tours itself ; he was discouraged at there being no Leaguer rising within the city, which he had expected and which Henry had feared. It was for this reason that he had not brought forward the Swiss to defend St. Symphorien against Aumâle's attack. Henry III. that day recovered the skill and courage which he had shown in the field in his earlier days, and his energy through the rest of the campaign was remarkable. It was the effect of having made a decision. Now that he was committed to common action with Navarre the time had gone for the feeble attempts at compromise with the League which this book has largely been occupied in tracing. The King of Navarre went up the Valley of the Loire and the King of France turned towards Poitou, but he was disappointed in his hope of entering Poitiers, where the people unexpectedly rallied to the League, and he was obliged to return to Tours, May 17. About a month earlier, Montpensier had attacked the armed peasant bands in Normandy, of which mention has been made, near Falaise, and had practically exterminated them.

The setback which Henry had experienced in Poitou was more than balanced by the battle of Senlis. This place was held for

the King by Thoré (Montmorency) and was attacked by Aumâle and Mayneville. The garrison was being hard-pressed when the Duke of Longueville's army arrived from Compiègne strengthened by various Huguenot parties under the brave and chivalrous La Noue, who was placed in command of the whole. The Duke of Longueville nobly waived his rank in favour of the more experienced Huguenot officer. Montluc de Balagny, son of the well-known royalist Bishop of Valence, led the Leaguers. The royal cannon caused dismay in the rebel ranks; they appear to have thought that Longueville's army was deficient in this arm, and at the critical moment the garrison made a sortie. Caught between two hostile forces the Leaguers were routed. The Parisian levies made a very poor show, but Mayneville died bravely at his battery. Balagny fled to Paris and likewise Aumale, the royalists captured all the guns and military stores and much other booty. Longueville's army advanced towards Vincennes. Almost immediately after Châteaudun was surprised by Châtillon; there the Leaguers resisted desperately and the majority of them were killed in the street fighting. As a set-off to these successes Alençon and Montereau were lost to Mayenne.

Meantime, the Vatican had been keeping a close watch on the affairs of France, and Sixtus' inclination to absolve Henry III. varied in inverse proportion to the success of the League. Paris had become the political barometer for Rome. The Pope required the release of the Cardinal of Bourbon and Epinac as a proof of Henry's contrition for the murder of the Cardinal of Guise, but this was exactly what Henry would not promise; he was quite willing to write formally to His Holiness for the absolution. Mayenne's activities were naturally on the other side and the Pope formed a wrong estimate of the relative strength of the League and the weakness of the King. The attitude of Spain was doubtful. Philip had paused after the events of December and the total dispersal of his fleet, which had been followed up by the continual and successful depredations of the English corsairs, but Mayenne's requests for assistance were so pressing and his offers so lavish that Philip agreed to give him a subsidy. Herein lay the weakness of the League. To obtain any final success the League was bound to an intimate alliance with Spain, or rather to the acceptance of Spanish control. This idea was

very irksome to Mayenne, who desired Spain's help but did not intend that she should reap the advantages, and not only to Mayenne but also to the nobles of the League. Whole-hearted acceptance of Spanish help, which Philip not unnaturally coupled with Spanish control, was only possible to mere adventurers or to the religious enthusiasts of Paris and the Leaguer towns. To the military caste Spain was the enemy; amongst the folk the traditional hostility to England took the first place, even though the countries had long been at peace. It is interesting to notice that previous to the Armada a very similar situation existed in England. The Court and the upper classes had French leanings, but the merchant class and below, from prejudice and tradition, were anti-French and from commercial interests were inclined to a Spanish (Habsburg-Burgundian) connection. This old sentiment had not been seriously shaken by the events of Mary's reign, for Philip had not been unpopular in England, and it again became pronounced early in the next century. The English aristocracy were cultivated and travelled, but the people were almost incredibly ignorant of anything outside the boundaries of England. Their anti-Scottish prejudice was every bit as strong as their anti-French. The same facts apply to France, where the people, always amongst the most stay-at-home and in a very real sense insular, were no more free from ignorance and prejudice than their neighbours across the Channel.

As Henry III. increased in prestige and shook off his lethargy there was a noticeable reaction : the military caste began to draw towards him, for their traditions were all in favour of loyalty to the Crown and their religious enthusiasm was limited. The unwarlike and feeble nature of the Court and the foolish persons who had surrounded the King had largely accounted for their Leaguer proclivities in the previous years. On May 24, Sixtus issued a monitory to summon Henry to appear before him within sixty days under penalty of excommunication. This monitory, whilst it fanned the zeal of Paris and probably prepared certain persons for the action of Jacques Clément, did not directly help the League. On the contrary, it worked in favour of Henry III., for the *Noblesse* were politically Gallicans and anti-Italian from racial antipathy. Sixtus was right in taking a serious view of

the murder of a Cardinal but did not, of course, expect the King to appear personally. So too, Henry, with the best intentions, could not release a man who, however inoffensive personally, was the centre of a rebellion and pretended to his throne.

The two Kings advanced on Paris and by the time they had closed on the city had an excellent army of nearly 40,000 men. Against this the League had nothing in any way comparable. On Orléans they wasted no time, but took Gargeau and Etampes, where the Leaguer commanders were hanged. Poissy was taken, and Pontoise on July 25; in this last place the League made a stout resistance and the King of Navarre obtained for the garrison an honourable capitulation. From policy, no less than from his natural temper, the King of Navarre was more inclined to mercy towards the rebels than Henry III., who now seemed inclined to treat the Leaguers with severity, and against none was his animosity so intense as it was to Madame de Montpensier, whom he threatened to have burned. The bridge of St. Cloud was forced on July 30, and all was ready for the assault on Paris. The King of France had his headquarters at St. Cloud and Henry of Navarre at Meudon.

The assault was fixed for August 2 and, so far as can be seen, must have succeeded, for Mayenne had no troops capable of standing for a moment against the royal army; but the course of events was altered by the crime of a single man. On the last day of July Jacques Clément, a Dominican friar, arrived at St. Cloud with a letter of recommendation from the Count of Brienne, now a prisoner in Paris, and passport signed by the *président* de Harlay. The first was genuine and had been given to Clément by Epernon's brother-in-law, who was convinced that the friar was, as he professed, a disguised royalist who had important news for the King relative to a plan of the *Politiques* to open one of the city gates at the moment of the attack; the second paper was a forgery. This elaborate scheme shows that Clément was manipulated by the chiefs of the League. Certainly Catherine de Montpensier, who had good reason to fear Henry's arrival in Paris, was active in the scheme and Mayenne was probably privy to it. Clément himself was a fanatic and quite ready for so desperate a deed. There is no reason to believe

the nasty stories told with reference to the friar and the Duchess. The officials at Henry's headquarters, including the *procureur général* La Guesle,[1] were satisfied with the friar's papers. Whilst Henry was apart talking to Clément, the friar suddenly drew a dagger and plunged it into the King's stomach. Henry pulled the weapon out and struck his assailant in the face, and at the same time Clément was knocked down by the *procureur général.* At that instant, on hearing the alarm, the guards rushed in and despatched Clément, in spite of La Guesle crying loudly that he was not to be killed. It was thought that the wound would not prove fatal, and news to that effect was sent to all concerned. Henry received Navarre, who had come over in haste, very affectionately, and required, as a measure of precaution, the army to recognise his successor and take in his presence the oath of allegiance.[2] This was done and Navarre left the royal presence to inspect the positions and reassure the army. In the evening the King became rapidly worse and inflammation set in; as nearly always in those days the medical science was unequal to coping with an internal wound. Henry III. died in the early hours of August 2, almost at the time previously ordered by him for the assault, aged thirty-eight, and with him ended the second royal house of France. He was buried at Compiègne, for St. Denis was in the hands of the League. Henry was perhaps fortunate in his death, for after a reign which had seen and partly caused endless miseries to France, of which the end was yet distant, the last few months of his life showed his rehabilitation as a King, and he was near to achieving national unity. On the other hand, who can say for how long the accord between the

[1] Sieur de Chaux; he was an Auvergnat.

[2] Cheverny states that Henry III. obtained a promise from Navarre to become a Catholic as soon as possible. This is not the view of de Thou and Cayet. More valuable is the account of Charles de Valois who was with the King up to the end. He states that the King advised Navarre to change his religion but does not record any answer. He was sixteen at the time. *Mémoires du duc d'Angoulême.* Edition Petitot, pp. 522-535.

Charles de Valois, Count of Auvergne and afterwards Duke of Angoulême, was the son of Charles IX. and Marie Touchet; he was *Grand Prieur de France* 1586-1591. He was as devoted to his uncle Henry III. as the King was to him. His memoirs show his terror and grief at Henry's assassination. Auvergne's life was exciting and adventurous but belongs to a later period of history. His name heads the list of those who signed the certificate of the manner of the death of Henry III. Estoile, vol. iii, pp. 372-375. For Mayenne's report of the murder to Dijon, see Documents F and G.

two Henries[1] would have lasted when once their immediate objects were gained? Such speculations are not very profitable. Henry would not have been a long-lived man and the problem of the succession would have been postponed but not avoided. It was perhaps fortunate for France that fate, even by means of a monstrous crime, removed the weaker character and left the stage free for the self-subsistent Henry IV. Henry III. had not the taste for Kingship; Tavannes had said long before that his real inclinations were for the life of a country gentleman with plenty of money.[2] Estoile's melancholy epitaph is not far wrong. '*This king dying left the kingdom and all his subjects poor and weakened, and this quite as much by their own fault of rebellion as by any defect in the king, who would have made a very good prince if he lived in a better time.*'

[1] For the respective characters of Henry III. and Henry IV., in which estimate the balance is not wholly favourable to Henry IV., see *Mémoires des troubles arrivés en France sous les règnes des rois Charles IX., Henry III., etc.*, by Villegomblain. Vol. ii., pp. 2-5.

[2] Cheverny gives a good and fair character of the King, but his bias causes him to blame Henry's conduct in the spring of 1589, for which he is chiefly to be praised. *Mémoires*, pp. 140-160. The extraordinary grief which Queen Louise showed for her loss is a strong point in Henry's favour, for Louise was a woman of exceptional piety and goodness.

CHAPTER V

ARQUES AND IVRY

FROM THE ACCESSION OF HENRY IV. TO THE INVESTMENT OF PARIS

The problem which the events of the next few years were to solve now begins. Will Henry IV. by his own power and resources be able to make himself unconditionally master of his kingdom or will the League, even if in an inferior military position, be able to enforce Henry's conversion ere he be recognised by all the land as King? We of course know the answer; but the question was an open one in 1589, otherwise a man of Henry's sagacity, who never attempted the impossible, would not have tried the first alternative.

With the disappearance of Henry III. a great change came in the character of the League. Those who resisted the last Valois had no sound grounds of religion until after the expiration of the period of the monitory, only a fortnight before Henry's death, for he was and always professed to be a truly Catholic monarch. So the Leaguers of Henry III.'s reign were: (1) Those who resisted Henry on personal grounds; (2) Catholics so violent as to deserve the name of fanatics; (3) A miscellaneous body who profited by the confusion and gained considerable advantages from it. Now, the Catholic *royaux*, who had been numerically strong and had great weight in the councils of the nation, felt honestly uncomfortable under a heretic King. They disliked the League, they hated the Spanish connection, but they inclined for a Catholic King of France as ever had been. These had no interest nor confidence in any wild schemes of changing the succession. They agreed that no one but the nearest male descendant of the Capets could be King, but at the same

time he must be converted. The point is that it did not require a person to be a fanatic Catholic to withdraw from Henry IV. The principles at stake were legitimism pure and simple, and the theory of the necessity of orthodoxy, which was based indeed on sound reasons and confirmed by the Estates. The action of the League was in no sense a support of the democratic principle against divine right; for the League was founded on an ultramontane basis with Spanish support in the background, and the chiefs of the League had never, in theory, the remotest intention of furthering democratic methods. Henry IV. had as his supporters: (1) The Huguenots. (2) The *Politiques*. (3) Some *royaux* who from intense legitimism and personal loyalty to the late monarch felt bound by their promise to recognise his successor. The Leaguers then at their best were Catholics prepared for extreme measures; for although the general moral tone of the League was very low, there were in it a number of devout men who practised their religion and showed its effect in their works. On the other side, except amongst a rather limited number of genuine Huguenots, who equally showed the fruits of religion in their lives, the impulse of religion was slight. The strength of the royalists (henceforth used for all of either religion in Henry's service) lay in their practical programme of internal peace and a stable *régime*. The *Politiques* who were the early strength of Henry IV. were not trimmers, as is sometimes supposed, but those who, probably as conscientious as the extremists, adopted what we may call the common-sense view.

After the Parisians had enjoyed their processions, jubilations, and follies over Henry III.'s murder, in which Mayenne took no part, the Council of the League had the more serious business of deciding what sort of King they would recognise. Opinions were divided. Some were for Spain, a few for Savoy, and others, the more sober majority, were for the Cardinal of Bourbon. Mayenne was torn between the insistence of Catherine de Montpensier, who hotly urged her brother not to waste such a chance for the house of Lorraine, and his dread of being committed to Spain, or we may say to any decisive course of action. Charles Emmanuel was hardly a serious candidate, and Spain Mayenne would have none of. The old Cardinal at least belonged to the royal blood and he had been approved by the Estates. So, finally,

the Cardinal was proclaimed Charles X. He was a prisoner at Amboise, old and feeble, and it was impossible to imagine that any enthusiasm could be manifested for him. Mayenne's real sentiments are hard to estimate. It is improbable that he ever thought of the crown for himself or for any Lorrainer. His attitude to Henry IV. was invariably correct, apart from the fact of recognition, and it seems likely that he realised the ultimate conversion of the King, and in the meantime intended to prolong his own post as lieutenant-general of the realm of France so long as it was profitable.

Henry IV. at the same time was learning that he was beset with difficulties, and that there was no time to lose. Guitry, one of the original Huguenots, was sent to Suresne to exhort the royal Swiss to continue in the King's service; to this they presently agreed, at least for two months on credit, whilst awaiting the instructions of the Cantons. De Givry,[1] a Catholic and a charming and honourable character, did what he could with the *royaux*, in which he was helped by a certain d'Humières, a near relative of the founder of the Picard League. This shows in a striking manner the cleavage in families caused by the troubles in France. Their joint efforts were only very moderately successful and Henry's forces began to melt away. The King could rely on the whole-hearted support of the Dukes of Montpensier and Longueville, Sancy, Givry, and Marshals d'Aumont and Bellegarde, and the *Surintendant* d'O; but Biron raised difficulties and was only appeased by the investiture of the county of Périgord. Still this powerful noble and the best soldier amongst the *royaux* was gained, and continued to serve Henry well. In return the King agreed to a long statement about maintaining the Catholic Church, whilst various princes and nobles made a profession of loyalty. This declaration did much to reassure the Catholic Swiss. It was registered at Tours on August 14.

Though not many of the *noblesse* actually joined the League, there were plenty of quasi-deserters. Epernon went off to serve the new King, as he said, in his government of Saintonge, and François de Montholon resigned the seals from motives of religion; but Henry so much respected his known moderation

[1] Anne d'Anglure, son-in-law of Cheverny.

and integrity of character that he refused to appoint a Chancellor until after Montholon's death. On the other side, La Trémouille took himself off with his Huguenots to the west, under pretext of the necessity of safeguarding Protestant interests. It is curious how several of Henry's orginal followers, not that La Trémouille was one of them, began to show distrust of their chief. Whether they were convinced that Henry's conversion was a mere matter of time, or whether they began to suspect that Henry's policy was to be one of buying out his enemies at the expense of his old friends—both surmises proved to be true—it is difficult to say, but the old cordiality was sensibly diminished. Châtillon himself hinted at the latter alternative when he so much lamented the death of Henry III., saying that now this King (Henry III.) had made proof of his fidelity and valour he would have advanced his interests marvellously; but that the other one was likely to make use of his servants, and do nothing for them. This was not the view of an adventurer but that of as high-minded a man as Châtillon. In any case Henry IV. found it impossible to maintain his army before Paris and broke up his camp on August 8. He decided on a campaign in Normandy, where there existed some royalist elements; moreover, should matters turn out favourably he would not be too far removed from the capital. He also placed reliance on help from England, for which the port of Dieppe was convenient, and the governor, de Chatte, was wholly trustworthy. To have retired on the Loire would have been a sign of inaction, and much depended upon a spirited and successful policy. Any campaign in Provence would have been without result, though matters shortly became very critical in that province owing to the understanding between the League and Charles Emmanuel. Upper Languedoc was hopeless, but he trusted on Montmorency being able to act as a counter-weight in the Leaguer scales, if nothing more, and the Huguenots might be safely left to deal with Lower Languedoc. In Guyenne, between Matignon and the Huguenots, there was not much to fear. The danger of an attempt to rescue the King of the League existed. Accordingly, de Mornay was sent to remove the old Cardinal from Chinon to Fontenay en Poitou, as a measure of precaution. D'Aumont had gone with the Swiss into Champagne. Matters improved towards the end of August, for Pont

de l'Arche was secured by the King and Darnétal was occupied by Biron. There Henry IV. made his headquarters, threatening Rouen, then as always a very important town, and to some extent a menace to Paris. Early in the following month he received news that Mayenne was coming against him, for which he had hoped; but Mayenne's forces threatened to be far more formidable than Henry had supposed to be possible in so short a time and he had no intention of engaging the enemy near Rouen, a Leaguer stronghold. The King therefore fell back on Dieppe.

The long affair known as the battle of Arques began on September 13, but it was not until the 20th that there was any hard fighting and Mayenne's retreat only finally took place on October 6. It was far from being one of the great and bloody battles which often have no political effect, but it was one of the decisive battles of the wars of the League ; if Henry had lost it, he would have ruined all his chances and might very likely have had no alternative but to escape into England by Dieppe. The importance lay in the fact that Henry maintained his position against greatly superior numbers. It proved the inferiority of Mayenne as a general and caused discouragement in the Leaguer army.

Henry had arrived at Arques and entrenched himself on September 8. Arques and its castle lie on the highest point of a ridge about five miles south of Dieppe, and from it may be seen the town of Dieppe itself, the sea, and the valley of the little river Béthune which is here joined by two other streams. These little valleys, which in those days ended in a marsh at the confluence of their streams, made the position a strong one, which Henry increased artificially. Le Pollet lies a little to the east of Dieppe across the united streams, here called the Arques river, and to prevent the enemy from seizing this hamlet, Châtillon was sent to occupy it. On the 13th Mayenne arrived reinforced by Aumale and Brissac; in all they had some 25,000 men against which the King had certainly not more than 9000. On the 16th the Leaguers made a simultaneous demonstration—it hardly amounted to an attack—on Le Pollet and against the bridge over the Béthune ; but the space between the Eaulne and the Béthune was commanded by the royal cannon at Arques, so that

the demonstration came to nothing. In this skirmish the Count of Belin was taken prisoner and most courteously entertained by the King. Belin was asked what he thought of the King's chances and replied : '*Frankly, Your Majesty, I think very badly of them.*' Henry answered that the Count only regarded numbers, but that he himself trusted in the justice of his cause : nevertheless the King must have had considerable misgivings. There is a hamlet, Aschelles, on a ridge on the right bank of the Eaulne, and it was there that Mayenne determined on making his real attack on the fortified camp.

A thick fog in the morning of September 21 enabled the troops of the League to cross the Eaulne and attack the first line of trenches.[1] At this point some of the German *landsknechts* crying out that they were Protestants and wished to surrender to Henry were helped over the earthworks by the defenders. They then turned their weapons on them and so were enabled to capture all the outworks. This treacherous act caused general confusion and some panic. Matters might have gone badly for the King but for a sudden lifting of the fog which permitted the guns of the castle to be brought into action against the assailants, and at the most critical moment Châtillon and his men arrived from Le Pollet and ejected the *landsknechts* from the trenches which they had seized. The inexplicable hesitation of Mayenne to press the attack after the confusion caused by the Germans' capture of the outworks also contributed in no small degree to Henry's success. On September 23 an English squadron arrived at Dieppe with munitions, money, and men. Both armies could hear the drums and trumpets and general cheerful noise when Henry IV. dined on board with the English admiral. This increased Henry's army by some 4,000 men, but the danger was not yet over. Mayenne had apparently broken up his camp and left the district,

[1] This trench was some way in advance of the main works. *Une tranchée perdue qu'il (le roi) avoit fait faire plus de 2000 pas plus avant que son retranchement, droit au dessus de Martinglize environ cinq cens pas. Tranchée* in the language of the day, invariably means a trench dug by the besiegers, and *retranchement* a work thrown up by the defenders. It evidently does not in this case. In it were six *enseignes* of Swiss and four hundred French arquebusiers ; the king himself had spent the night in this trench. The League lost about four hundred in this action. Forget ascribes most of the credit for the recovery of the *tranchée perdue* to Montpensier. Forget's account, *Mémoires de Nevers*, vol. ii., pp. 597 *seq.* Also Segesser, vol. iii., pp. 20-24. Fresne Forget was one of the new secretaries.

but his plan was to get between Arques and Dieppe. Accordingly, he marched up the valley of the Béthune for some distance and then doubled back, and took up a position between Dieppe and St. Martin Eglise on the other side of the stream, and nearly opposite his original position. But Henry had taken the precaution of occupying the eastern outskirts of Dieppe without at the same time leaving the castle of Arques devoid of defenders. There were several outpost and one or two cavalry skirmishes; but Mayenne had no heart for a general action, and for the royalists it was too hazardous a matter to seek one. One episode is of interest in military history. A royalist gunner, a Norman, had hit on the idea of harnessing two culverins which were dragged about to different parts of the various skirmishes and proved very valuable. It must not be supposed that they were very serious weapons, but the novelty of it disconcerted the Leaguers. It was the first use of light artillery in history. All this delay gave time for the approach of La Noue's and d'Aumont's army, which determined Mayenne on retiring. This he did on October 6, and drew off towards the Somme to meet some reinforcements offered by the Duke of Parma. Alessandro Farnese, the only commander who could be matched on the Leaguer side with Henry IV., will play a very important part in the war until his death. To the inactivity of Mayenne were added the troubles caused by the dissensions amongst the Lorrainers, to such an extent that the Marquis of Pont à Mousson left the army and returned no more.

Henry joined d'Aumont and La Noue with the Count of Soissons, and together they mustered a well-equipped and efficient army. They turned towards Paris, and meeting with no opposition from Mayenne were back at the old headquarters of St. Cloud on the last day of November. La Noue's and Châtillon's attack on the suburbs south of the river were more of the nature of an alarm to the Parisians than an effort to take the city. Even if they had succeeded in blowing up the Porte St. Germain and had entered Paris, it seems probable that the small force would have been literally smothered in the street fighting; for the Parisians are formidable enough in barricade warfare, as they proved in May 1588 and on many more recent occasions. The royalists, however, captured a good deal of booty of which they were in need, for their army treasury was very low. Henry was

careful to protect the churches and religious houses in the suburbs, and in this matter his behaviour contrasted very well with that of the champions of Catholicism at St. Symphorien and Villeneuve-St.-Georges in the preceding spring. The news of this attack brought Mayenne back in haste from Picardy, and he was able to cross the Oise at St. Maxence, where the bridge had been imperfectly blown up by the royalist governor of Senlis. Paris had been reinforced by the Duke of Nemours, and as the King had no troops which permitted him to undertake a siege he retired towards Etampes. At the end of December Henry arrived at Tours, having taken Vendôme on the way, where he was received by the *premier président* de Harlay who had escaped from the Leaguers of Paris. More important, or at least more significant as an omen of success, there too he found the Venetian ambassador Moncenigo, who greeted him as King in the name of the republic. The astute Venetians had made up their minds as to the best investment for the future. Henry remained but a few days at Tours and then continued his campaign with vigour through the winter, which was not in accordance with Mayenne's idea of the game. The important town of Le Mans surrendered on December 12 and with it most of Maine returned to the King's obedience. He was no less successful in Normandy, for Alençon fell on the 24th, followed by Domfront and Argentan ; Falaise was taken by storm and in it the Leaguer governor of Normandy, de Brissac, was taken prisoner.

At this point we must leave the narrative of military events and turn to the political situation, especially with reference to the Papacy, Spain, and England.

The murder of the last Valois freed English policy from some embarrassment. Our interests, at any rate until the destruction of the Armada, lay in a French alliance, to which the Queen, with occasional feminine vacillations, adhered ; but the Protestantism of most of the Council was opposed to giving active support to a Catholic King of France against his revolted Huguenots. At the same time, an alliance could only be made with the *de jure* ruler of that country. Now Henry III.'s murder had done two things. It had proved to the satisfaction of both Queen and Council the existence of a Spanish-Roman plot against a sovereign who was under the displeasure of the Pope, which was

an imagination. What it had really done was to prove that the League was a menace to the divine right of kings and that there were some crack-brained religious who would not shrink from murder. Also, it made a Protestant *de jure* ruler of France. Consequently, all was well. Elizabeth could now with a light heart be allied to Henry IV. His enemies, the Pope, Spain, and the League were hers, and the defence of English interests coincided with the support of Protestantism. Elizabeth was not much of a Protestant, but her anti-Catholic feeling had been skilfully fanned by the Council, and indeed it was remarkable and deplorable how accidental happenings always worked against Catholic interests in England. The Queen herself had been excommunicated and individual Catholics had been in plots; Henry III. had been warned and soon after murdered. There was of course no logical sequence in these things but only chronological order; but we must admit, looking at the condition of the times, that matters were capable of a bad interpretation to zealous or fanatical minds. In the matter of foreign policy the Council was never unanimous. Lord Burghley, the most eminent and the least tricky, held to the old-fashioned view that France was our natural enemy and that English interests lay rather in an understanding with Spain, and he was genuinely opposed to piratical exploits. After the Armada this view of policy was of course dropped for the time, but after the Cadiz expedition, six years later, Burghley and Buckhurst opposed further war as ruinous in taxation, oppressive to the people, and of profit only to the adventurers themselves. Peace and commercial relations with Spain were of more real advantage to the country; in addition to this Buckhurst suggested the employment of English arms for a real conquest of Ireland. Leicester was now dead, but he had belonged, with Sir Francis Walsingham, now at the close of his life, to the aggressive school with regard to Spain and to alliance with France. Essex was soon to become the exponent of the Leicester tradition, and was friendly with Catholic and Protestant alike, provided they were anti-Spain; but he subordinated all policy to his insane ambition. Sir Christopher Hatton was also near the end of his life. He was of importance because of his familiarity with the Queen's mind, greater than any, and supported the French alliance or cooled

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on it according to Elizabeth's wishes at the moment. He was not of the importance of Burghley, Walsingham, and others in moulding national policy. He with Buckhurst alone of the Council, as was perhaps the case of Sir H. Gilbert amongst seamen, were sort of cryptic Catholics. The Jesuit Father Crichton, who received many kindnesses from Hatton and knew him well, said clearly that he was a Catholic at heart, but followed his sun, which was the Queen. The Puritan party regarded him as *an enemy in particular of the Gospel*, and it is certain that for the severities against them after 1587 Hatton was chiefly responsible. The general sentiment therefore kept to the French
8 alliance, and until the Peace of Vervins, 1598, Henry IV. could rely on English support, and had usually some 4000 English troops in his service. This, combined with our undoubted ascendancy at sea, was a very real asset to the French royalists and proved of greater support than was altogether warranted by our success in the field.

Philip thought that the time had come to intervene more directly in the affairs of France and obtain a return for all the trouble which he had taken in the interests of the League.

His scheme was to declare the Infanta Isabel protector under himself of the realm during the time the Cardinal King was in prison. Philip knew that he would not be set free and his life was not likely to be long. The Infanta was to marry a prince of the royal blood who should be King after the death of the Cardinal. In addition, Philip promised that no Spaniard should be given any bishopric or other benefice or magisterial office. Commerce was to be free to the French in New Spain and six million livres were to be given to Paris as a subsidy. Above all, Philip offered Franche Comté to France on the marriage of the unnamed prince to his daughter. The King of Spain knew that this programme would not in the least accord with Mayenne's, but he reckoned on the support of the democracy of Paris. The Sorbonne and most of the minor clergy there were wholly Philip's, either from enthusiasm or owing to large subsidies, and they could work on the *Sixteen* who had unlimited credit with the people. The idea of a municipal democracy allying itself with Philip of all men is curious, but precisely the same situation was reproduced at Marseilles a few years later. The

'Solvent of the League' soon got to work. In spite of all exhortations, and some intimidation, from his strongest supporters, Mayenne refused to have anything to do with the scheme, and in this he was supported by a man so extreme as Epinac, who had ransomed himself from prison, as well as by the moderate Jeannin, Villeroy, and Brisson. All that was national in the League revolted from Philip's offer. Philip hoped that his offers, some of which were of real value, would so dazzle the Leaguers that Mayenne, whom he knew to be unpopular, would fall from power; but nothing happened.

Mayenne attacked the powers of the Council of Union, the *Forty* which he himself had set up. The Duke said that the form of the Union had a smack of republicanism that was not usual or suitable for a kingdom. He formed a council of his own which in future was to submit all business to himself as lieutenant-general of the kingdom. This amounted to the supersession though not formal abolition of the *Forty*. It was a crisis for the League, but its significance has hardly been appreciated. The scheme of a federation of towns governed on a democratic basis with their source of inspiration centralised in the *Forty* was exploded. The League as such returned to its original conception, a military and clerical organisation. The Leaguer towns did indeed continue to resist Henry IV., and above all Paris, but they did so without much regard to what was taking place in the League at large. They acted as isolated units in their own interests, or rather in the interests of the municipal bodies, and they were thrown, except in accidental circumstances, upon their own resources. It was impossible in the long run that a provincial capital, say, like Dijon could maintain a sort of municipal independence when it exercised little control over the other towns of the province and received from them still less help. The revolution which the second phase of the League seemed to be inaugurating, the setting up of a representative power against the executive, was ruined. The popular part of the programme which had always been hateful to Mayenne was in theory cut out. The question at issue was to become a national against a purely religious and personal one.

Sixtus V. had previously, in reply to a pressing invitation from the League to take a direct share in the work, sent a Legate

into France with the non-committal instructions of uniting the country under a truly Catholic King. Unfortunately, Enrico Caetani was not the most suitable of envoys. He took up a definitely Spanish attitude, far removed from the Pope's, and had only one aim, that of completely ruining the fortunes of Henry ; whereas Sixtus pinned his faith on the King's conversion and, if and when that came to pass, would greatly have preferred him to Spain as ruler of France. The *parlement* (Leaguer) of Paris was amazed at the pretensions of Caetani, who, when he visited the Palais, endeavoured to seat himself on the throne ; the *premier président* Brisson politely led him to a place below his own. However, the *parlement* registered various acts which the Legate desired. On February 10, 1590, the Sorbonne, ever extreme, decided that no recognition could be given to Henry as a relapsed heretic, even if he were subsequently to reabjure his errors. Thus the Sorbonne took upon itself to forestall the possible decisions of the whole French hierarchy and even of the Holy See itself. In March the oath of union was renewed before Caetani by the *Prévôt des Marchands*, the *échevins*, and the chiefs of the quarters. About this time the execution of the Prior of the Dominicans took place at Tours on the very probably mistaken charge of complicity in the murder of Henry III. Jacques Clément had come from his priory. Henry agreed to this execution largely to please Louise de Vaudemont, who, in spite of her saintly character, could not forgive the murder of her husband. Henry IV. could never refuse a lady, and so the unfortunate Prior was torn by four horses. If he were guilty, there is no doubt that the penalty for high treason cannot be complained of ; but it was a matter of mere surmise without any real evidence. But the trials for treason in all countries then were not conspicuous for fairness.

Mayenne was anxious to do something to restore his reputation after Arques and had already had some success ; Poissy and Pontoise were both retaken and an attempt to deliver Rouen to the King was frustrated.

Henry was set upon the capture of Dreux, a place of no particular importance in itself but commanding the rich plains of La Beauce, a granary of Paris. Mayenne approached with some Spanish and Wallon cavalry which he had obtained in Belgium

and thereupon the King left Dreux on March 12 and passed the night at Nonancourt. These manœuvrings, which led to the Battle of Ivry, were designed to prevent Mayenne, who was advancing from Mantes, from crossing the Eure. Mayenne's object was to relieve his garrison at Dreux and a general engagement was not part of his intention.

Between Nonancourt and Ivry there is a plain, known from a village due north of Nonancourt as St. André; the more southern part is covered by the forest of Ivry, but beyond it and due east as far as the Eure the ground is open and flat. The village of Ivry lies on the west bank of the Eure in a rather wide loop in the north of which there is a bridge, and further up-stream, about five miles distant, is another bridge at Ezy-Anet. Mayenne crossed the first of these bridges, that on the Mantes road, and found the open plain occupied by Henry's troops, numerically inferior to his own. He was therefore compelled to fight, but the elements of success seemed to be on the side of the League, with an unfordable river in his rear. We shall see that this fact provided his own means of escape but meant destruction to his beaten army. The League mustered about 4000 excellent horse, heavily mailed and equipped with the long lances which the engravings of the time have made familiar to us, and some 13,000 infantry. The King had roughly 2000 horse, armed with sword and pistol, and much less ponderous than the Flemish cavalry. They were composed of the choicest men of the military caste, Huguenot and Catholic; he had 3000 foot. The proportion of Swiss and German mercenaries on either side was considerable. Henry was reinforced up to the very moment of the battle. The prospect of a sharp and short fight under a dashing leader appealed to the generous courage of the French *gentilshommes*, who were not inclined to a weary and indecisive campaign. Mayenne arranged his army in squadrons of cavalry interspersed with companies of infantry. The pick of the heavy horse under Egmont, where also was the Duke, were placed in the centre. On his right were Beroldingen's regiment, and on the left Pfyffer's,[1] both mainly composed of men from the Forest Cantons. The Leaguer army, superior in numbers, slightly overlapped with its wings the extreme right

[1] The son of Ludwig of the retreat from Meaux fame.

and left of the royal army. Henry's dispositions were similar; the alternate arrangement of horse with foot on their flanks being a necessity of the weapons of the day. On the King's right were the Solothurn regiments of Aregger and Von Grissach, and on his left Wiechser's mixed regiment and Hartmann's Graubündners. The King and his picked horse were opposite to Egmont's. La Guiche was in charge of the royal battery of six guns.[1]

Both armies showed a religious spirit. The Huguenot pastors prayed before the King, and his Catholic soldiers, especially the Solothurners, confessed and heard Mass. Nor were the Leaguers backward in these pious exercises. They too confessed and heard Mass, after which some religious, of whom a good many were in the Leaguer army, made a procession with a great crucifix, blessing the Catholic army and invoking confusion on the heretics. The battle opened at ten in the morning and was exceedingly fierce and short. La Guiche's artillery began with nine volleys, which threw the enemy into some confusion, and the Leaguer guns were slow to respond, nor were they so effective. After that both sides attacked simultaneously. The light horse of the League, in advance of the main body, were ridden down by d'Aumont's troopers, but the Flemish cavalry broke the royal horse and for a time were even in possession of the guns, which they overturned and so put out of action. These Flemish cavalrymen were in their turn attacked by Montpensier and Biron, and a desperate struggle took place. In the meantime the centres had engaged and the Wallons were not able to use their lances before Henry's troops were amongst them; the long lances were most unsuitable for a hand-to-hand fight. The Leaguer *reiters* had previously been thrown into disorder by arquebus fire, and fell back in a manner to hamper the movements of Mayenne's main squadron. Henry seized the opportunity and he and his cavalry were mixed up with the Wallon horse and the retreating *reiters* before the Leaguer centre had realised what was taking place. The battle was soon decided; it had become a *mêlée* in which strength, activity, and swordsmanship alone told. Egmont fell and, on the arrival

[1] Edward Webb's statement that he acted as *maître canonnier* at Ivry is wholly incredible; see *Engl. Hist. Rev.*, xxxi., pp. 467-9.

of Biron from another part of the field, Mayenne and Nemours, seeing that their cavalry was routed and their infantry, except the Swiss, unlikely to make a stand, fled from the field by the bridge below Ivry, which they broke behind them and reached the shelter of Mantes. They had too great a start for Henry to be able to overtake them, as he could not cross the Eure except at Anet, which is, as we have seen, a few miles higher up the river. The men of the Forest Cantons formed themselves into the well-known square and awaited, a formidable array of pikes, events. Biron considered that they were too solid to be rushed, so the guns which had been remounted were turned on the Swiss, with the French guards and the royal Swiss ready to attack on every side. Then Aregger, not liking, as was natural and right, to attack his fellow-countrymen and co-religionists, suggested to Henry that it would save much blood and trouble to offer them a composition. This, Pfyffer, Beroldingen and their men, who in truth were in a hopeless position, accepted, and Henry accorded very honourable terms to the men of the Forest Cantons. The *landsknechts* would gladly have surrendered on similar conditions; but the French, remembering their treachery at Arques, killed them almost to a man. The defeated army was driven towards the Eure, and the bridge being broken it had no way of escape, for the victorious army stretched in front of them across St. André's plain. Henry did all he could to save his own rebel subjects, but, according to popular tradition, did not trouble much about the fate of the foreigners. All the same, even amongst the French soldiers of the League, the loss of life was heavy, for many were killed in the fight and even more were drowned in the Eure. It was a most complete victory. All the infantry had surrendered or been destroyed; half at least of the cavalry were accounted for; all the guns were taken, and a signal emblem of victory, if of small importance in itself, Mayenne's standard fell into the hands of Rosny. The Leaguer army had ceased to exist; but the political results were wholly incommensurate with the great tactical victory.[1]

The excitement in Paris was intense and all expected the arrival at any moment of the royalists, but Caetani showed courage, if he lacked dexterity, and made the leaders in the

[1] See Document I.

capital reject any idea of peace with Henry or at least to await Mayenne's report. The Duke remained at St. Denis. He did not care to face the Parisians, with whom he had never been popular, and appointed Nemours as governor of the city. He himself soon went to Soissons to reorganise his army and, if possible, to gain Spanish reinforcements.

Many causes operated to prevent Henry from marching at once on Paris with his victorious army. Chief amongst them was the attitude of several of the Catholic royalists, who did not relish the idea of the King, still a heretic, becoming unconditional master of his kingdom. There were the usual troubles with the Swiss on the question of pay. Probably, too, Henry did not know how utterly unprepared were the Parisians to resist or how weak were the city's defences. Above all, he shrank from the storming and possible sack of his capital, as well as from the odium which would be attached to the certain bloodshed and damage resulting from an attack. Hannibal after Cannae did not march on Rome, a fact on which all historians have commented and most have expressed surprise ; but perhaps the best answer lies in the fact itself. If a man of Hannibal's military genius did not advance at an apparently propitious moment, as indeed Maharbal is said to have advised, the result must have appeared to him far less certain than it seems to us. In a similar way it is safer to suppose that to Henry's mind the fall of Paris appeared to be by no means assured. We may dismiss the common story that the King was so much occupied with Madame de la Rocheguyon that he threw away his chance.[1]

[1] Too much attention has been given to this discreditable, if amusing, side of Henry's character. With the possible exception of Henriette d'Entragues, I cannot find that any of Henry's love affairs possessed political importance. He would never sacrifice a minister or an important piece of policy to please a mistress.

The letter to the Duke of Longueville indicates the King's policy. After describing the completeness of the victory which was won by God : *qui a monstré qu'il lui est égal de vaincre en petit ou grand nombre,* and the capture of the *cornette blanche,* Henry continues— *je vous prie, incontinent, de vous avancer avec toutes vos forces vers Pontoise ou Meulan . . . pour vous joindre avec moi, et croyez, mon cousin, que c'est la paix de ce royaume et la ruine de la ligue à laquelle il faut convier tous les bons François à courir sus. Lettres Intimes Henri IV.*, L. Dussieux, p. 143.

The *cornette blanche* consisted of black lilies, not crosses, on a white field. The double cross was of course and is a crest of Lorraine. *Cornette* was the standard of a cavalry squadron. *Enseigne* was the name of the colours of an infantry regiment. The royal standard of the Valois was golden fleur de lis on a blue field, of the Bourbons golden fleur de lis on a white field.

Henry's innumerable love affairs never distracted him to such an extent that he became oblivious of the serious objects of his life.

The brave Givry was an unwilling cause of encouraging the resistance of the Parisians. Once the first stupor caused by the defeat at Ivry had passed, they showed plenty of resolution, and if the capital were to be taken at all, after the first impression had worn off, it could only be by a regular siege. Givry had some days before the battle promised the Parisians that he would let them have a certain quantity of corn and wine if they would pay him a price ; this was done. There was no treason in this business ; it was done with the consent of the King by reason of his necessity for money, for no one could foresee how soon a siege of Paris was to become a practical consideration and his army was seriously discontented at the lack of pay. Ivry was fought and won and the whole condition of affairs was changed ; but Givry having got the money refused to break his contract, although all his cause's interests were against keeping it. It is a nice point ; how far ought a bargain with a city of rebels to outweigh the interests of a whole kingdom ? The only thing left to do was to begin the investment of Paris by cutting off all further supplies, and with this object in view Henry occupied Corbeil, Lagny-sur-Marne, Melun, Provins, and Montereau ; he was thus master of the upper Seine and its tributaries. The spirits of the defenders were kept up during April by the vagaries of Catherine de Montpensier and by the formation of a new association, the Confraternity of the Name of Jesus, by the activity of the religious, and by the fanaticism of the Sorbonne. Nemours undertook the more materialistic work of organising the defences and training the town bands, and Epinac looked after the order and administration of the city. On May 7 Henry, with Longueville and La Noue, attacked the suburbs of St. Martin and St. Germain. On the 9th Charenton was stormed, where Givry was left with a strong force. The Leaguer commandant and his men were hanged. This is an example of the law of war, from which even the humane Henry did not shrink, which forbids the defence of an open town. This law, harsh in individual cases, was first applied by our Henry V. and is not really barbarous. The distinction between combatants and non-combatants cannot

be too rigorously maintained. That alone distinguishes civilised warfare from barbaric massacre. The King demolished the buildings in the outskirts of Paris and all the châteaux in the country and all places on the roads which lead to the capital were occupied, so that it was impossible for any to leave or enter Paris. It was not, however, until June that the city began to be in great straits or that the siege was pressed with much activity.

In the previous month the Cardinal King of the League died at the age of 62. His death was wholly without significance except for the fact that Mayenne had now to choose definitely whether or no he would place himself and the League at the disposal of Philip. The Cardinal was a weak and colourless old man, the 'old fool' of Henry III.; he was a mere figure-head and has left no memory behind him beyond a few acts signed in his name and some money struck with his effigy as Charles X. Events favoured Mayenne to the extent that the war prevented the assembly of the Estates which might have resulted in the acceptance of Philip's daughter and the unnamed prince as the occupants of the throne of France. He kept on putting off the Estates from month to month and rendered delay still more certain by fixing on improbable towns in turn for their assembling. Mayenne had a positive genius for postponing any decision, even as had Philip II. The Duke refused to deliver any of the towns of the Somme to Parma as a guarantee and opposed even the entry of Spanish detachments into Amiens and Péronne. Jeannin, as was to be expected, and even the extremist Epinac showed themselves no less patriotic than Mayenne. The Duke refused to enter into negotiations with Henry IV., he would have nothing to do with electing another Bourbon in the Cardinal's place, he was unwilling to seek the help of Spain, he declined to enter Paris; but he exhorted the Parisians to resist, promising them to come speedily to their relief, which, without the help of Parma, he must have known to be impossible. The only move he made was to leave Péronne for Champagne with a few Spanish troops, and was nearly captured by Henry, who had information of what was going on; Mayenne fled into Laon only just in time to escape being taken. It is hard to understand what was Mayenne's real programme. From his correspondence we are led to suppose that he had none, except that a great

Spanish victory for the League was a misfortune to be avoided at any price. It is extremely difficult to have no hope of success for yourself unless it be combined with the success of others whom above all you mistrust and hate; such was the position of Mayenne. The idea in his mind seemed to be that if he alone could somehow be victorious, then there was no saying what might not be within the reach of a general made popular by success; if, as seemed more probable, the League were to fail, he could always enter Henry's service at a price. Mayenne is always dull and selfish; but he did good, if not high-principled, service to France in refusing to give up anything to Philip, which more enthusiastic Leaguers would not have hesitated to do.

CHAPTER VI

THE KING'S FAILURE AND MAYENNE'S QUALIFIED SUCCESS

FROM THE INVESTMENT OF PARIS TO MAYENNE'S OVERTHROW OF THE SIXTEEN

Towards the end of June, 1590, the misery of Paris became terrible. The population was over 300,000, a vast city for the sixteenth century, and the prospect of by far the most populous town of Europe perishing by slow degrees from famine was unprecedented. Never in fact in modern history has so large a population of non-combatants suffered so acutely. The government of the *Sixteen* recovered much of its power and its energy never failed. There were processions of the religious, partly disguised as soldiers with pike and arquebus on their shoulders; there were frenzied political sermons, sometimes two or three a day in the same church, of which the people never seemed to tire. Boucher and Lincestre were amongst the most violent and popular of the preachers. There were processions to Notre Dame de la Lorette and supplications to the Patroness of the city, Ste. Geneviève. The Spanish ambassador and the rich gave liberally to the people, but their need was food not money. Mendoza also established public kitchens in various open spaces of the city, where a sort of porridge made of oats and rye, together with horse and donkey flesh and other less desirable meats, was distributed free. Under all the ferment and with many theatrical displays and much rodomontade the fact must not be overlooked that the Parisians showed great courage in defying the pangs of hunger, and much zeal at guard duties and fighting when they got the chance, and although mixed up with a folly which seems inseparable from the inhabitants of great cities, the attitude of Paris, if not exactly sublime as they

termed it, was indeed very creditable. The mistakenness of the cause need not detract from the merits of the resistance. There is no greater mistake than that of attributing a joyous gaiety to Paris: it is a deadly serious and fanatical city. On July 9 St. Denis capitulated from famine. Paris became literally a city of the dead and dying; even a man of the importance of the *Prévôt des Marchands* was unable to obtain a piece of dog to make soup for a sick relative who died from lack of nourishment, and Madame de Montpensier had the greatest difficulty in keeping her smallest dog. Some of the inhabitants, protected by a guard furnished by the Chevalier d'Aumale, went into the open beyond the suburbs to collect vegetables and a little meagre food, but many perished from the bullets of the besiegers.

This desperate resistance was unexpected and upset the King's calculations. There was always the possibility of Mayenne's arrival, by himself not to be feared, and the danger of Spanish reinforcements was real. The determination of the people of Paris was genuine heroism, for they could easily have overpowered the regular garrison and the *Sixteen* and forced the conclusion of peace. They were animated mainly by the stories told them of the barbarity of Henry and the heretics who would order wholesale executions. The popular idea about Henry was of course a bogey; but it is curious to reflect how entirely ignorant the people of an intelligent capital could have been as to the real nature of their King. On the contrary, Henry actually gave permission to some thousands of the most miserable to pass his lines and go into the country. Meantime the royal army had increased to hard on 30,000 men, all well trained and equipped, and the King considered that the moment for more vigorous work had come. On July 24, at night, he divided his army into ten divisions, each of which was to attack simultaneously all the ten suburbs of Paris. These suburbs have long since formed an integral part of Paris, but their names exist either as those of *arrondissements* or well-known quarters of the city. Paris seemed to be encircled with fire from the guns of the besiegers' batteries. Every one of the suburbs fell into the possession of the King. Even the most obstinate were now inclined to make up their minds to the inevitable capitulation

when a messenger arrived from Parma. The Duke, much against his will, had complied with Philip's orders to leave the Low Countries and with his best regiments march to the relief of Paris. To Parma it seemed bad strategy to leave the vital interest of Spain in Belgium to attend to the affairs of the League, where it was clear that no great gain could accrue to Spain; for Parma realised, even if his master did not, that Philip's interest held no place in Mayenne's plans, so far as he had any. However, Parma could not join hands with Mayenne before mid-August, and Paris seemed in no mood to continue its fearful privations, even if it were possible. Negotiations with Henry were opened. He offered good terms to Paris; the gates were to be opened at the end of a week if Mayenne did not arrive with relief before that date, unless a general armistice were concluded in the interval. The envoys returned to Paris; their powers did not extend so far and their instructions were confined to vague generalities. Still Henry did not assault the city, he reckoned more and more on its immediate surrender without further fighting. No doubt at this time, whatever may have been the case after Ivry, a general attack would have succeeded, and succeeded easily.

On August 23 Parma with 14,000 men effected his junction with Mayenne at Meaux. On the 30th the sentinels on the fortifications reported that the enemy's positions had been abandoned and that the army had left the suburbs; another two or three days' delay and Henry must have entered his capital. It was a decisive event in the history of France. The joy in Paris was extreme and the Leaguers said that its defence and relief was the greatest miracle since the creation. It was really remarkable and a singular piece of bad fortune for Henry IV. The siege had lasted 16 weeks and three days, according to Estoile's reckoning; for he dated the investment from May 7, though it was hardly complete at that time. Paris had no such experience for nearly three centuries, when she again had to endure a siege of about 15 weeks with a less happy termination.

It was most important that Lagny-sur-Marne should be held, for that town was able to block all navigation to Paris by the Marne, and every effort to do so was made. Henry's original plan was to take up his position at Claye, which is on rising ground;

by that means he would have forced Parma either to a general engagement between that place and Meaux, or compelled him to make a long detour to enter Paris, during which the King might again have made an attempt on the capital. But Biron, whose opinion carried great weight, was in favour of taking ground at Chelles, beyond the forest of Bondy on the level and close to the right bank of the Marne. Parma delayed some days at Meaux to await his artillery and on the 31st was able to take up a position from the side of Claye, which was not, of course, now occupied, between Lagny and the royal army in front of Chelles. Parma in one night dug his army in, which was not according to Henry's expectations; he never liked slow operations, and indeed they were contrary to the nature of his cavalry as well. The King desired a sharp and decisive battle and even sent a herald to Mayenne to defy him. The wary Italian, the antithesis of the gallant Frenchman, answered the challenge and said that he would fight or not, according to his (Parma's) views of what was for the best. Parma was the first great soldier to have the dubious fame of taking to burrowing in the earth like a mole. For five days the two armies watched one another. On September 6 the movements of Parma's cavalry seemed to presage the much-desired battle, but it was only a demonstration to cover the passage of troops to the left bank of the Marne to attack Lagny, which was already under the fire of the guns on the right bank of the river. Lagny was taken by storm and all the defenders massacred without Henry being in any way able to interfere. Biron's strategy had cost the royal cause dear. A final attempt of Henry, who retired with his forces across the plain of Bondy and crossed the Seine just below its confluence with the Marne, to surprise Paris from the Abbey of Ste. Geneviève failed, largely owing to the vigilance of the Fathers, who not only gave the alarm but, led by Nivelle, the printer of the League, valiantly repelled the assailants. The King found his army discouraged by the recent events. Many demanded their pay, quarrels broke out between the Catholics and Huguenots, and the nobles of the military caste desired their dismissal. It was a poor sequel to Ivry and the siege, but even Henry could not keep his army together. He therefore abandoned the district of the capital, and after dismissing the chief nobles to their

respective governments himself with a small but picked body of men went in the direction of Beauvais.

Mayenne entered Paris on September 18, where he was received with little enthusiasm; the sufferings of the siege had cast a deep gloom over the city. Corbeil, which had been besieged by Mayenne and Parma since September 24, was taken on October 16, and treated with remarkable barbarity by the Spaniards. Their disorders were entirely changing the sentiment of the countryside with regard to their deliverers.[1] The affairs of Belgium required immediate attention, so thither Parma returned after resting his troops for a week and leaving a small garrison at Corbeil. Almost immediately after it was retaken by Givry who, in turn, killed all the foreign soldiers, and Lagny was reoccupied on November 10. The main enterprise on which Henry had embarked was undoubtedly a failure, but at the same time the League, apart from Parma's brilliant relief of Paris, had not much to its credit and in the eyes of all was more than ever dependent upon Spain for any chance of ultimate success.

In August of this year Sixtus V. died, a man of exemplary life and a remarkable Pope. He had been called a bad and *politique* Pope by the Leaguers of Paris; but that only meant that he refused to bind himself blindly to Philip and could see that orthodox Catholicism existed outside Spain. To him succeeded Urban VII, who only reigned a fortnight, and after him Gregory XIV., like Sixtus a pious and austere man, but, unlike him, very much committed to the Spanish interest.

During this time and after, the events in the provinces of the south are of greater interest than Henry's own campaign, but to avoid a break in the continuity of the story these events will be related in the following chapter.

Henry's first care was now to prepare for the campaign of 1591, and to reorganise his army and to increase its strength; so Turenne was sent on a mission to England, Germany, and Holland to solicit men and money, and help or promises of help were forthcoming from them all. The second matter to demand quick attention was the question of religion. The lack of success had disclosed rifts in the hitherto general harmony of the royalists, and the first trouble came from his original followers. It will

[1] See Document J.

be remembered that the Huguenots were still living *in statu quo* of the Treaty of Tours between the two Henries. It was a precarious and unsatisfactory condition; for even in Henry III.'s reign, until he was overborne by the League, several edicts had left them in a superior position, and it seemed hard that they should not be at any rate as well off under the Protestant Henry IV. It was also necessary to satisfy the foreign Protestant allies, some of whom were beginning to suspect the King's intentions. On the other hand, the need for pleasing the Catholic royalists was equally pressing, and these were inclined to grumble at any concession to the Huguenots, and even went so far as to hint that it was quite time for Henry to begin the instruction about which he had so much talked. After all, these Catholic royalists were the most important part of Henry's subjects. That the failure before Paris had brought his conversion nearer is certain. The King restored the private chaplains and the ecclesiastical establishment of his predecessor, but he himself attended the Huguenot temples. Henry found the religious difficulties the most wearisome part of his heavy task. He was unable to understand what all the fuss was about; not that he was an irreligious man, for Catholic or Calvinist he was always punctual and reverent at the services, but there was something very modern about him. His actual conviction was probably on the side of the religion of his birth, but he saw nothing essentially false in Catholicism, and if that were the way of peace and the general wish of his subjects, well, he had no objection to being Catholic. Perhaps the truest way of explaining his attitude is to say that when in this matter he saw men of equal probity, learning, and rank on either side, he regarded the question at issue as being at least doubtful. For theology he cared not a straw.

Early in January, 1591, the Chevalier d'Aumale was killed during a surprise attack on St. Denis which failed. He had lately grown to have much credit with the *Sixteen*, of whom he called himself the seventeenth, but he was a cruel and evil-living man, devoid of any apparent religion and one of the worst type of Leaguer. Soon after this a comical attempt to surprise the Porte St. Honoré by some royalists disguised as peasants carrying sacks of flour completely failed. This was afterwards known as *la journée des fariniers* and celebrated with rejoicings. In

mid-February Henry decided on an important stroke; he joined Biron and Montpensier before Chartres, an old Leaguer stronghold, and began the siege of the town. Chartres was of great importance to Paris, as it is the centre of the rich lands of La Beauce from which the capital drew most of its supplies. The town was strong and well defended by its garrison and town militia, but they were hardly numerous enough for the task. Many breaches were made in the walls and some outworks were taken, but the assaults were always beaten off with loss until Châtillon invented a sort of covered structure which could be pushed from within on rollers to traverse the rough ground and deep ditches which protected the walls. It was not until two months had passed, April 19, that the town opened its gates and then it was largely due to the exhaustion of ammunition; more so, perhaps, than to Châtillon's ingenious 'tank.' The Leaguer governor was hanged, but all the rest of the garrison were included in the capitulation, and the town even retained its municipal privileges in return for a heavy indemnity. This loss caused great discontent in Paris, especially with Mayenne, who attempted no diversion to prevent its fall and, from whatever reasons, failed in every enterprise which he undertook. From the point of view of posterity the most happy thing was the fact that Chartres remained Leaguer long enough to ensure the safety of its priceless windows. The entry of Huguenots at any time previously during the wars of religion is too terrible to contemplate. It was really the gothic barbarity of the French and English Reformed which made them so much more unpleasant than the Lutherans. The *Sixteen* gained in power as Mayenne's decreased; for though no longer popular, the spirit which the Parisians had shown during the siege had gone, and from a natural reaction most were now inclined to peace, they could impose their will, aided by the Spanish garrison, upon a weak and demoralised majority.

At the end of May an important conference of the Leaguer chiefs took place at Reims; Mayenne, the Lorraine princes, and the ambassadors of Spain and Savoy were present. There was no possible accord on the subject of electing a new King. All the princes had their own favourite, but the Nuncio Landriano and Cardinal Pellevé favoured the assembling of the Estates

General for the purpose of election. Mayenne managed to prevent any decision except to the extent that an envoy should be sent to Philip to explain the difficulties of the situation in which the League found itself. Jeannin was chosen as ambassador and it was a safe choice. There was no fear of his committing his cause to Spain without safeguards, for, apart from his personal devotion to Mayenne, his sympathies were rather for an understanding with Henry. In his first interview with Philip he insisted on the extreme improbability of the election of the Infanta as queen. The subsequent interviews were with Don Juan Idiaquez. Jeannin first spoke of the possibility of Henry, if he were to be converted, marrying the Infanta. Idiaquez would have none of it. The Spaniards aimed at control of France not at providing a wife for Henry IV. They knew well enough that, Catholic or heretic, Henry was the last man who would permit any sort of tutelage over his kingdom whether from Philip or Elizabeth: neither more nor less in either case, and both monarchs tried it on. Jeannin knew equally well the uselessness of suggesting Mayenne, for Philip would not trust him, and so far as the Estates went the Duke was even more hopeless than the Infanta, who was the child of Henry III.'s eldest sister. Idiaquez said plainly that no scheme which did not make his daughter the recipient of the French Crown would be considered by his master. To the envoy's remarks about the Salic Law the Spaniard said it was pure imagination. So it was in the sense in which Frenchmen regarded it, but it was an unfortunate remark to have made. Frenchmen were very touchy on that point and on the Gallican liberties and it was on those two rocks that the League foundered. Anyhow, Jeannin's mission had cleared the air; if the League desired any further help from Spain it knew who was to be its sovereign. Jeannin was in sore perplexity; he neither dared nor wished to accede to this condition, but to refuse was to endanger the whole prospects of the League. He therefore temporised; he was a skilled diplomat and not a friend of Mayenne for nothing, and said that the difficulties might be overcome at the much-talked-of meeting of the Estates. On this Philip agreed to pay Mayenne's expenses and to maintain Parma's army, on the condition that the pay was to be in the hands of his own treasurers. Jeannin, when he returned to France, never

ceased to work for a composition with the Catholic Bourbons or even with Henry himself. A very able man was lost to the League by that little slip of Idiaquez. We shall now see how Gregory XIV. made an even more serious *faux pas* in respect of the Leaguer interests.

In April Landriano had brought fresh monitories from the Pope against Henry IV., which not only declared him incapable of reigning but warned all Churchmen who adhered to the Béarnais and laymen, after a short delay, that they too were liable to serious censures. Mayenne saw the folly of it, but the Nuncio and the Spanish ambassador were insistent ; so the Duke allowed the monitories to be published early in June. This had the effect which Mayenne had foreseen. It was true that the *Sixteen* were confirmed in their zeal and lack of reason, but the effect on the royalists and the Gallican Church was very different. The royalist fractions of the *parlement* of Paris were divided between the two towns of Tours and Châlons-sur-Marne. On August 5 the *parlement* at Tours declared Gregory to be a *self-styled Pope, enemy of peace, of the King and state, fauteur of the Spanish conspiracy.* It declared that all who sent for documents, such as monitories, to Rome were guilty of *lèse-majesté.* At Châlons the monitories were condemned to be burnt by the executor of high justice ; the Nuncio was to be seized ; all were forbidden to help or conceal him, on pain of their lives, and ecclesiastics who had helped to formulate the monitories were to be deprived of any benefices which they might possess in France. It is to be noticed that these violent declarations were the work of the *parlement*, all the members of which were Catholic. The Huguenots had nothing to do with them. It takes more than abuse to make a break in continuity, otherwise France had done so over and over again ; but the King—the foam in the *parlement* did not count—never rejected the jurisdiction of Rome, and neither King nor *parlement* ever attempted to alter a word of dogma. In a meeting of the magnates at Mantes in the previous month the King had complained of the violence of Gregory and directed the attention of the *parlement* to the doings of the Nuncio, but he again promised to preserve inviolate the Catholic religion. He next pacified the Huguenots by reissuing the edicts of toleration of Henry III. of 1577 and 1580. The clergy at Chartres declared

the Pope's monitories to be null and unjust in form and matter, and contrary to the liberties of the Gallican Church. This declaration was signed by the Archbishop of Bourges, the Bishops of Chartres, Beauvais, Nantes, Châlons, Bayeux, Le Mans, as well as by the Cardinals of Senoncourt and Bourbon. The *parlement* at Tours protested against sending a mission to Rome to explain the views of the Gallicans or indeed of having any further communications with the Holy See on the question of the fundamental laws of the kingdom. Gregory's death on October 15 solved these thorny problems and was an event much in Henry's favour.

During these meetings the King, to give some occupation to his troops, besieged Noyon in Picardy and took it on July 17. Mayenne, although reinforced to a considerable superiority over the royal army, attempted no battle and saw the town lost before his eyes. About the same time several events of importance took place. A most striking gain to the League was the escape of the young Duke of Guise from Tours, where he had been kept prisoner since his father's murder. It is true that he ultimately entered the King's service. Daily prayers were made to Our Lady for him by the Leaguers in Paris and, curiously enough, it was on the day of her Assumption that Guise made his escape ; but its manner was not out of the common, for he slid down a rope which was attached to the bars of a window in his prison with the connivance of the gaolers. He was received with enthusiasm at Orléans and in Paris, where the magic of his father's name survived. It was, however, an embarrassment to Mayenne personally. The royal side experienced two great losses. One, François de la Noue died from a wound received at the siege of Lamballe. The other was the death of Châtillon at the age of thirty. Both were excellent men, and the first at least one of the most experienced soldiers in Henry's army. La Noue was universally liked. Châtillon was less popular owing to the rigidity of his Calvinism, and indeed he had no cause to look with friendly eyes on Catholicism. The King was very grieved at his death, for it was in some measure due to Henry's neglect, or what Châtillon considered to be neglect.

Both sides now prepared for a decisive campaign. The late Pope had enlisted for the League 3000 Italians, 6000 Swiss, and

2000 Spaniards from Naples. The Papal force was commanded by Ercole Sfondrato, Duke of Montemarciano, and it turned its steps towards Verdun where was Mayenne ; but it suffered greatly from sickness and slightly from desertion on its long march. The Swiss were men of Uri, Unterwalden, Zug, Luzern, and Fribourg. Solothurn and Schwyz, though Catholic, took no part in the Papal-Leaguer service.

Henry had been joined by Turenne with 16,000 German mercenaries at Alligny-sur-Aisne. The viscount was given the marshal's bâton by the King, who also allowed him to marry the heiress of the Duchy of Bouillon-Sedan. About 6000 Swiss came to him and on the Oise he was reinforced by some 5000 Englishmen under the Earl of Essex. The King directed this army towards the Norman and Picard coast, because Elizabeth required him as part of the bargain to clear the Channel provinces of Leaguers so as to leave no chance for Spanish privateers to take refuge in the harbours. All these things happened in September. The siege of Rouen was decided on for two reasons : firstly, it pleased the Queen of England, and secondly, it was the first step to the taking of Paris, which was still, as was natural, the chief item in Henry's programme. On November 11 Biron completed the investment with his own French troops and those of Essex. Henry brought up his main body, largely mercenaries, and his artillery and established his headquarters once again at Darnétal. On December 7 he summoned the Rouennais to recognise their legitimate King and exhorted them not to believe the calumnies of the League. The inhabitants replied with defiance that they would sooner die than accept a heretic. In truth, they were well prepared. The folk, the magistrates, and the town council were all devoted to the League, and between them and the energetic governor, Villars,[1] there was perfect unanimity of feeling. Rouen showed a spirit of unity more complete than that existing now in any other Leaguer town. Villars was a capable officer and popular. He was devoid of all religious enthusiasm and had carefully balanced the chances to ascertain which party more favoured his ambitions ; but having finally accepted the terms of the League, he honestly fought for it to the best of his ability.

[1] Not to be confounded with the Guyenne Villars, of the House of Savoy. The defender of Rouen was of the family of Oise.

Professional soldiers, not in our sense of the word, were very numerous during this and the following century. Villars neglected no precautions. The town was abundantly provisioned and its garrison was sufficient, all doubtful persons had been expelled, and all the able-bodied citizens were drilled as soldiers or organised for labour. The suburbs had been demolished and all available places fortified, and there was even a flotilla of craft armed for fighting as well as for supplying the town. Villars had profited by the experiences of Paris to avoid some of the mistakes made there, but processions to keep enthusiasm at the highest pitch were encouraged. Villars and Essex were friends.

Unlike the siege of Paris, which was mainly a question of starvation, that of Rouen was marked by frequent and sanguinary attacks. For some reason Biron insisted on attacking St. Catherine's hill, one of the strongest positions of the defence, and rendered still more difficult by the snow and the iron state of the ground.[1] The English contingent suffered much, they were but ill-supplied from home and the King of France could not do much for them; he was always short of money. Although, as may be supposed, they fought bravely enough, they were not accustomed to continental, or indeed to any warfare, and were unequal in skill to the best troops of the League, and the Marshal seems to have placed them in the worst spots. On January 4, 1592, a Dutch flotilla arrived up the Seine and added 3000 men and munitions to the besiegers. No real progress was made. The problem for Henry was not unlike that which he had to solve

[1] *Journal of the Siege of Rouen*, T. Coningsby, Camden Misc. Old Series 39. *Rélation du siège de Rouen en 1591*, Valdory. He was captain of the town militia.

Elizabeth showed great displeasure at the losses of the English, and at the persistence of Essex and Sir R. Williams in what she considered to be a useless enterprise. See various letters which passed between them. Hist. MSS. Com. Calendar of MSS at Hatfield House, vol. iv., pp. 149-187.

In December, 1591, Essex sent a reply to Villars who had sent a challenge. Essex was ready to meet him on horseback or on foot, armed or in doublet, and to maintain that the King's cause was juster than the League's, that he was a better man than Villars, and that his mistress was prettier than the governor's. But if Villars cannot come alone, as he is in charge of a fortress, then Essex will have twenty men to meet a similar number, the worst a fit match for a colonel, or sixty, the meanest being a captain, though saving the cause he was his friend. Essex also challenged the Chevalier Picart, a friend of Marchaumont. The matter is not important except as illustrating the 'gentlemanly' nature of the old wars and the gulf which exists between them and the sordid warfare of to-day.

during the siege of Paris. In both cases it was vital to do something quickly before an army of relief arrived; for the forces of Lorraine, the Papal army, and the Spaniards had gathered at La Fère and were beginning to move through Picardy. This time he determined to anticipate the arrival of the army of relief. He left the main body under Biron to continue the siege and himself at the head of a picked body of about 7000 went into Picardy to await the arrival of Mayenne and Parma. Towards the end of January the army of the League drew near Aumale, where the King had his headquarters, and it proved to be immensely superior in numbers to his own. He therefore retired the main force upon Neufchâtel and thence went forward with some horse across the Bresle to attempt to hold the enemy in check; for he could not have expected to engage the whole Leaguer army with his squadron of cavalry. His position was very faulty because the way of retreat was not easy owing to the river and he was liable to be outflanked by the enemy's cavalry, which actually happened. His little force suffered much from the Spaniards' fire, more than half were lost in the struggle for the bridge and the King was wounded slightly. He exposed his life in the most reckless manner. The situation was dangerous in the extreme. At length Henry and the remains of his troop recrossed the Bresle and took cover in the woods beyond Aumale where the enemy cavalry did not care to follow him. February 5, Henry returned to Rouen and by the 17th was well enough to make a surprise attack on the quarters of the Duke of Guise during which the Count of Chaligny, one of the Lorraine princes, was taken prisoner. The company which had been left at Neufchâtel was captured by Parma; the father-in-law of Givry was amongst them. According to Jean de Tavannes, it was only the slowness of the Spaniard (Parma) and the irresolution of the Frenchman (Mayenne) which prevented the affair of Aumale from being absolutely disastrous to the King. Mayenne had, probably, no wish to see the King a prisoner, but Henry certainly showed less than his usual skill.

The army of the League advanced very slowly on Rouen. They marched partly by night, some 12,000 strong, divided into four battalions, commanded respectively by Mayenne, Parma, Rosne, and Tavannes. When within twelve miles of Rouen news came that Villars had made a successful sortie, capturing

five guns and inflicting much damage on the besiegers; this he had done, but the damage was repaired after a short delay by Biron. Guise wished to throw himself into the town with 1000 men, but Mayenne objected. It seemed that no further help was necessary, and Parma, whose heart was always in the campaign in the Low Countries, retired towards Picardy. Mayenne had given great offence to the army by his inaction and Guise took his departure.

At that time began another series of half-hearted negotiations between Henry and Mayenne, and nothing is more remarkable than the frequent interchange of messages between them throughout the campaign. Henry had got possession of some letters of Don Diego d'Ibarra, the ambassador, which were full of intrigue between the Spaniards and Orléans with a view to that town putting itself unreservedly under Philip's protection; these he sent to Mayenne. The Duke was filled with anger: hostility to Spain, his sole ally of value, was his dominant passion and he, as well as the other Lorrainers, was wearied of the whole business. He offered a secret recognition to the King if he would surreptitiously become a Catholic, and guarantee the interests of the Lorraine princes, the only part of the League in which he was now interested. Even de Mornay was in favour of the King offering to submit to instruction, but Henry was not yet certain that Rouen and Paris might not be taken, so nothing came of it. Instead, Mayenne for the ninth time appointed the Estates to meet, at Soissons, to consider the question of the Infanta; this meeting, like the previous ones, he well knew could not come to pass.

In spite of all this correspondence, Henry had not neglected the siege work before Rouen, and the town, cut off from supplies upstream by the construction of forts and downstream by the Dutch flotilla, showed signs of losing patience. Villars clearly explained to Mayenne that he could not hold out over April 20. Mayenne and Parma, who were at Rue, hurried off with all their troops towards Rouen, covering over forty miles in four days across a country much intersected by streams. Curiously enough the fortunes of war had been reversed since Villars' despatch. The royalists had grown weary; large bodies of men had to be disbanded for the purpose of resting them, and in spite of English

reinforcements Biron had determined upon breaking up his camp. This was not Henry's wish, and on his return, he had been at Dieppe, he refused to retire beyond the Seine, but took up a position at Gouy, about eight miles from Rouen on the road to Pont de l'Arche. Difficulties and disputes prevailed no less amongst the Leaguers. Parma was all for an attack on the royal army before its position could be strengthened or its numbers reinforced; for Henry's *gentilshommes*, if they had an amazing trick of melting away during a period of inaction, soon rallied round him when anything stirring was toward. Mayenne raised objections; Henry could easily retreat by Pont de l'Arche; there were great stores at Caudebec, and it would be better to secure that town; its capture, too, would free the lower reaches of the river. As a piece of strategical theory the first objection was undeniable, but the practical inference was nil; for if Henry had crossed the Seine at Pont de l'Arche he would have been safely removed from giving any further trouble to Rouen. Caudebec, which became in an unexpected manner of great advantage to the League, yielded on April 26, and during this operation Parma was wounded whilst examining the positions. It is recorded that he did not stop his explanations nor put down his map until the manner of the attack had been arranged to his satisfaction. On May 28 Henry appeared with 23,000 men and 20 guns a little to the east of Yvetôt, but finding Mayenne's position too strong for a frontal attack moved round the little town to the north and drew up his army to the west or north-west of it, thus securing his lines of communication with Dieppe and cutting those of the enemy with Le Havre and Lillebonne, both Leaguer strongholds. Various outpost affairs were fought until June 8 in which Mayenne had the disadvantage and lost some ground. The danger of the Leaguer army was now extreme. All their sources of provisions were gone except by river from Rouen, but that was useless, for Rouen itself was in considerable straits. Across their front stretched the royal army, which shut out all way of retreat towards Picardy. In their rear, which rested on Caudebec, lay the Seine. There was and is no bridge over the Seine below Rouen. The genius of Parma, who suffering from his wound was still undaunted, was now to be abundantly proved. It was one of his most brilliant feats as it was his last.

Parma had caused to be built at Rouen many rafts and pontoons. These were floated down to Caudebec on the falling tide and the troops were swiftly ferried across the river. Half of them were over before, on the following morning, the royalists observed what was going on, and then the guns of Caudebec kept them at a distance. Not a man nor a gun was lost in the crossing; the Spaniards then set fire to the rafts and pontoons. The army of the League was now in comparative safety, the only way for Henry to cut them off would have been to hasten past Rouen and cross the Seine at Pont de l'Arche, and if time permitted to break the bridges of the Eure over which Parma would have been bound to pass. It is very doubtful if time would have allowed for this manœuvre, but in any case the officers of his army were opposed to it. There remained nothing for Henry to do but to break up his army, dismiss the English and Dutch,[1] and go himself with the remainder to secure the royalist strongholds beyond the Oise. Parma had hurried on to St. Cloud and threw some Wallon reinforcements into Paris; he then returned to Flanders. On December 3 he died at Arras, forty-seven years old.

The Duke of Parma was the greatest soldier of the sixteenth century. He was a faithful servant of Philip II., in spite of the King's unjust suspicions, and he alone made it possible for the Spaniards to retain any hold over Flanders. If rather slow he was very safe, and for his strategy and skill in all the devices of warfare has never been surpassed. He was absolutely without scruples in any transaction of diplomacy, but otherwise compared very favourably with the soldiers of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. Of remarkable pugnacity in his youthful days he was of an equable temperament in maturity. Henry IV. was an unrivalled cavalry officer, but he did not show to advantage

[1] Sir H. Unton wrote to Burghley an account of the failure of the siege. *Henry gives out that he will renew the siege again whereof I have no opinion.* Unton entirely discouraged Henry from asking England for further help; previously he had been warmly in favour of a spirited policy in France. The English of that century would never back a losing cause. Hatfield MS. as before.

Elizabeth refused to help Henry any further than by her prayers. There was a printed form of prayer to be used publicly for the success of the King of France. She told him clearly that he had wasted a lot of her men and money and had generally been disappointing, as in fact he had. She complained too of his renewing the toleration to the Huguenots and so losing a good many of the *royaux*, the most important folk from the monarchical point of view.

in siege operations and he was temperamentally incapable of lingering warfare and long-drawn-out combinations. Maurice of Orange showed himself Parma's equal in siege work, but that was at the time when Farnese's powers were failing from sickness. These three are the greatest soldiers of our period of history.

It is now necessary to turn to the events which took place in Paris during the time of the campaign which we have been following.

After the day of the *fariniers*, when a Spanish garrison had been introduced to the city, the *Sixteen*, who had not forgiven Mayenne's dissolution of the *Forty*, began to pluck up spirits and to excite the Parisians to excesses. In February, 1591, their real power for mischief began. The *Sixteen* spoke of the tyranny of the nobles which ruined the Church and the liberty of the people, they complained of the magistrates and the waste of public money, themselves the great spendthrifts. The democratic programme was once more to the fore. In those days the masses of the towns were not anti-clerical; anti-clericalism, in the political sense, lay rather in the *parlement*s and amongst the nobles. In the modern sense of being anti-Christian anti-clericalism did not exist anywhere. Therefore the alliance between the democracy of the towns and an ultramontane clericalism, both hostile to the theory of divine right, was not so strange as it at first sight appears. To all these complaints Mayenne paid not the slightest attention. With Gregory XIV. the *Sixteen* had more success, for in May he sent his blessing, in reply to a letter, to the chiefs of the ten quarters and urged them to continue in their pious and laudable objects. This communication of the Pope excited the bigotry of the zealots and some of the preachers began the habit of speaking against certain individuals by name and inciting their congregations to violence; they were persistent in their attacks on the *parlement* and were morally responsible for the scenes which were soon to take place. A perfectly harmless man, Tardif, a *conseiller* of the Châtelet and a friend of Estoile, was attacked in this manner and ended, as will be seen, by losing his life on the vague charge of being a *Politique*. Mayenne's continued absence from Paris had a bad effect; he would doubtless have prevented bloodshed if he had been present, but the Duke never was where his presence was required. The

further too he was from a democracy the better he was pleased. In September the *Sixteen* got a letter through to Philip II. in which they informed him that all good Catholics only desired to see either himself or one of his family wear the crown of France. The present ambassador, Ibarra, was even more at the service of the *Sixteen* than Mendoza. This letter was signed by Louchart, La Bruyère, Hamilton, and the rest whose names we know, and Génébrard. Of all of them only one, Génébrard, was of some merit. He was the self-made Bishop of Aix-en-Provence, that is, he was appointed only by the authority of the League, a famous Hebrew scholar and one of the most learned men of France. His life and morals were irreproachable; but these great qualities and gifts were spoiled by a fanaticism so extreme that it may be qualified as insane.

A certain Brigard, a zealous Leaguer, was charged with treason for having written to his uncle, who was a royalist, on some indifferent matter and was deemed worthy of death, but the *parlement*, as may be supposed, acquitted him. This spark produced the conflagration that had long been smouldering. On November 6, a secret inner council of ten was formed, Ameline, Louchart, Acarie, Le Goix, Tuant, Borderet, Rosny (not de Béthune), Rideau, Rainssant, and Besançon, to deal with this act of injustice as it was termed. Le Clerc, governor of the Bastille, and Crucé were added to the number—we seem to be describing the events of May 1871—and a massacre of all *Politiques* was seriously debated. During the crisis Mayenne at Laon was not without knowledge of what was likely to happen, but any quick decision was impossible to him, so he waited much alarmed. Constant meetings of this inner committee filled the decent part of the population with fear, and it was thought that danger menaced the magistrature above all on account of the *affaire Brigard*. Brisson was warned again and again of his danger; but, partly because he could see no means of escape, partly because he was a Leaguer, at any rate in theory, and partly because he trusted to the immunity of his high office, the *premier président* let himself be seized and with him Larcher, *conseiller* in the *Grand' Chambre*, and Tardif who has been mentioned before. Boucher and Senault, who cannot morally escape complicity in the murder, kept away at Vincennes and seemed to be out of the matter.

The three magistrates were all hanged on November 15 after a meeting of the council held previously at the house of the curé of St. Jacques. The unhappy *premier président*, who had acted against his conscience from fear at the overthrow of the royal officials, now again tried, but in vain, to save his life by representing the value of a legal manual which he was writing and could finish if kept closely in prison. Rarely has a more barbarous act been committed. The next day the three bodies were hung on a gibbet in the Place de la Grève with an inscription describing them as traitors, heretics, and enemies of God. This was done by Cromé. Le Clerc, accompanied by the armed ruffians of the town, tried to excite the populace to set upon all *Politiques*, traitors, and *royaux*, in fact, to a sort of new St. Bartholomew; but the Parisians were so horrified at events that they remained quiet and expressed their feelings as to the pity of the death of the magistrates. During this time M. de Belin, Mayenne's agent, though he strongly reprobated these crimes, was afraid to move from terror of the *Sixteen*. Fortunately, the Neapolitan soldiers would lend no assistance to schemes of violence, saying they were there to defend Paris from the enemy and not to hunt out *Politiques* or traitors, a work which belonged to Mayenne and to the judges. The commander of the Neapolitans, Aubrey, told the curé of St. Jacques that he wished all heretics to be in the Inquisition, all the traitors of Paris in the river, and all its rogues on the gallows; but to fall upon unarmed men to whom the name of *politique*, a very elastic term, was given, was as unworthy of his profession as it was for the curé to leave his breviary and take up sword or halberd.

On November 25, Madame de Nemours, Mayenne's mother, sent out a courier to tell of the alarming state of affairs in Paris and to implore her son to come quickly to deliver her and the well-disposed and to save the city from sure ruin. On the 27th the news was abroad that Mayenne drew near and might be expected the next day. Some of the *Sixteen* expressed defiance of the Duke, saying that they had made and could easily unmake his authority, but all the same most were very uneasy. The next day in fact Mayenne did enter Paris and was met by de Belin and other men of rank, and even Louchart and Senault greeted him to make the best of it; but Mayenne's face did not

afford them much encouragement. Naturally dark and heavy, the Duke's expression was blacker than ever. Mayenne went to his mother and nothing happened on the 29th; but on the 30th many of the *Sixteen* came to Mayenne's lodging and behaved in a disorderly way without any signs of respect. Whereupon de Vitry,[1] one of the Duke's *gentilshommes*, *jurant à sa manière habituelle* declared that the *Sixteen* were all *canaille et pendus* and urged Mayenne to hang them all. On December 1, Le Clerc seeing the Bastille surrounded gave it up to Mayenne, and du Bourg, a moderate and respectable man of the Duke's retinue, was put in charge. Two days later Aubrey came to Mayenne and warned him of the dangers which might even now occur if strong measures were not taken. Mayenne replied that he would be satisfied within twenty-four hours.[2] On December 4, Ameline, Louchart, Emmenot, and Auroux were hanged in the basement of the Louvre. It is said that Mayenne desired their trial before the *Grand' Chambre* for the murder of the magistrates, but that the *parlement* for fear of the *Sixteen* refused; be that as it may, the execution took place by the sole order of Mayenne and without any form of trial. These four were scoundrels of the worst kind, with the possible exception of Ameline, who was a man of refinement and real capabilities, an honest enthusiast; he had done more for the organisation of the League in the provinces than any other of the council. Emmenot had, amongst other evil deeds, murdered a harmless man, Minterne, for the sake of his money, whereof his widow had demanded justice of the Duke, who promised one day to satisfy her. This fact decided Emmenot's fate, for Mayenne was reminded of it when efforts were being made to save Emmenot's life on the ground that he was not a direct accomplice in the murder of the magistrates. Mayenne then said that he should be hanged, even if he had to undertake the business himself. On the 9th Mayenne summoned the Sorbonne before him and explained his disgust with all the Paris Leaguers, including themselves. The faculty were scandalised at the slight respect which was paid to them. It had been an unprecedented thing for a *président* to fall a victim to mob justice, and it was new for the highest theological authority in France to be rated

[1] Louis de l'Hôpital.

[2] See Document K.

by a man fully dressed for war, however high his rank. The process against Brisson was annulled and his memory rehabilitated, as also in the case of the other two; three more of those concerned in the *président's* death, amongst them Cromé, were exempted from the pardon accorded to the rest of the *Sixteen*. On December 11 Mayenne left Paris, taking with him Le Clerc, who was deprived of the fortune which he had amassed, Launoy, president of the *Sixteen*, and many others of the more criminal sort, as he had been prayed to do by the chief Catholics of Paris. At the same time proclamation was made forbidding any assembly of persons to debate on public matters under pain of death, and an oath of obedience to Mayenne was imposed on all officers and officials.

The population of Paris was profoundly impressed; some hated what had been done, and Boucher, when Mayenne was safely out of the way, even dared to preach against it and called the criminals martyrs; some quietly rejoiced and all feared. The *Sixteen* had henceforth only the shadow of their former power. Thus Mayenne, having destroyed the Council of the Union for all France, ended by ruining the organisation of the League in Paris. He could not have acted otherwise, but it is curious that the lieutenant-general of the League should have destroyed the system upon which its real vitality depended. However, the Spanish-democratic league was not Mayenne's League, and whatever feelings he may originally have had towards the Leaguer masses, on whom his brother had relied, long before the final scene they had become nothing but loathing and contempt.

CHAPTER VII

THE TRIUMPH OF LEGITIMISM AND HENRY'S RECONCILIATION

FROM THE SIEGE OF ROUEN TO HENRY'S ENTRY INTO PARIS

After the raising of the siege of Rouen a considerable pause took place in the activity of the rival armies in the field. Henry had no longer the men necessary for undertaking a campaign of any magnitude, and Mayenne had so depressed the life of the League that its energy and power for active work were equally weakened. Moreover, a change had come about in Paris. The crushing of the *Sixteen* had allowed the growth of freer expression of opinion, and the majority, with sharp reactions of fanaticism, were now more inclined to take a national view than that of a faction. That Henry alone could be a serious candidate for the throne was gradually being recognised, and could his conversion, above all things desirable, be accomplished the rest would fit in naturally. Henry had long hesitated, but, owing to the events of the last two years, was beginning to get accustomed to the idea that his abjuration was a necessity for himself and for the peace of France. It was in fact obvious. In spite of his successes in the field not a single provincial town (Bordeaux and Grenoble had been loyal throughout) had opened its gates to him. The chances of taking Paris were negligible, and whole provinces successfully defied his authority. France was occupied by two hostile armies, both mainly composed of foreigners; his own of foreign Protestants, the League's of foreign Catholics. Such a state of things could not go on indefinitely. Consequently, in the present chapter the political manœuvres and intrigues which led to Henry's conversion and recognition will be most important, but before that the events in the provinces, and

especially in Provence, where much happened to affect the history of the League and of France, must be considered. Two other events occurred in the summer of 1592. Early in June Montpensier died. He was whole-hearted in his loyalty to his cousin and his high rank and high character were a great asset to the King's side; with all that he was an indifferent soldier and a man of very moderate capability generally. Marshal Biron was killed by a cannon shot at the unimportant siege of Epernay, July 27, a misfortune which removed the best soldier after Henry on the royal side. His son Charles, also marshal in turn, took his father's place and was not unlike him in character; he perished on the scaffold, long after our period, in a manner not very dissimilar to that of Essex. The old marshal was a remarkable professional soldier very typical of his kind. He served two kings with ability and devotion, but he was by nature ambitious, and on two occasions during the siege of Rouen there are serious grounds for thinking that he deliberately refrained from doing his best; not from any treacherous wish to aid the enemy, but simply because a prolongation of the war served his interests. The professional soldiers of those days were really a caste, a word I have often used, and had no particular use for peace. In strife they lived and moved, and the ordinary amenities of life were unfamiliar to them. As a rule they were honourable men according to their code and there existed a strong *camaraderie* between them, even when on opposing sides, and a tendency to ignore the civilian. It was about the nearest thing to 'sport,' apart from real field sports, which existed, and its total disappearance from modern armies does not at all indicate 'progress.'

At the end of 1590 the Duke of Savoy, at the urgent request of the Provençal Leaguers, entered Aix, as we have seen. Charles Emmanuel had a deep-laid scheme of his own. He might have wished, but could hardly have hoped, to add the province to his duchy by means of the support which the League offered, but the expedition was really to cause a diversion—to prevent the French from attempting the recovery of Saluzzo and as a set-off to Philip II.'s vague aims in Southern France. The Provençal Leaguers had been divided. The section led by the Count of Carcès was for Mayenne; the de Vins faction, which

since his death was led by the Countess of Sault, his sister-in-law, was for Savoy. After the defeat of Carcès by La Valette his party lost credit and the Countess gained the upper hand. The Duke, after taking Antibes, was in fact declared Protector of Provence by the *parlement*, November, 1590. He had entered the province with 1000-1200 horse and 5000-6000 arquebusiers. Berre capitulated after a long siege, and the Duke, when he saw how feeble was de Mesplès' garrison which had resisted him, much lamented the waste of time. Miramas had previously, in October, surrendered to the Count of Martinengo, the Savoyard general. Marseilles rose against Charles Emmanuel less than a year after his arrival in Provence, in spite of early enthusiasm, and became to all intents an independent republic under the consuls, Masparaud and Casaux. It resisted the royal authority and was violently Leaguer, looking to Spain and not to Savoy for support. The internal administration was clerical-democratic, somewhat on the lines of the *Sixteen*, and the more moderate townsfolk went in fear of their lives. It is to be noticed that by this time no one in Provence troubled their heads about Mayenne and what may be called the official League. Why Marseilles, a democratic town, put into Spanish lottery in preference to the Savoyard no one knows. Our guess may be that Charles Emmanuel was more likely to interfere in their virtual independence than the distant Philip.

La Valette and Lesdiguières, who governed for the King in Dauphiné, had for some time past a complete understanding for working together,[1] wherever the Duke of Savoy seemed to be threatening. The vagaries of the Marseillais they did not take seriously. In November, 1591, La Valette went towards Digne, the army of Lesdiguières converging on it from the north. This place was taken, and de Crottes, a Dauphinois, was put in charge. The Provençals did not love the Dauphinois but they tolerated them more readily than the Gascons. This fact is of importance later on. The two governors then separated; Lesdiguières returning to Dauphiné and promising to come at any time to La Valette's help if only he had a week's notice. La Valette and his army went to meet the Duke of Savoy. He took the road to Beines, which he attacked but failed to take.

[1] See Document U.

News came that Charles Emmanuel was advancing to its relief. This was not true, but Carcès with 800 horse and 2000 foot was in fact approaching Beines. La Valette waited drawn up ready for the attack, when he learned that Carcès had recrossed the Verdon and was retiring on Aix. The next day La Valette went to Valansolle and expressed a great desire to fight the Duke of Savoy. De Mesplès told him of a scheme which would draw the Duke. This was for himself to occupy weakly some town or village to incite Charles Emmanuel, who had a grudge against Mesplès for his defence of Berre, to attack him, and then for La Valette to come up with all his forces. This was agreed, and Mesplès chose Vinon for the scene of the exploit. After a week the Savoyard army came ; the battle was being very fiercely contested when La Valette arrived. There were in his army a few Huguenots under the Seigneur de Gouvernet, and, knowing the Savoyards' horror and fear of Lesdiguières' Huguenots, La Valette disguised most of his cavalry with the white *casaque*. In the end the Savoyards were badly routed and many were driven into the river. Their ground was very badly chosen in the case of defeat, but of course they had counted on an easy victory over Mesplès' few hundred and the rest was a complete surprise. La Valette did his part very well, but the credit for the scheme and the long fight he put up to overwhelming odds really belonged to Mesplès.[1] After this La Valette went to rest his troops at Brignoles, but he was soon again in the field. He had a plan for finally disposing of the Duke of Savoy and capturing Nice. In February, 1592, he took Flassans, but on the eastward march lost his life from a bullet at the siege of an unimportant little place, Roquebrune-sur-Argens, which surrendered the following day. The army abandoned the Nice enterprise and returned to Sisteron, carrying with them the body of their general. Bernard de La Valette was a very faithful royalist, a lucky general, and popular with his men, but he was disliked by the Provençals. However, his *régime* differed widely from the system

[1] I have followed de Vignaud's account of the battle in which he took part. A wholly different version is given in the *Histoire de Lesdiguières*, p. 125. There is no mention of Mesplès, but Perier de la Bréole takes his place. The credit for the victory is given to René de la Tour du Pin (*i.e.* Gouvernet-Oraison), who seized the opportunity for attack when the Duke of Savoy was on the wrong side of the Verdon. The author of the *Histoire* was not in a position to be accurately informed as to the details of the battle.

of terrorism to which his brother resorted, who, although successful in clearing the province of the Savoyard and Leaguer garrisons, made the Provençals more defiant than before of Henry's authority.

When the Duke of Epernon heard of his brother's death he hurried with about 4000 men from Saintonge and arrived in May in Provence. His appointment as governor was demanded by La Valette's Gascon troops, and Henry IV., against his inclination, had his consent practically forced from him. The rebellion in Provence was partly separatist and the Gascon troops were wholly foreigners to the Provençals, nor did they behave at all well in the country. Epernon took Antibes and, in 1593, Auriol and Roquevaire; in all these places wholesale executions took place; he then joined Montmorency from Languedoc and began the siege of Aix. No Leaguer capital of any province opened its gates to the King's representative before his conversion, so far did the League succeed. Meantime, Arles had revolted from the Duke of Savoy and made an agreement with Epernon. The Arlésiens were weary alike of the League and of Charles Emmanuel. The Duke did nothing more in Provence, for he was forced to attend to matters nearer home in Piedmont which Lesdiguières had invaded with success and where he had occupied several fortresses.

In Guyenne during the years 1592-93 Matignon was having considerable trouble with the League.[1] The capital itself never got the chance of revolting, but it was full of Leaguers and only the marshal's constant presence prevented a rising. In some of the neighbouring towns, Marmande, Agen, Périgueux, and especially at Blaye, the Leaguers had matters their own way. Blaye on the Gironde, which de Lussan had seized for the League, was, owing to its position and the intimate relations which de Lussan maintained with Spain, a source of great annoyance to the royalists. It was considered to be of such importance that Elizabeth allowed English ships of war to go to Bordeaux to check the activities of the Spaniards and the League. There were two naval engagements during Matignon's siege of Blaye with much destruction and loss of life to both English and Spaniards;

[1] *Le gouvernement de Matignon en Guyenne pendant les premières années du règne de Henri IV.*, by V. Gebelin.

but the success of the joint land and sea operations was very limited and Blaye remained untaken. The record of these events, of which many details exist, is interesting, but it belongs as much to the history of the English-Spanish war as to that of the League.[1] The various operations in these provinces, as well as Montmorency's success in Upper Languedoc, at Villemur, against Marshal Joyeuse's son, who commanded for the League, were not of a nature to produce a decision. Henry IV. consequently began to be assailed from all sides with urgent arguments, not wholly devoid of threats, to begin his much-talked-of instruction in the Catholic Faith.

All his chief Catholic supporters were insistent as to the necessity, Aumont,[2] Epernon, the Dukes of Longueville and Nevers, and the new Duke of Montpensier (Dombes). Amongst the Huguenots Rosny was openly in favour of it and even Mornay was hardly opposed. All France was threatened, inside with ruin and desolation from the prolonged war, and outside by the danger from Spain. Henry IV., as we have seen, had no very pronounced feelings as to the merits of the rival religions, but he resented being forced in a matter of conscience, especially by such notoriously irreligious men as were some of those who constrained him. It is certain that the narrowness of Calvinism was as displeasing to him as to Rosny and many others who were Huguenots, but that sentiment is not necessarily a stepping-stone into the Church.

Gregory XIV. was dead and after him Innocent IX., who left no impression on the political world. To them succeeded Clement VIII. He was a man of good family and well versed in matters of diplomacy, but he continued the pro-Spanish policy of Gregory with important modifications, and this difference gave hope to the royalists. Cardinal Gondi and the Marquis of Pisani, the former French ambassador to the Holy See, left for Rome and the Venetians promised to further Henry's interests in that quarter. The Venetian diplomacy in those days ranked as high

[1] 'The English on the Gironde,' 1592-93. *Eng. Hist. Rev.*, vol. xxxi, pp. 279 *seq.*

[2] Guillaume de Tavannes complained to the King of Aumont's disregard of his duty of maintaining Henry's authority and regarded with suspicion his raising of the siege of Autun; but Aumont was a genuine royalist, perhaps a little uneasy under a heretic King. *Mémoires*, G. de T., pp. 70, 71.

as did the Austrian in the nineteenth century. Mayenne undertook to support Henry's agents secretly, but the Pope, still politically swayed by Spain, refused to allow the envoys an entry to Papal territory. Mayenne was sought by all; by the King, by the Leaguers, and by the Spaniards. He managed to balance one against the other. Jeannin urged him to convoke the Estates, in earnest this time; which he did, appointing Paris for the assembly and not Soissons as the Spaniards desired. The reason for this was that Paris was now safe for the experiment. The reaction had gone far since the suppression of the *Sixteen*, and the *Politiques* or crypto-*Politiques* were now in a majority, if not yet very vocal. At the end of October Mayenne entered Paris and caused the *parlement* to register the appointment of the new Legate, but at the same time listened to a violent attack on Spain and the preachers (this term signified the political curés and had nothing to do with the Dominicans as such) by the *avocat général*. In November the Sorbonne issued a strong declaration against the *Politiques* and spoke of the *Sixteen* as having been unjustly destroyed. This was impolitic if they wished Mayenne to be at all favourable. The Duke was intensely irritated and laughed at their further request that detractors of the Pope or of Philip should be punished. He is reported to have said that he knew well how to destroy their little empire, the Sorbonne, if necessary. The question of the convocation of the Estates was far from settled, for the Duke of Parma, who spoke of returning to France, was against their meeting in Paris and Mayenne would not hold them in a northern town under Spanish influence. Once more Mayenne's policy of delay served him; for the course of events solved this thorny question, as is their habit. On December 2, Parma died at Arras, to the great regret of the zealous Leaguers and to the great relief of Mayenne. As a point of history, it is worth remarking how often even great statesmen, not that Mayenne was one, have owed their success rather to a fortunate sequence of events than to their own subtle combinations.

The Leaguer Estates opened in January, 1593, but the inaugural *séance* was not until the 26th. Paris was full of the agents of the various candidates for the crown; most of them had no chance whatever of election. There were the three

Lorraine princes, various Bourbons, the Duke of Nemours, Charles Emmanuel, and the more serious and dangerous candidates, the King of Spain and his daughter; but the real danger would only come when and if Philip offered his daughter to a Leaguer who combined princely rank with popularity. On the opening day there was not a single representative of the *Noblesse*, the deputies of the *Clergy* and the *Tiers* together numbered about sixty. These were all from Paris, Brittany, Lyons, Provence, Vermandois, and some *bailliages* of the Centre. Mayenne's discourse had little assurance and avoided all really vital matters. The Legate desired to make the Estates swear never to enter into negotiations with Henry IV.; but the Archbishop of Lyons objected that this proposal anticipated the ruling of the Pope and was inadmissible. Epinac, extreme man as he was, was an able canonist and never supported the follies of the League or the exaggerated pretensions of Spain. On February 4, some deputies from Champagne and Burgundy[1] arrived and a few of the *Noblesse*, amongst them de Vitry, Leaguer governor of Meaux, whom we have met; to those were soon added Villars and the Norman deputies. Auvergne, Languedoc, Guyenne, and Dauphiné were never represented throughout the assembly. A letter of the *royaux*, who had assembled at Chartres, proposing a conference to be held near St. Denis, was given to the Estates, which rejected the advice of Cardinal Pellevé, a notorious pro-Spaniard, that the Sorbonne should be consulted on the matter. There were never present more than 49 deputies for the *Clergy*, 55 for the *Tiers*, and 24 for the *Noblesse*, Pellevé and Epinac were elected spokesmen for the *Clergy*, the Seigneur de la Vau, a Burgundian, for the *Noblesse*, and the Prévôt des Marchands, L'Huillier, for the *Tiers*. The manipulators of the Estates, which were far from working harmoniously, were the Legate, the Duke of Feria, Philip's special ambassador, Mayenne, and in the background the Sorbonne and the preachers. These Estates never represented anything but themselves and were wholly unfit to pronounce upon such a question as the Salic Law, upon which the arguments for Spain wholly turned. The endless twaddle of an old doctor of law, Mendoza, who was

[1] *Lettres d'Etienne Bernard sur l'assemblée des Etats Généraux de la Ligue en* 1593. Garnier, Dijon. Document L.

attached to Feria, combined with the ambassador's pride and lack of tact, irritated Mayenne to such a degree that he nearly broke off all negotiations. Finally, Mayenne promised to further the claim of the Infanta in return for the governorship of Burgundy, which was to be hereditary in his family, and his confirmation as lieutenant-general of the kingdom; but neither Mayenne nor Feria were in good faith. The Spaniard's task had the less chance of success, for his master's help was more remote; whereas Mayenne knew that at any time he could get practically what he liked from Henry IV. in return for his services.

The conference which was suggested for St. Denis opened at Suresne on April 14 between the League and the King's commissioners. This conference was desired by the majority of Parisians, perhaps even by a majority in the Estates, but it was hateful to the zealous Leaguers. At the end of April, Henry IV. cut short all further talk by suddenly declaring to the *Surintendant* d'O his intention of being received into the Church. François d'O had all along, for some unknown reason, made himself the spokesman of the *Royaux* in the interests of Catholicism; never was there so strange an agent of religion. This vital news was at once passed on to the Archbishop of Bourges. On May 4, an armistice was concluded for two months, to be operative within eight miles of Paris and Suresne. The Archbishops of Bourges and Lyons engaged in a learned controversy on the Catholic and legitimist principles, which was conducted with some warmth but in perfect gravity and good taste. On the invitation of Mayenne a commission of the Three Orders went to hear, at the same time as the conference, the proposals of Feria. The Duke announced that he had authority to offer 14,000 soldiers and over one million écus for the French if the Infanta were to be elected queen. A most unexpected protest was raised. It was none other than the fanatic Bishop of Senlis, Rose, who declared that the *Politiques* were right in saying that ambition had more to do with the League than religion, and that rather than listen to Feria's proposals he would himself become a *Politique*. How strong is the national sentiment of Frenchmen.

Henry realised that the moment to strike had come. He hurried matters forward and said that he would no longer bother

about a council but would seek instruction at once from a certain number of Bishops and doctors, and at the same time he summoned a convocation of the magnates of France and deputies of the *parlements* to meet at Mantes. Meantime the *status quo* in the matter of religion and of the edicts concerning the Huguenots was to be observed until after the convocation. Mayenne created some mirth by saying that God looked at the heart and not at the exterior profession of religion. It was not funny in itself, but the tender consciences of Mayenne and d'O had a comical side for their contemporaries. The Bishops and doctors, as well Leaguer as royalist, were therefore summoned to Mantes for July 15, but no pastor was invited to assist in arranging the *differences and difficulties from which proceeded the schism of the Church*; such was the formula. It was a wise decision, fairer even to the Huguenots; for as the triumph of Catholicism was a foregone conclusion, any debate could only have been held for the confusion of the Protestant divines. Henry's quick wit saved France from the sorry spectacle of another Westminster conference, a disputation in which the result was likewise pre-arranged but in a different sense. Just before the beginning of this conference some of the King's followers were deep in intrigues with Mayenne, and so great was Henry's mistrust of all that he had as far as possible kept Englishmen near to his person. After Rose another shock came to the Parisian Leaguers. Amongst the curés who went to the convocation at Suresne was Lincestre, one of the erstwhile most fanatic of Leaguers. It is fair to say that Lincestre, apart from his extreme views, was a man of a wholly different type to Boucher, and other political curés, and he had at one time saved some Huguenots from the mob. This priest was from Guyenne, in origin, and his name is curious and has even an English sound. Is it possible that he was of English descent, from the long period during which the Bordelais was a possession of the English crown? The prelates and divines were interrupted on July 23 by the Cardinal of Bourbon raising the question as to the competence of the French Bishops to receive Henry before the Pope had given his judgment. The majority declared that the excommunication of the King was contrary to the laws of the kingdom and the liberties of the Gallican Church; moreover, the Bishops were competent to

pronounce in processes of heresy. The next day the King went over all the disputed points with the Archbishop of Bourges, the Bishops of Nantes, Le Mans, who was an Angennes, Chartres, and with the Elect of Evreux, who was the able but unscrupulous du Perron. Supported by de Harlay and Groulart, the *présidents* of the *parlements* of Paris and Rouen, Henry refused to sign a detailed exposition of the Faith as regards minor matters and the Bishops agreed to a simpler formula. The day after the King took leave of his pastors and old friends and assured them that he would allow no injury to be done to those who continued to follow the reformed religion. He made Gabrielle d'Estrées his confidante, writing to her that he intended to take the *perilous leap. I have a hundred troublesome bores on my hands, enough to make me hate St. Denis as much as you do Mantes. It seems a year since I have seen you. A million kisses to my dear mistress.* The King was not insincere. He passed rapidly from mood to mood, and now that he had determined on the step he went towards it in the same light-hearted spirit as that in which he would have embarked on a dangerous military exploit. He had the faculty for a whole-hearted belief in the emotion of the moment. He was very fervent at the Huguenot worship; he believed in an eternal devotion to the mistress of the day, and he was very genuine in his religious duties as a Catholic.

Previous to all this, there arose one or rather two occasions of real danger within Paris.

The Three Orders had again been invited at the end of June to hear Feria explain all the advantages which were to be gained by accepting the Infanta, and they also had once more to listen to a pedantic dissertation by Mendoza on the subject of the Salic Law. This did not put the Estates in a good temper. They therefore asked a plain question. *Would or would not the King of Spain marry his daughter to a French prince?* It was a real crisis. Perhaps Feria had not the power, perhaps he lacked a sufficient grasp of the situation; but if he had then said that the Infanta might marry the Duke of Guise, it is possible that the magic of the name would have rekindled the dying embers of the League. Mayenne and the *parlement* would of course have protested, but the election might have been ratified by the Estates. Feria and his master let this chance slip: they had

miscalculated the forces against them: both thought that the opposition to Spain was incarnate in Mayenne, and that without him the Leaguers would elect the Infanta, but it was not so. It was the old mistake of Catherine and of Henry III. The popularity of the Duke of Guise, which was extremely embarrassing to Mayenne, increased amongst the masses and he was usually accompanied by a great crowd; the remains of the *Sixteen* and the zealots began to take heart. The ambassador at length informed the council of the League that Philip would give his daughter to the Duke of Guise. At last the word was spoken, but not to the Estates. Mayenne asked Feria for proof of his offer and the Spaniard complied on July 12. Mayenne was wholly unprepared for this, but he was not yet at the end of his capacity for causing delay. It was now a race to get Henry IV. received before Feria could lay his master's offer before the Estates. The excitement became intense, now the odds were in favour of Feria and now of Mayenne. Fortunately, the Duke of Guise held back. He was partly afraid of his uncle and partly was unwilling to wholly identify himself with Spanish interests. The Lorraine interests had always been anti-Habsburg until a few years previously. Feria tried in vain to bring the proposal before the Estates. Mayenne disputed the terms word by word and pointed out the uselessness of the election without having an army to support it. The crowd pursued the Duke of Guise in the streets and saluted him as King; he, perhaps fortunately for himself, repudiated the implied settlement. It was too late, Mayenne had won. On July 25, Henry presented himself at the door of the Abbey church of St. Denis, accompanied by his guards, officers, the great dignitaries of France, and followed by the acclamations of the people. They knocked, the door was opened by the Archbishop of Bourges who with eight other bishops received the King. Henry told them that he desired to be received within the fold of the Catholic, Apostolic, and Roman Church. He then made his abjuration and profession of faith, and was blessed by the Archbishop. His confession was heard whilst the *Te Deum* was sung in the nave of the church. Afterwards the King assisted at High Mass in the presence of the *parlement* and the royal officials who had arrived from Tours.

Thus was accomplished the momentous act and tranquillity began slowly to return to France.[1] It cannot be doubted that it was a necessity. Four years of ruin and indecisive warfare had passed since the murder of Henry III., and the King's victory was as remote as ever. Although his genius in war might have still left him undefeated in the field by the League, there is no

[1] The Pope was not at all satisfied with this reconciliation and refused to receive Nevers as the envoy of Henry, but admitted him to audience as Duke and a peer of France. Clement's discourse showed that the Curia was not well informed as to the political situation in France. They looked at it through Spanish Leaguer glasses. There is an excellent summary of Henry's resources in Nevers' discourse to the Pope.

1. Two-thirds of the kingdom were in Henry's obedience.

2. The princes of the *fleur de lis*, most of the provincial governors, the four secretaries of state, and the principal financial secretaries were with the King.

3. Five out of the six *présidents* of the *parlement* of Paris, the *premier président* of Rouen, and three *présidents* of Dijon were respectively at Tours, Caen, and Semur.

4. There was a strong royalist fraction of the *parlement* of Toulouse at Castel Sarrasin. Grenoble, Bordeaux, and Rennes were all loyal.

5. Henry had at his disposal the services of 10,000 *gentilshommes*.

6. Against all this there were only the Lorraine and Savoy princes who were of any standing. Most of the League was rubbish except what was foreign.

7. Furthermore, most of the governors and royal officials whom the League called heretics were appointed by Henry III., and for advice about these appointments he had mostly relied on the *père Edmond Auger, Jésuite, personne sans reproche*.

Nevers offered proof (*pièces de conviction*) of his assertions. *Ce que j'ay toujours offert à Votre Sainteté de faire apparoir par pièces authentiques que j'ay apportées avec moy, ne prétendant de mettre en avant chose que je ne puisse prouver, afin de retrancher tout prétexte de dire de moy avec vérité ce que l'on a dit de Moïse—multa dixit et nihil probavit.*

The Duke also implored His Holiness not to delay to receive the penitent King until the angel, about whom the Pope had talked, came to tell him that the King's change of heart was genuine, for that was not probable. *Car it est à craindre que l'on ne pense que V.S. se remette expressément à chose impossible ; parceque Dieu n'a accoustumé d'envoyer ses anges pour occasion si claire et notoire à un chacun—Quia habemus Moysem et prophetas. C'est à dire que Christ vous a suffisamment enseigné par la doctrine ce que vous avez à faire sans vous remettre à recevoir de luy miracles.* Finally, he prayed for good counsel to His Holiness, so as to bring him to a conclusion requisite and necessary for the welfare of France, Christendom, and more particularly for the Holy See. *Mémoires Nevers*, vol. ii., pp. 405 *seq.* The earliest edition of Nevers' discourses to Clement VIII. which we have is in Latin. 'Acta legationis illust. ducis Niverniæ ad Clementem VIII. ubi de regis Christ. Galliæ regni negotiis agitur.' Francofurti apud heredes Andreæ Wecheli, Claud Marnium, Joann. Aubrium, MDXCV. A note to the reader adds : *Ea primum Lutetiae Parisiorum gallico idiomate in lucem edita*, and was translated into Latin so that the strength of the cause of France might be spread abroad.

The preface of the *Imprimeur du roy* to the French version of 1594 is interesting. *Le discours de M. de duc le Nevers sur ce qu'il a traitté à Rome pour le roy, estant tombé entre nos mains nous eussions pensé grandement préjudicier au public de l'en frustrer tant il est rare, excellent, etc.* The printer was strongly Gallican and anti-Spanish. All Nevers' difficulties in Rome and his refusal to allow the French prelates in his charge to visit the Grand Penitentiary are related in the *Mémoires*.

reason to suppose that the great towns of France would ever have opened their gates to a heretic, on the contrary, there is every reason to suppose that with the continuance of hostilities, the schemes of Spain, the ambitious of the Leaguer chiefs, and the obduracy of the Leaguer masses would have ended in the dismemberment of France, and that for generations, perhaps for ever, she would have lost the primacy in Europe to which from her history, culture, and the genius of her people she was entitled.

The Leaguer Estates had one more fatuous measure to pass,[1] which they did on the last day of July ; it was to vote the acceptance ' integrally ' of the decrees of Trent. The matter had gone beyond the Estates. Since Henry IV.'s reconciliation, all such questions lay between the Pope, the King, and the French hierarchy. It is improbable that they attached much importance to their own measures. They were weary of the whole business, and were desirous of returning home, and in fact a considerable number left Paris at that time. The Estates persisted in a desultory way until the end of the year ; there were present rarely more than fifty deputies and they were without authority.

The King's reconciliation had considerable effect in the provinces, but not so speedy as might have been supposed. The peasants were almost stupefied with misery, and so far as they took these matters in at all desired only what would bring them a little relief. In the Leaguer towns, and more especially in the provincial capitals, there were like symptoms ; the more solid townsfolk were for peace and the *politique* element amongst the more notable lifted up their heads and began to enter into surreptitious communications with the royalists. Those who have a stake in a country may fairly safely be reckoned as constitutionalists. Those who had everything to gain and nothing to lose were Leaguers, much in the same way as in our days they would be radicals and socialists. I speak of the League as it had become after the conversion of the King. The town councils usually contained the most confirmed Leaguers and they continued their violence long after the Leaguer *parlements* became faint in their sympathy. This was particularly noticeable in Burgundy. At Dijon the *parlement* was flouted and subjected to all kinds of

[1] Lettres d'Etienne Bernard, *supra*.

indignities by the arrogant attitude of the *Vicomte Major* (Mayor) and the *Chambre de la Ville*. The archives of the *Chambre* reveal how clearly the heart of rebellion and fanaticism was in that body. Out of a population of some 15,000 the *échevin* Pignalet reckoned that close on 2000 were royalists. He was thinking only of grown men, which means a considerable proportion. The surrender of Dijon must be deferred for the next chapter.

In Provence matters moved faster in favour of Henry, which seems strange for so Catholic a province; to say nothing of any other aspirations which it may have had. The intense dislike which Epernon seemed to arouse in those amongst whom he moved is the explanation. During the summer of 1593 he had been engaged on the siege of Aix. The town was surrounded and an immensely strong work, St. Eutrope, had been built against it, but it defied the joint efforts of Epernon and Montmorency. An attempt to blow up one of the gates and wall had failed. Martigues had cruelly fallen and this encouraged the capital to resistance. No reliance could be placed on Epernon's honesty in observing a capitulation, but Montmorency was a well-meaning and fussy man. He had a very high idea of his importance, and was the head of one of the most glorious of families, and adopted an aggrieved and querulous tone when matters went against his wishes. Epernon could do what he liked with him. However, towards the end of 1593, Carcès, the defender of Aix, found himself in a position of difficulty. He had tired of the League, especially of the Savoyard interest, and Aix could not hold out much longer; he had to choose between Epernon and Lesdiguières. He entered into negotiations with Lesdiguières and Oraison, who guaranteed that the town of Aix, if Carcès submitted to Henry IV., would not be forced to receive Epernon as governor. He was *de facto* governor of Provence. The Duke had no following but his own Gascons, no, not the greatest royalist in Provence. This matter was arranged and on January 7, 1594, Henry was proclaimed by the *parlement*. The royalist fraction which had flitted from Pertuis to Manosque and was now at Sisteron soon after amalgamated with the erstwhile Leaguer *parlement* at Aix. Bishop Génébrard, who had been the soul of Aix's resistance, fled to Marseilles, there to continue for some time his Leaguer activities. Henry's conversion was

a judgment and a true sifting of Frenchmen. Those who were *bona fide* Leaguers and out only for a Catholic King came in very soon; those who stayed out were now convicted of having motives other than pure Catholicism. One of the first was de Vitry, an active Leaguer and an honourable man. He told the town council and garrison of Meaux that since Henry had been reconciled he intended to surrender the town and enter the King's service. The views of the Meaux Leaguers are not recorded, but de Vitry was not a sort of person to listen to much talk; the town obtained exemption from the *Taille* for nine years. De Vitry proved himself a true man. He had consistently served Henry III., and if his desertion of Henry IV. smacked somewhat of disloyalty to the last Valois, he had a conscientious objection to serving the first Bourbon. To show, apart from religion, he had no hostility to Henry IV., he hunted the royal stag-hounds when the master was ill; for hunting went on regardless of the civil war. Le Châtre followed in February and gave back Orléans to the obedience of the King. In the same month Lyons broke out in revolt against the League, chiefly because it was feared that the governor intended to call in Spanish help. There was a rumour that the governor of the Milanese was sending troops, probably unfounded. Ornano, the lieutenant-general in Dauphiné, was summoned to take charge in the King's name and even the efforts of Epinac failed to quell the royalist enthusiasm. The people burned an effigy of the League together with the arms of Spain and Savoy.

The next thing to be done was to proceed with Henry's coronation, for a King of France hardly seemed to be a true King without having gone through the ancient and splendid ceremony. Reims was impossible, it was one of the very strongholds of the League, but, though highly desirable, the course of French history could provide instances to show that coronation at Reims was not an absolute necessity. On February 17, 1594, Henry was crowned at Chartres by its Bishop, Nicolas de Thou. The ceremony was necessarily berefit of much of its dignity. The regalia at St. Denis had been melted down by the Leaguers and the miraculous oil in the *sainte ampoule* at Reims was of course not to be obtained; but some hardly less holy oil belonging to St. Martin of Tours was brought for the anointing.

In Paris there was continual excitement and even danger of bloodshed between the remains of the *Sixteen*, the preachers, and the *Politiques*. Mayenne pacified the former by dismissing de Belin, an honest man, anti-Spanish but a Leaguer, and the latter the Duke appeased by declaring that he never had been, and never would be of Spanish sympathy, one of his few honest statements, and that he desired a satisfactory peace as much as anyone. De Belin immediately entered Henry's service, perhaps he remembered the King's kind behaviour at Arques. De Brissac, one of the stormy petrels of the League, was appointed governor of Paris, and Mayenne with his wife and children took their leave of the capital early in March. There seemed to be much to fear from leaving a man so extreme or irresponsible as de Brissac in charge, but the contrary happened. Brissac passed from one extreme to the other, and began to cultivate the society of the *Politiques*. It is difficult to say when the hero of the barricades in his heart threw over the League. Brissac was an imaginative man of culture and classical learning and lived in a rather fantastical world of his own; like men of his rank he was weary of the futility of the League. He had but little religious enthusiasm and had no real objection to recognising Henry. At the same time we may suspect that, judging by the exceedingly good terms he had made for himself, he realised, when in charge of Paris, that he could do better by bargaining on the King's necessities than by adhering to the sinking fortunes of the League. Henry's extravagant manner of literally outbidding the League for the services of his opponents was well known and, whatever may be thought of the justice of the system, it proved as potent a solvent of the League as Mayenne himself. The chief points of the arrangement, apart from de Brissac's personal reward, were abolition and indemnity of the past, the preservation of the city's privileges, no Huguenot services to be held within eighteen miles of Paris, and a safe conduct for the Legate, the Spaniards, and other foreign soldiers.

On March 21 de Brissac opened the Porte Neuve, and whilst various Leaguer companies were dismissed on different pretexts, numerous royalists disguised as Leaguers were introduced to the city. Brissac was acting not without danger to himself, for the Spaniards had some idea that all was not well and insisted

on his accompanying the visiting rounds on the night of the 21st. At the time appointed, about four in the morning, de Vitry arrived at the Porte St. Denis and St. Luc at the Porte Neuve; these were opened. It is strange how quietly the operations passed. The troops which entered by these two gates were divided into four companies; one followed the walls and entered by the Porte St. Honoré; another from the Porte Neuve made for the corner of the rue St. Honoré and the rue de l'Arbre Sec; the third went to the Pont St. Michel, and the last marched along the quays. This was the only company to encounter any opposition. There were *landsknechts* at the Quai de l'Ecole, but their resistance was speedily overcome and some were pushed into the Seine. The King himself was received by the *Prévôt des Marchands* at the Porte Neuve. The Châtelet was occupied by de Vitry, the Arsenal and the Louvre were secured either by the royal troops or by the royalist civic bands. In the northern quarters some slight resistance was offered by the Leaguers, but the armed forces which had been inveigled into remote quarters of the city did not move; for each was cut off from communication with the others and knew not to whom to trust. The clergy received Henry at Notre Dame, and the ringing of bells which had long been silent except to sound the alarm mingled with the cries of *Vive le Roi*, which the people gradually found courage to raise. Like our Charles II., his grandson, Henry might with equal truth have said: *I can't think why I did not return long before, they all seem so pleased at my coming.*

The long nightmare of the *Sixteen* was over. The University and its quarter were not less complaisant. Already by midday the shops were opening and life was beginning to run normally; the King's entry, which only eight hours before had seemed fraught with unknown dangers and possibilities,[1] had taken

[1] It was the tutelage of Spain which had converted the majority of the Parisians from being ardent Leaguers to moderate royalists. They had not abated in the least their ardent Catholicism, which was long to be the chief characteristic of the capital. The famous *Satyre Ménippée* was certainly one of the minor causes of the downfall of the League's popularity. The earliest edition was printed at Tours, 1594, and was called *La Vertu du Catholicon d'Espagne*. Subsequent editions have both titles. It must not be regarded as a wholly truthful picture of the later League. It is of the nature of a manifesto of a victorious party and an extraordinarily virulent attack on Spain. So long as it was believed to have been first printed in 1593, its importance as propaganda was naturally exaggerated; however, much of it was composed earlier and from early 1593 was probably circulated in the form of printed

place without any loss of life except amongst the *landsknechts*, and three or four people in the Ile de la Cité and in the northern quarters. It was just four years since Ivry.

After dinner the King watched the departure of Feria and Ibarra with the Spanish and Neapolitan troops by the Porte St. Denis. *My compliments to your master, and don't come back here*, said the good-humoured monarch. Some of the *Sixteen*, the Legate, and a few of the greater fanatics departed with them. Towards these the populace, now frantically loyal, showed more hostility than to the foreign troops. Henry astonished even his old followers, accustomed as they were to the King's indifference to all but the needs of the moment, by being on the day of his entry on the best of terms with the Duchess of Nemours and playing cards with the arch-patroness of the League, Catherine de Montpensier. His 'invincible hardness of heart' was never more strikingly shown. There is something very strange in the passions and fury of those days. The League was a desperate gamble for most, a matter of an ideal for some, but it is impossible to think that any great personal animosity could ever have existed between the leaders of the two parties, whatever may have been the case amongst their followers lower down in the social scale. However, Henry, if it suited him to forgive and forget, was keenly critical of any pretence or fine language; a bargain was a bargain and there was nothing more to be said. So to de Brissac, who greeted him with a speech about giving to Cæsar what belonged to Cæsar, he sharply answered, *Given! no, sold, and at a considerable price.*

sheets. The *Anti-Lorrain* and the *Exhortation d'aucuns Parisiens eslargis de la Bastille* (prisoners of Bussy freed by Mayenne) are also of amazing virulence, and from them the authors of the *Satyre* got some ideas. One of the most prevalent was the portraying of Philip II. as the *bourreau des Indes, Sathan de Castille etc., demy-Juif.* Also in the *Exhortation*, Spaniards are called *veillacques Sarrazins, race infame des Gots.* There is also a fictitious letter in Spanish in which the *Sixteen* offer the city to Philip. *Ces marranes font déjà des synagogues dans les faubourgs et y prêchent la circoncision.* One of the more popular beliefs or assumed beliefs was that the Spaniard was partly Moor and partly Jew. The prejudice in England at the time of the Armada and after was a pale ghost compared to the virulent hatred of Spain shown by the later anti-Leaguers. There were many compilers of the *Satyre*, like the Marprelate tracts; Le Roy, canon of Rouen and chaplain of the Cardinal of Vendôme, and Nicolas Rapin were the most important. Gillot, another canon, and Pithou also contributed, whilst Passerat seems to have composed the verses. The violence of the Leaguer clergy could be met at times with that of the *royaux* clergy. Not one of the authors was a Huguenot. The idea seems to have been first discussed at Canon Gillot's house in Paris.

A few days later the Parisians saw the recently heretical Béarnais taking part in a procession across Paris and touching for the King's evil.

François d'O, again governor of the Ile de France, received the oaths of the municipal officials and a circular was drawn up to be sent the round of the provincial capitals. The Chancellor read at the Palais the letters patent which revoked the interdiction placed on the members of the *parlement* of Paris who had remained in the city to act in the Leaguer interest. The other courts, that is to say the *Cour des Aides* and the *Chambre des Comptes* and the *Châtelet* were likewise restored to working order. On March 30 the *parlement* issued an *arrêt* against all ordinances, *arrêts*, and decrees issued since the last day of December, 1588, revoked all the powers given to Mayenne, and declared all who favoured or resorted to him to be guilty of *lèse-majesté*, and Mayenne himself was required to recognise Henry IV. under the same penalty. All the acts of the pretended assembly of Estates General were likewise *cassés et annulés*, and all processions and religious ceremonies in any way connected with the League were no longer to be observed; but instead, March 22 was in future to be kept as a day of thanks to God for the deliverance of the capital. The *parlement* further charged the *procureur* and the *avocat général* to see that all the acts and records of the Leaguer *parlement* were obliterated or destroyed, so that nothing should remain of the late troubles.[1] The Sorbonne was more obstinate, but after a month's resistance began to remember St. Paul's views as to the condition of those who resist the power which is given by God, and without more ado accepted the new Rector on April 23. It was a worse recantation than that of the *parlement;* for *parlements* may err and have erred, but it was something new for the supreme theological faculty of France to admit itself to have been mistaken.

Henry's entry into Paris marks in a very real sense the end of the League. The League which had any shadow of excuse for

[1] Reference to this fact was made in the introduction. The late Leaguer *parlements* followed at varying intervals of two to six months. In the case of over delay *lettres royaux* were usually sent to enforce the destruction. Letters patent were used to suspend or transfer a parlement, for that concerned the public: the destruction of records did not. Peculiarly obnoxious individuals, such as Génébrard, were dealt with by an *ordre exprès du roy*, popularly called *lettre de cachet*; but all letters except *patents* were folded and sealed.

existence certainly expired on that day, but some towns continued to resist with Spanish help and Mayenne and Mercœur were still irreconcilable. With Henry's reconciliation the storm subsided, but the vessel continued to roll and pitch in the heavy swell for at least another year.

The events up to the articles of Folembray will occupy the next and last chapter.

CHAPTER VIII

THE END OF THE LEAGUE

FROM THE SUBMISSION OF PARIS TO THE ARTICLES OF FOLEMBRAY

With the year 1594 the provincial towns began to surrender rapidly. Villars came to an understanding with the King and gave up Rouen on March 27, nor were all the efforts of La Chapelle Marteau able to influence the townsfolk against the arguments of Villars and Rosny. The Leaguer *parlement* of Rouen was reunited with the royalist fraction at Caen. Le Havre, Pont Audemer, and Montivilliers made their submission in turn and the League in Normandy was a thing of the past.

Matters were less satisfactory in Brittany.[1] There the greater part of the province still adhered to Mercœur, who was tied to Philip II. to an extent which Mayenne never was; for the King of Spain had more interests in intervention in Brittany than elsewhere, save perhaps in Burgundy. The important seaport of St. Malo, after maintaining a quasi-independence both of the League and of the King, something after the fashion of Marseilles, declared for Henry; this was a considerable gain. Elizabeth had taken some part in resisting the Spanish attempts on Brittany. When Blavet was surprised by the Hispano-Leaguers some 3000 men were landed under Sir J. Norris and they fought several successful actions. In the late summer, 1593, further troops were sent to Brittany to get rid of the Spanish force at Crozon. This reinforcement gave relief to Marshal d'Aumont;

[1] *Histoire de ce qui s'est passé en Bretagne . . . durant les guerres de la Ligue*, Moreau, Canon of Quimper, eye-witness from the Leaguer point of view. La B. de Messueur, Brest, 1857.

Correspondance du duc de Mercœur et les ligueurs Bretons avec l'Espagne. Société Bibliophile Bretonne. Rennes, 1899. 2 vols. Extracts from Simancas; French and Spanish letters. *L'Histoire de Bretagne*, vol. 5, M. B. Pocquet.

he was more free for activity in the field and reduced Mollard and Quimper. Combined action by sea and land, Norris and Aumont by land and Frobisher by sea, was begun against Crozon. The following year it was crowned with success and Crozon was taken. So the all-important naval station of Brest was saved, but Frobisher died of his wounds shortly after. The success of the English here is in contrast to their failure before Rouen. It is another proof of our unrivalled power at sea and comparative weakness on land.

Riom, in Auvergne,[1] Périgueux, and the obdurate League town of Poitiers recognised Henry in April, 1594; the last chiefly owing to the fact that Elbœuf was weary of the whole thing, and like other Leaguers made a good bargan for himself without bothering over Mayenne, his chief. In the north, Laon,[2] La Fère, Soissons, Amiens, and Beauvais were solid for Mayenne, but Abbeville made its submission. In the east, Reims, Vitry-le-François, St. Dizier, Rocroy, and Mezières were held, the first, at least, against its will by the garrisons of the Duke of Guise or of St. Paul, one of the Leaguer marshals. Toulouse and Upper Languedoc, Cahors, the districts of the upper Garonne and Rodez remained faithful to the Lorrainers, but they were isolated.

Provence was much disturbed with the Carcès, Oraison, Epernon dispute and must be considered at some length. It is necessary to couple the question of Provence with the reduction of Champagne to the King's obedience, though the connection between the two matters is not immediately apparent. We must leave the chronological order, slightly, to finish up the history of Provence.

The condition of this province was almost anarchical outside of Aix, now loyal, Arles, Toulon and some of the larger towns.

[1] *Mémoires*, Vernies de Salers, 1589-1593. Clermont-Ferrand, 1838. It consists of a sort of *résumé* of the parties and their position and prospects in Auvergne written before the submission of Riom. The author was the president of the *Cour des Aides* at Montferrand. It may have been compiled as a sort of *aide-mémoire* for the King at the request of Forget or one of the secretaries.

For the Périgord, the *Chroniques* of Jean Tard, Canon of Sarlat, are the observations of a cultured man. Useful for 1589-1594. Gérard, 1887, pp. 305 *seq.*

[2] *Mémoires de ce qui s'est passé en la Ville de Laon*, 1589-94, by Antoine Richard. He was a *contrôleur à l'élection de Laon* and a royalist, a dangerous profession in so strong a Leaguer country. He was a spectator of all the stirring scenes there. Published by the Académie de Laon under the title of *Mémoires sur la Ligue dans le Laonnais*, 1869.

Marseilles was still quasi-independent under the rule, or rather the tyranny, of Louis d'Aix, the *Viguier* and Casaulx, one of the *Consuls*, with the support of Philip II. Montmorency attempted with indifferent success to compose the Carcès, Oraison, Epernon feud. All claimed to be acting for the King, but it was Epernon and he alone who was still governor, albeit his appointment may have been irregular and Henry desired nothing better than his removal. He was in fact the real obstacle to the pacification of Provence. The King was much perplexed; partly because disaffection was always dangerous in a frontier province, and partly because he felt for the Provençals and their resentment at the conduct of Epernon. The Duke called practically every Provençal a rebel, and by his treatment of them in fact made many so who would not otherwise have been disaffected. It was difficult and hazardous to remove Epernon by letters patent, for Henry knew him well and he was capable of causing serious mischief. Lesdiguières, good and trustworthy soldier as he was, was impossible as governor for so Catholic a province, and Oraison, a more truculent and uncertain character, was likewise disqualified as a Huguenot. Carcès was hardly to be trusted. His past was bad, though no worse than that of many an ex-Leaguer, but he would not have been accepted by the original *royaux*.

Meantime, a strange event occurred in Champagne at Reims. St. Paul, who now called himself Duke of the Rethelois, had erected a sort of stronghold at Reims for the purpose of overawing the town; he was the nominal lieutenant-general of Guise in Champagne and a great rascal. The Rémois complained to the Duke of Guise, who required St. Paul to withdraw his garrison; the soldier of fortune replied coolly and laid his hand on the sword-hilt; instantly Guise drew his own sword and ran St. Paul through the heart. The Count of Chaligny had done the same sort of thing to Chicot:[1] the Lorraine princes were not of an equable temperament. Guise clearly realised that the Leaguers would be shy of him in future, if that was the way he treated his subordinates, and having no liking for Spain and having the cold and calculating nature of his father, listened to the advice of his mother and decided to make terms with the King.

[1] Antoine d'Anglerais, a popular character in romance.

The negotiations were rather protracted and as usual in such cases Guise did very well for himself, amongst other things being paid 400,000*l.* for his debts. In December, 1594, Henry had a brilliant inspiration. It was to withdraw Guise from Champagne, where he was rather too much associated with the old Leaguer tradition, and offer him the government of Provence, trusting to the magic of the name amongst a Catholic population to overcome their separatism. He calculated justly, but Epernon refused to admit the new governor's claims. The King did not at once enforce his appointment, but nine months later a fresh outrage of Epernon at Lambesc produced a fresh outcry on the part of the Provençals.[1] Henry then issued letters patent requiring Epernon to withdraw from Provence under the penalties of *lèse-majesté*; this was registered at Aix in November 1595. Guise's hands were now free and he began to clear out Epernon's troops and garrisons. Epernon had no followers but his own Gascons and speedily lost ground. Grasse was taken by Guise in December; the reduction of Hyères gave more trouble, but towards the end of January, 1596, that too was accomplished. On February 18 Marseilles opened its gates to Guise. This had been effected by an understanding between a certain Corsican called Libertà within the town and de Bausset, royalist governor of the Château d'If. The sea power, which throughout the war of the League was wholly at the King's disposal after the loss of the Armada, contributed curiously little to his success. The Duke of Epernon did not intend to rebel seriously, but only wanted a further *douceur* to keep quiet. He soon submitted and obtained two governments in addition to those which he already held. The problem of Provence was solved.

To return to the year 1594. Henry began the siege of Laon on May 25. It was a place of great natural and artificial strength; to-day it dominates the plain for miles around and before the invention of long range artillery must have been practically impregnable. Inside were Jeannin, who remained attached to Mayenne's fortunes, and one of the Duke's sons; he himself had gone to Brussels to appeal for reinforcements from the Archduke

[1] The murder of Honoré de Castellane, Seigneur de Besaudun. Epernon said that Besaudun, a notorious Leaguer, had rejected all his offers of composition and had killed his envoy; but see *Mémoires pour servir à l'histoire de la Ligue en Provence*, Aix-en-Provence, 1866.

Ernest. There he was violently attacked by Ibarra and Feria, who accused him of having alone been the obstacle to the election of the Infanta and of being the cause of the ruin of the League. Juan de Tassis, a moderate man, and the Archduke managed to pacify the angry parties. Some reinforcements were sent in charge of Count Mansfeld and he and Mayenne marched to the relief of Laon. These troops were intercepted and destroyed by the royalists, and Mayenne with difficulty once again escaped to La Fère. In spite of the failure of the army of relief, Laon resisted with courage and skill. Du Bourg, who had been governor of the Bastille, was in charge of the defence. Several assaults were repulsed and the loss amongst the royalists was heavy. Biron, like his father, was suspected of being less active in attack than he might have been, and during one of these assaults de Givry was killed. Henry mourned him long; he was in fact one of the most pleasing characters of the time. The town capitulated on August 2. Almost immediately after Péronne fell and, far more important, the great town of Amiens made its submission. This was a popular rising: the people, seeing that the League was dead and the present activities a barely disguised Spanish venture, opened the gates to Charles d'Humières, who represented the King in Picardy. Thus the town and the family which were the first to start the League were to see almost but not quite its end.[1] Cambray submitted to Henry in person. Henry need not have offered such advantageous terms to the adventurer Balagny, its defender, the self-made duke of the Cambrésis. Henry made his solemn entry into Amiens on the day of the Assumption and confirmed all its privileges. Beauvais also followed; its extreme Leaguer governor, Sesseval,[2] was remarkable for being one of the very few who made no bargain for himself. Since the Leaguer cause was lost, he refused to sell to the King that which he owned and had won.

In the south-west, some trouble was caused by a peasant rising. This was neither pro-King nor pro-League, but directed against the armed bands who made themselves petty tyrants in the open country. Matignon did much to cure this trouble by

[1] For Picardy, *Journal Historique*, 1587-96, of Patte. Société des Antiquaires de la Picardie, vol. 19, 1863. Patte was a native of Amiens and contemporary, but the journal was written up twenty or thirty years later.

[2] François de Serricourt of the Lorraine regiment of Tremblecourt.

rounding up and enlisting all destitute and vagabond soldiers to be used against the Leaguers in Languedoc and against the Spaniards.

It is worth while to glance at the end of the *Sixteen*. Le Clerc, Crucé, Hamilton, Pelletier (not one of the original), Cromé, and others had escaped to Flanders. These were condemned by the *parlement* and executed in effigy. The executioner of Brisson was hanged in person, and with him three others, one a priest, on the charge of complicity in the murder of the magistrates.

After the reconciliation of the King and his entry into Paris, the *parlement*, the Gallican lawyers, and the new Rector of the University began an agitation against the Jesuits. It was alleged that their aim was to subject the Church and the kingdom to the ambitions of the Spanish monarchy; *per contra*, a hundred years later, they were accused of acting wholly in the interest of the absolutism of Louis XIV. and of French nationalism. It is difficult to have it both ways. In point of fact, the Society's aims were to maintain the authority of the Church, to forward the Counter Reformation, and to convert the vast outside heathen world. The Jesuits were never to be identified with the political interests of any particular kingdom, however Catholic or however powerful. But the prejudice was easily aroused. The Jesuits had many enemies, but they possessed important friends as well, amongst them that curious patron of religion, the *Surintendant* d'O. The Sorbonne, too, disavowed the Rector's action and the faculty of arts followed. These seemed to wish for the Jesuits to be dismissed from the University but not from the kingdom. The case against them, at the instance of the Rector, was argued before the *parlement* by Arnauld, the father of a more famous son, and the Society was ably defended by Duret.[1] The barrister for the attack, seconded by Dollé, laid weight on the incompatibility of the rules and principles of the Society with the Gallican liberties and the genius of the French monarchy. Arnauld in particular treated them as spies of Spain whose aim it was to reduce all the world to Spanish rule. Duret had no difficulty in showing the absurdity of this thesis. The Rector, who was not altogether winning his case, asked the *parlement* to adjourn the matter. Thereupon the *parlement* ordered the case to be confounded with the inquiry on the whole question

[1] Cimber, vol. 13, pp. 370-397.

of the Jesuits, an investigation which had been talked of for some time past but in which no progress had been made. One single judgment could then be given to all the questions *en bloc*. Henry himself was not in favour of any move against the Society.

If nothing further had happened to excite the popular feeling, the matter would most likely have dropped; but on November 22, a young man, Jean Chastel,[1] a pupil of the Jesuits, of whom they had no opinion owing to his flighty and depraved nature, attempted to stab Henry as he was entering the house of Gabrielle d'Estrées, but fortunately only wounded the King very slightly. Chastel showed fanatic courage and doubtless expected to be revered as a second Jacques Clément, but the Leaguer stock had fallen to nothing. He said that he had heard some of the Jesuits arguing about the lawfulness of the assassination of a heretic king or one under excommunication. It is possible that he might have heard of such argument as a matter of abstract theory, on the lines of Mariana, but he in fact in no way implicated any Jesuit of approving his particular crime. To put it on the lowest grounds, of all people they were the least interested in doing anything to irritate the King. Chastel was plainly guilty and was sentenced to the usual horrible death. On the same day, the 29th, the *parlement* banished from the kingdom, within fifteen days, all the members of 'the self-styled Society of Jesus, corrupters of youth, perturbators of public peace, and enemies of the King and State, under pain of *lèse-majesté*.' Under a like penalty it was forbidden to send French subjects to study at the Jesuit colleges abroad. The expulsion was never complete in France. The seneschal of Auvergne protected the Jesuits of Clermont-Ferrand and the *parlements* of Bordeaux and Aix did not move in the matter; but those of Grenoble and Rouen and some time later that of Dijon followed the example of Paris. An *arrêt* of the *parlement* of Paris was only hortatory as regards the provincial *parlements*. An edict would have bound them all; but Henry IV., always devoid of spite, had no wish to increase any ill-feeling and no edict followed. Before long

[1] 'La vérité défendue en la cause des Jésuites contre le plaidoyer d'Arnauld,' by Richeomme, provincial of Aquitaine. There were four provinces in the Kingdom of France.

'Le dernier interrogatoire . . . de Jean Chastel, d'après les procès-verbaux inédits.' *Histoire de la Société de Jésus*, vol. ii., by H. Fouqueray, S.J.

those who had been expelled from the *ressorts* of Paris, Bordeaux, and Aix were readmitted.

Early in 1595 the *parlement* registered the reissue of the edict of 1577 (Peace of Bergerac) in favour of the Reformed. The clauses which opened to them all offices were contested as being contrary to the King's engagement after the death of Henry III.; but the voice of de Harlay decided the *conseillers* and the edict was registered without protest.

At the same time Henry, judging the time to be favourable, declared war, for which he already had taken measures, on Spain, January 17, 1595. The council was not unanimous, but Sancy, who assured the King that no trouble, in the case of an invasion of Franche-Comté, need be apprehended from the Swiss, and Biron, whose interests were bound up in war, easily overrode the more doubtful and possibly more prudent views of Rosny, who desired delay. The war, which indeed fell almost entirely on Franche-Comté and the Eastern frontier, is so associated with the expiring efforts of the League in Burgundy that we will consider the two together.

It was in Burgundy that the League had ever caused the greatest anxiety to the crown, owing to its proximity to Spanish territory and the independent spirit of its people. Like Provence, it was a frontier province, and like it, too, had souvenirs of a not very remote past, glorious and independent of France. The League was never the menace in other provinces as it was in these two, and Burgundy took the first place. Brittany, it was true, was very disaffected and Spain very active; but support could only get there by sea and in the long run must fail from the Anglo-French mastery of the sea. In Burgundy England could give no help, even if she were inclined, and the adventuring of English lives in France or in any other country was always unpopular. It is strange how Philip II, with all his sagacity, continued to waste the resources of his vast empire in interference in France. England he was bound to fight, but the great subsidies sent to the League mostly found their way into Mayenne's pocket, and his contingents of soldiers were generally defeated. Champagne, no doubt, was a frontier province, but it was too intimately connected with the French monarchy through the ages to be a real danger and it was not a province in the strict

sense of the word. The towns of the Somme were the third most critical district. It was, too, to Burgundy that Mayenne clung long after he had abandoned hope of gaining any success elsewhere.

We have already seen how, after the reconciliation of the King, many inhabitants of Dijon began to hope for an understanding with Henry's agents, but although numerous they were overawed by the two military Leaguers, Franchesse in the castle and Tavannes at Talant. All the same, in 1594, a conspiracy was formed amongst sundry citizens and even some of the town council to deliver up one of the gates to Biron. This disaffection from within, although this attempt failed, was significant, for a similar scheme succeeded in the case of Beaune next year.

The conspirators were ready to act in June 1594. The nominal head was Jacques La Verne, the mayor. He had been a violent Leaguer and was a man of restless ambition, devoid of true patriotism, also weak in character, easily alarmed, and as ready to collapse one moment as he was feverishly active another; but the real conspirators were Gagne, Quarré, Fyot, and Bretagne, the last in particular being the most active. Gagne was an *échevin* and canon of the Sainte Chapelle; after the failure of the plot he succeeded in escaping to St.-Jean-de-Losne. Pierre Quarré, *commissaire aux requêtes*, had a brother in the royalist fraction of the *parlement* at Semur: he was a cousin of Vaugrenant and had a personal animosity against sundry Leaguers. Fyot d'Arbois was a *conseiller* of the *parlement* and cousin of La Verne. Claude Bretagne, another *conseiller*, was an ardent and consistent royalist whom Mayenne called his grand enemy; La Verne in his last hours denounced him as the principal conspirator, and he escaped with difficulty to Mâlain. There were several royalist or semi-royalist captains near Dijon whom the conspirators could call to their help; the most formidable of these was Vaugrenant, governor of St.-Jean-de-Losne. The scheme was for this man to be at the Porte St. Médard on the night of August 21, when the others would open the gate to him from within. But Franchesse at the castle got news that something was toward, and a canon shot apprised Vaugrenant that his presence was known and that the plot was out. Soon denunciations began to stream in to the authorities and the names of the conspirators

were speedily known. La Verne himself disclosed all and rather more than he knew. He and a relative, a captain Gault, of no importance, were executed in October; all the other conspirators made good their escape. That there were several hundreds more implicated is certain, but of these no notice was taken beyond a few expulsions.

After this Mayenne went to Beaune and decided on the destruction of the suburbs. This produced much ill-feeling and some fourteen of the chief townsfolk who had protested were imprisoned in the castle by his order. 200,000 crowns worth of damage was done. Dijon, after the failure of La Verne's conspiracy, was safe and Beaune seemed no less so; accordingly, Mayenne went to Chalon, leaving a strong garrison under de Montmoyen at Beaune. Marshal Biron had meanwhile entered Burgundy with about 800 horse, 12,000 foot, 2000-3000 Swiss, and a few guns. He first undertook the reduction of Châteauneuf, belonging to the Montmorency family, which had been seized by the rebels.[1]

The citizens of Beaune had been alarmed by the arrival of Captain Guillerme,[2] governor of Seurre, who had been sent by Mayenne to begin the trial of the fourteen who had been imprisoned. The mayor and *échevins* saw the town's danger, for this Guillerme was a notorious ruffian, and despatched two messengers to find Biron to explain the situation and to tell him that Beaune desired to surrender to the King. There was a rising of armed citizens, directed by Alixaut, one of the *échevins*, in which Guillerme and the engineer Carlo, who had blown up the houses of the suburbs, the two men most hated by the people, were killed, and Montmoyen's brother de Latruey was taken prisoner. During this commotion Biron entered the town to the great joy of the people and turned his guns on the castle. After a short delay a practicable breach was made, and Montmoyen surrendered and came out in safety on payment of 5000 crowns ransom for himself and some ladies who were in the castle, February 5, 1595. Auxonne, Nuits, and Autun likewise surrendered to Biron later on. There still remained Dijon.

After March the royalist elements there became bolder and a scheme was contrived by Breunot to deliver the town to Biron.

[1] See Document M. [2] Cf. Document O.

Gabriel Breunot, *conseiller* of the *parlement*, had long been a crypto-royalist, and in spite of the opposition of Desbarres he managed to overcome the timidity and reluctance of the *premier président* Brulart. This Desbarres, with Franchesse and Tavannes, were the only determined supporters of the League now left. Tavannes wished to introduce a strong garrison owing to the proximity of the royal army, but the town council refused to allow it as contrary to their privileges and stopped the entry of the Baron de Thenissey and his men. However, from timidity the town council allowed a delay of a fortnight in proclaiming Henry as King, probably owing to the fact that the Spanish army, soon to be scattered at Fontaine Française, had left Franche-Comté and was approaching Dijon, and it appeared to be more numerous than the Marshal's. In case of a royalist defeat the town council and *parlement* wished to be on the safe side. But popular pressure in favour of immediate surrender increased, and on May 26 deputies were sent to Biron with the articles for capitulation and the recognition of Henry IV. Breunot presented them and the Marshal promised their acceptance in the King's name, with a few modifications. On the 29th Biron entered;[1] there was some hard skirmishing, and the cannon of the castle fired into the town, doing considerable damage. It was a situation common in the sixteenth century, when a town, inside the *enceinte*, was occupied by one party, but the citadel or castle was still held by the other. About twenty years earlier, the resistance of Kirkaldy in the castle of Edinburgh, long after the city was taken, is a good example. The defences were still stronger than the power of the guns, except in special circumstances, and in England, even during the Civil War, the long resistance of places such as Basing House, not much more than fortified manor houses, showed the weakness of the Parliamentarian guns. The French artillery of that time and previously was however superior.[2] Henry entered the town

[1] See Document N.

[2] Le Perier's narrative of the defence of La Bréole, a village in an angle of the Basses Alpes, close to the left bank of the Durance. Perier was in Lesdiguières' service and held the place against Epernon, 1586. In 1589 he entered La Valette's service. Fol. 202, Carpentras. Méjanes, vol. i., pp. 94, 95. After the taking of Seine; 'il (Epernon) touttes les autres (troupes) de la France (*i.e.* non-Provençals), tant de pied que de cheval, avec un régiment de 4000 Suisses, et en tel estat et équipage il s'en alla finalement à la Bréaule pour assiéger la place

on June 4 and began the siege of the castle in person; it was not surrendered by Franchesse until June 30, but before that Tavannes had given up the strong position of Talant. It was on the 22nd that the royalist fraction from Semur retook possession of the *Palais*, and the Leaguer members having made their submission the schism of the *parlements* was over.[1]

Ferdinando de Velasco, Constable of Castille and governor of the Milanese, had left Franche-Comté, as we have seen, with 10,000 men; he retook Vesoul and aimed at relieving Dijon. He had crossed the Sâone, which formed the frontier between France and Imperial territory, on the very day that Henry entered Dijon. He reached Gray, and on June 5 Henry and Biron, leaving enough troops to contain the castle, marched out towards Gray to meet this new danger. The King went as far as Mirebeau, where he turned north to Fontaine Française, where was his cavalry rendezvous. The original scheme was a reconnaissance in force to delay the enemy's advance and a general engagement was no part of the plan. Biron was misled by the reports and he had no idea that the whole Spanish army was at hand, but thought that he was against merely some skirmishing parties like his own. Fontaine Française lies on a small plain or rather plateau, for the country generally is hilly though of no particular height, on the right bank of the Vingeane, a small stream: it is a village of several hundred inhabitants and is situated between two pools. It is on the extreme edge of Burgundy and was then a frontier village, as its name Française implies. Henry left the village with only a few hundred horse when he saw his vedettes returning at full gallop, pursued by two squadrons and followed by all the enemy's forces. Biron was wounded and swept along in the flight of the advance guard, which he tried

(an instance of the use of 'place' to denote only the castle or fortified part, as in another passage, 'contre feu M. de Vins qui tenoit la place d'Allemagne assiégée, another village); où estant arrivé, il fit dresser dès aussytost trois batteries d'artillerie et nous manda le trompette du roy. . .' Perier refused this summons. 'Surquoy led. Sr. duc fit jetter des aussytost huict volées de canon contre une tour et continua lad. batterie dix ou douze jours tant la nuict que le jour. La quelle fit sy grande ouverture et sy longue bresche de vint ou trente pas.' Epernon fired eight shots as a warning and expected the defence to collapse; after that he fired his three batteries in turn day and night. The fire was more rapid than might be supposed. At the siege of Auriol, later on, Epernon's guns threw 500-600 balls, in the course of six or seven hours, into the place. He had rather good siege artillery.

[1] See Document P.

in vain to rally. The King thereupon charged the immensely more numerous hostile forces again and again, attacking them with great courage and with great risk to himself. This gave the rest of his men time to reform. Velasco, who had not expected such good fighting, thought that if Henry's cavalry squadrons could be so formidable, it was useless to attempt to relieve Dijon against the main royalist army.[1] He therefore retired on Gray. For two months the King continued to overrun Franche-Comté and could not draw Velasco to a general battle. He even advanced up to the gates of Besançon, when the vigorous protests of the Swiss, who were nervous about the neutrality of Franche-Comté, and whom he did not care to annoy, caused him to withdraw his army. The action at Fontaine Française, like Arques, in spite of its minor character was a decisive battle in the history of the League. Mayenne's hope of maintaining a hold on Burgundy thereby vanished, and even for Spain and Philip their chances were henceforth confined to the north of France. The fighting there, at Ham, Cambray, and other places does not belong to the history of the League. These were fights between France and Spain, for the Frenchmen who took part in them made no pretence of fighting for the League but were openly in the service of Spain. In the loss of Ham Villars, late defender of Rouen and since then royalist, was barbarously killed by the Spaniards in cold blood.

An event now took place which removed the last pretext for Mayenne's further resistance, for, as we have noticed, he never identified himself with Spanish interests, which was the absolution of the King by the Pope. The Spanish element in the Sacred College, led by Colonna, attempted to hinder the work of Henry's agents, but two-thirds of the College were in favour of absolution. Clement VIII. did not desire any onerous conditions. These consisted in the restoration of the Catholic worship in places where it had been suppressed, as in Béarn and certain towns of Lower Longuedoc; the education of the young Condé in the Catholic religion, a hard condition for the Huguenots; the restoration of benefices and Church revenues, which had been

[1] "Discours victorieux de la charge . . . aux troupes du connétable de Castille et duc du Maine près de Dijon." Written at Dijon and printed in Paris same year, 1595.

given to soldiers, heretics, and women during the troubles, to proper and lawful Churchmen, and the declaration of the nullity of the absolution accorded to Henry by the French prelates at St. Denis. There remained only the Council of Trent. Henry's agents agreed to the acceptance of the canons and decrees of Trent with the proviso, unless there was anything in them which could not be enforced without danger to the kingdom. That is clearly with reference to the disciplinary canons: it was these which were resented as 'abusive' by the Gallican Churchmen and the *parlement*. No one questioned the doctrinal decrees. This *modus vivendi* was the Concordat by which the relations of Rome and the Church in France were governed until the Revolution, with a few modifications, and was not unlike the modern Concordat which lasted down to the time of M. Combes, 1905. The solemn ceremony of absolution was held in the portico of St. Peter's, July, 1595. The King's confession of having participated in the heresy of Calvin was read by Henry's envoys, du Perron and d'Ossat, to whom absolution was given by the Pope.[1] The cannon of St. Angelo were shot off and trumpets sounded amidst frantic demonstrations of joy amongst the huge crowd which filled the Piazza of St. Peter's. Henry had in fact recognised the spiritual validity of Papal excommunication, which only the Pope or one accredited by him could remove. Clement had modified the mediæval theory which claimed that excommunication deprived a monarch of his crown without regard to the 'organic laws' of the country over which he ruled.

On September 25 an armistice of three months was concluded between the King and Mayenne, who guaranteed it on behalf of what remained of his adherents. The events of the summer and autumn, the still menacing power of Spain, proved to Henry the necessity of making a final effort at pacification so as to secure the complete homogeneity of France. The Treaty known as the *Articles* was signed at Folembray in January, 1596. Seurre and Chalon, which the Duke still held in Burgundy, as well as Soissons, were given as a guarantee to Mayenne for six years.

[1] "La rebenedittione del re di Navarre fatta da N.S.P. Clemente VIII," Vicenza, 1595. This is from an official source. *Histoire Soc. Jésus*, vol. ii., pp. 440-470. H. Fouqueray.

All his adherents were confirmed in their possessions, together with whatever offices and honours had been granted by Mayenne. At the same time complete oblivion and indemnity for the past was offered to any Leaguer who submitted within six weeks, with special reference to Aumâle and Mercœur. In point of fact, this last rebel did not come in until the agreement at Ponts de Cé two years later. Mayenne's debts up to 35,000 crowns were to be paid and the government of the Ile de France was given to the Prince of Eguillon, Mayenne's son, who renounced his nominal governorship of Burgundy. Paris itself was excluded, for on the death of d'O, fifteen months earlier, Henry had determined on keeping that in his own hands. Within a very short time, the ex-Capuchin Leaguer governor of Languedoc, Henri de Joyeuse, and Villars, of the house of Savoy, in Guyenne, took advantage of the *Articles*. At Folembray the League had existed for twenty years in a continuous form and out of these twenty years only the short space from the murder of Henry III. to Henry IV.'s reconciliation at St. Denis, or at the longest up to the Papal absolution, was really a period during which a man from purely religious motives might have adhered to the League. From the day of the barricades the League was rather a gamble on the part of the Lorraine princes, and even when a heretic became King, whether from genuine motives of religion or no, the Leaguers were playing the Spanish game to bring about the dismemberment of their country. The sixteenth century is one of contrasts. It was a time of growth ; the countries of Europe were stretching themselves, the increase of knowledge and new discoveries were acting as a powerful solvent on the organism, and political morality had virtually disappeared from all countries. It would be an error to regard the same thing to be true of individual morality. No doubt the chief actors of those times do seem to have had but a hazy idea of moral conduct, but that might be said, and truly, of much earlier days and of much more modern ones. The mass of the folk, about whom in any land we can see so little, were not greatly affected either by the brilliance of the Renaissance society above them or by its vices ; they continued to live, so far as the civil war permitted, as they always have and always will, in the usual round of their callings and of family life. There are some figures of virtue amongst

the chief actors even in the political world, as we have seen, and it is to be remembered that the sixteenth century produced an unparalleled array of Saints.[1] Saints, too, of strict history, unlike certain ones of legend, of whose lives and deeds we know as much as of those of Henry and Mayenne.

The history of the League, amongst other things, illustrates the way in which a war may be prolonged to such an extent by fortunate or unfortunate accidents that though one of the belligerents, in this case the League, be beaten militarily, they may yet win politically. The opposite side becomes wearied by the sheer protraction of the struggle and the determination of the enemy to persist in spite of all discouragements. The case of Frederic the Great in the Seven Years' War is another and more remarkable example. The war of the League was in fact a war of principles at its best, selfish as were many of the leaders, and it ended in compromise. The legitimist and monarchical theory in France won; but the French monarchy was itself bound to Catholicism as was also the nation, so far as the religion of the state was concerned.

It will have been noticed that, with the exception of some subordinates, Henry never triumphed over his enemies as rebels; he bought them out partly on terms which satisfied their religious convictions, so far as they had any, and partly on terms which went far to satisfy, and in some cases to surpass, their ambitions. It is a proof of the good financial system of the latter part of his reign that, in spite of the vast sums spent on satisfying these men, at no period was there more content and prosperity amongst the smaller people nor any time at which the taxation was less burdensome.

Henry's work was successful in so far as it united a long distracted country round the person of the legitimist monarch, who happened to be an able man. It was unsuccessful in so far as the principle of duality in religion, not toleration, which is quite a different matter, was set up. The King was Catholic, the land was officially Catholic; but the King gave recognition to one, and only one dissenting belief, and that the most hostile,

[1] The following list of a few shows a most extraordinary variety of saintliness: Saints Luigi di Gonzaga, John of the Cross, Peter Canisius, Teresa of Avila, Carlo Borommeo, François de Sales.

in logic, of all the Reformed bodies, by which term I am expressly excluding Lutheranism and Anglicanism. The latter, indeed, purely insular, had never the slightest effect on the continent of Europe. Henry's work was further unsuccessful in having virtually put a premium on disloyalty, so that if a man were a rebel of sufficient *mérite* (*i.e.* prestige) and sufficiently obstinate he would obtain very much what he wanted. In these two features of the final settlements of politics and religion, the *Articles of Folembray* and the *Edict of Nantes*, lay the germs of Richelieu's trouble with the Huguenots and of Mazarin's with the *Fronde*.

The absolute monarchy was strong enough and popular enough in Henry IV.'s hands to keep these elements quiet, but during a minority the potential dangers of Henry's settlement were clear. The Bourbons were unfortunate in their frequent minorities, and that which was harmless when managed by a Richelieu, was, in the following century, a disaster in the hands of an Orléans.

Henry IV. has been praised by enthusiastic Protestants and blamed by strong Catholics for having harboured something which they call a 'Great Design,' and which was, happily, or unhappily, cut short by his murder. The 'Design' was supposedly a campaign in favour of Protestantism and existed in the imagination of the pompous and self-satisfied Sully. As in the case of the equally fictitious 'League' of Bayonne, 1565, there were a certain amount of unconnected facts which were capable of being screwed up to a point and given a bias by interested minds. Against such a writing of history Mézeray warned us nearly three hundred years ago.

That Henry's policy was anti-Spanish and that it involved alliance with Protestant states (and the Grand Turk) is certain; but I see here only continuity in French policy, from Francis I., and no Protestant sentiment. Catherine followed an anti-Spanish policy, and so did Henry III. when he was free; the weaker was France the more was such necessary. Henry IV. approved, and said that she had not done badly — *What more could one poor woman with a handful of children do?* This same policy was continued by Richelieu, and it is impossible to regard him as a crypto-Protestant. France was to be the power, and Spain,[1] however Catholic, was the enemy, and this

[1] So long as Spain remained in the house of Austria.

programme necessarily rested on an alliance with the Lutheran States.

Many years previously, before the defeat of the Armada, we see a most illuminating memorandum of the Duke of Nevers, intended for an Englishman of high importance in the Council (probably Sir F. Walsingham), which clearly shows the French sentiment. After discussing the reasons why Anjou would remain Catholic and the English Queen Protestant, because their future interests are bound to their respective beliefs, although *tout le monde n'est pas fort persuadé des vérités du Christianisme*, Nevers goes on—*But all the same with the alliance, marriage or no marriage, we shall become the arbiters of peace and war and the masters of Europe; for whatever may be said of the power of the house of Austria, she will be forced in spite of all the gold of the New World to take her orders from the Kings of France and of England.* The preponderance of French interests in Europe was in the minds of the Valois as much as in those of the Bourbons; the latter had more chance to make the dream a reality. All these monarchs desired the prevalence of Catholicism, but on the conditions of the supremacy of France politically. French policy has not altered much from the Renaissance to modern times.

Was Henry a great King? He was a providential one, because his own personality, by no means wholly amiable, was agreeable to the French character and made him the national rallying point. That he should have been popular in France is no matter for surprise, but it is always rather a shock to realise that Henry VIII. was popular in England; it gives us a strange idea of the English of that day. Both of these monarchs did identify themselves with their subjects and did remarkable things, but neither could be called great in the sense in which we might use the word of Edward I., St. Louis, or Louis XI., who was no saint; but to compare a Renaissance prince with a mediæval sovereign is futile. So Henry IV. remains the most capable King of modern France with the exception of Louis XIV. His life had been hard and uphill, in fact he had spent the greater part of it in the saddle. He was not fortunate in his parents, distinctly unfortunate in his wife (Marguerite), hardly happy in his mistresses, possessed of few friends, and ever surrounded by intrigue; owing to these

circumstances Henry had attained to an exhaustive knowledge of one side of human nature, its abysmal selfishness and greed. He seemed unaware of the existence of any other, and consequently his feeling for his fellow creatures was that of an amused contempt. This served him well in his dealings with the leading characters of his day and is what is meant by the constant allusions to his 'hardness of heart.' His grandson Charles II. was, partly from the vicissitudes of a similar youth and partly doubtless from heredity, the very image of Henry IV. Both desired and achieved absolutism and both succeeded in reuniting their respective countries, which had been virtually disintegrated by civil and religious strife. Charles II. was likewise a popular monarch, and it is pleasant to see the improvement in our tastes since Henry VIII. The Béarnais was of course a much better soldier than our King, but in political acumen it may be said that if Henry IV. was a great King then his grandson was equally great; in fact, Charles had more patience and more intellect for intricate combinations than the King of France.

It has been said that the League was a mere bonfire of rubbish, of empty intrigue which meant nothing, and there is a sense in which this estimate is true. Indeed, the League has been described before now in terms which seem to take all sober sense out of it. That is from allowing the mind to dwell exclusively on the vagaries of the Valois Court or of the Parisian mob. An equally purposeless condition might be pictured if we confined our attention to the frivolities and immoralities of Elizabeth's Court, and yet we know that would be a one-sided and inadequate view of Elizabethan England. In the League I seem rather to see a great clash of theories of government and even of contending ideals. The force of religion, experiments in democracy, the testing of the *Salic Law*, the triumph of the monarchical principle, the strength of nationalism, and the vindication of the spiritual supremacy of the Pope. If the outcome of the long struggle had been otherwise, there would have been no Augustan period of French letters and learning, no immensely powerful centralised monarchy, perhaps no Revolution. Europe would not have been the continent which we know.

DOCUMENTS

A

MAYENNE'S ESCAPE FROM LYON

December 1588

Anciens Fonds 444. 92. Bibliothèque de la Ville, Dijon.

Le duc et le cardinal de Guise s'étant enfin rendus très suspects au roy par une ambition sans bornes qu'ils couvroient du prétexte de la religion et du nom d'une Ste ligue, il les fit assassiner aux estats de Blois comme chacun l'a sceu.

Il y avoit un troisième dans cette maison qui avoit les mêmes inclinations que ses frères, c'étoit le duc du Maine ; il étoit à Lyon pendant lesd : estats ; le roy crut qu'inutilement il se seroit deffait du duc et du cardinal s'il laissoit le duc du Maine, aussy ambitieux qu'eux piqué d'un esprit de vengeance travailler sur le plan de sa famille. Il fit donc partir en dilligence de Blois le Col: Alphonse pour se joindre à Lyon et s'asseurer de sa personne : mais le duc fut adverty et sortit de Lyon par une porte tandisque Alphonse entroit par une autre. Il arriva à Chalon le lendemain et vint descendre au logis du faucon, tout en descendant de cheval il reconnut la femme du baron de Lux qui étoit aux estats, il connoissoit fort le mary et la femme. Il la pria de luy donner pour quelques jours seulement une retraite dans la citadelle, dont elle étoit la maitresse en l'absence de son mary, cela fut accordé. Il se retira dans le moment à la citadelle où il trouva moyen par ses intrigues et ses connoissances d'y faire entrer avec luy cinq cent hommes de troupes réglées (?) pour s'y fortifier : pour rester dans ce poste et y avoir plus d'authorité, il fit en sorte par ses manœuvres que les magistrats qui alloient entrer en charge ne fussent que des gens à luy touts dévoués et il en vint à bout.

B

A SWISS VIEW OF THE MURDER OF THE GUISES.

State Papers, Switzerland. Paris fo. S. 19.

Ludwig Pfyffer *to* Brullart-Sillery

Monsieur,

J'ay receu la lettre que m'aues envoyé aux cinq cantons catholiques laquelle j'ay adressé à monsieur l'Advoyer Fleckenstein, qui préside

ceste année, touchant la malheureulx acte à l'endroit de messieurs le cardinal et duc de Guise. Pleust qu'il fust esté mieulx considéré, la verité, laquelle est desia que trop manifeste, ne se laysse pas ainsi contrefaire saichant déjà tout le monde avec quelle cruaulté et iniquité les dictz princes ont esté massacrez, spéciallement le cardinal, n'y ayant esgard à aulcune dignité et sans aulcune forme de procès : affin que manifestement on eust cogneu leur faultes lesquelles on leur impose, chose certainement trop indigne à un prince qui se dict estre catholique. Et croyes que ces impostures ne pourront jamais satisfaire, comme à la verité ils ne sont acceptables au gens de bien et d'entendement de les recevoir, estans trop indignez. Quant à moy je remets tout à Dieu qui est juste et qui seul cognoit l'intérieur, lequel disposera tout selone sa divine volonté. Vous dittes qu'on a usé d'une modération et qu'on a restreint la peine sur les seulz chefz, comme ces jeunes princes d'Anemours et Joinville et d'aultres sont traictez avec estranges prisons. Or le temps manifestera tout ; Monsieur, vous scavez et m'asseure que l'avez, cependant que j'ay eu vostre cognoissance apperceu en moy et non aultrement que une bonne et sincere délibération pour la foy catholique, et n'eusse jamais pansé à la succession d'ung si grand mal qui a esté sans doubte détenu de longuemain caché pour avoir commodité. Quant à moy je le vous dy je ne suis point flatteur, ny hipocrite, ny aussi calomniateur, et que cest accident ne me passionne, Dieu mercy, aulcunement ; mais je suis catholique et s'il plaist à Dieu je mourriray tel et y mettray toutz mes moyens pour la conservation d'icelle. Et, Dieu mercy, toutz les bons catholiques ne sont pas encor massacrez, comme il appert qu'on a bien pretendu de longuement, encor que nous ayons perdu le premier chef si est ce que au bien de ceste perte unique j'espère que nous recouvrirons plusieurs en sa place, et que la bonté divine ne nous laissera orphelins, pour le moings nous n'avons aulcunement perdu courraige. Or depuis que tout est ja manifeste on ne nous subornera plus en la façon qu'on à faict par le précédent. Et en scaurons que de tant mieulx donner ordre à nos necessités : ce que je vous ay bien voullu advertyr au plus court.

Priant Dieu etc

Votre bien humblement affectionne serviteur

Ludwig Pfyffer, Ritter.

De Lucerne le xxiiiii[e] de janvier, 1589.

A Monsieur Brullart Conseiller du Roy en son privée Conseil et son ambassadeur aux ligues à Solleure.

C

LETTER OF HENRY III. TO THE PARLEMENT OF DIJON

January, 1589

Fonds de Juigné No. 3. Bibliothèque de la Ville, Dijon.

Nos amés et féaux ; Encore que vous soyez bons témoins des occasions que le feu sieur duc de Guise nous a données de nous ressentir des troubles qu'il a semés dans notre royaume, les entreprinses et attentats qu'il a fait depuis quelques années sur nostre état et couronne, nostre honneur et nostre propre vie, toutes fois, en attendant que nous fassions bien plus particulièrement entendre comme il s'est porté ingrat envers nous en récompense de ce que nous lui avons pardonné les choses passées, avec espérance que nostre volonté et les biens et honneurs, que lui avons fait depuis ce que nous lui faisions tous les jours jusq'au mécontentement de nos bons et loyaux sujets qui estoient scandalisés, le rameneroient au bon chemin et à reconnoître le respect et obéissance que justement il nous devoit. Nous vous dirons seulement que depuis quelques jours son insolence estoit devenue telle que, qu'au mepris de nostre authorité, il n'a oublié de tout poser pour nous troubler et arracher nostre sceptre, et nostre couronne, voire nostre propre vie : ce qui nous a donné juste occasion de lui faire connoitre que Dieu a mis en nous l'autorité, les moyens, et le courage de l'en châtier comme il a merité par la perte de sa vie, dont nous avons bien voulu vous donner avis par ce mot de lettre afin que vous en sachiez la verité, ce que par quelque faux bruit elle ne vous soit point desguisée. Ensemble que nous ne voulons aulcunement nous départir de nostre seinte entreprinse de faire la guerre et exterminer les hérétiques, ains comme elle n'estoit pas fondée sur la mort ou la vie et l'ambition du feu duc de Guise ; mais par le zèle et l'affection que nous avons toujours eu particulièrement gravée dans le cœur et l'honneur de Dieu et augmentation de nostre religion, C.A.R. Aussi ne peut elle estre detournée par occasion que ce soit, faisant de sorte que nosd : sujets s'entendent capables de nos bonnes et seintes intentions lesquels se peuvent asseurer de tout le soulagement que nous leur pourrons procurer. Ensemble que continuant à leur devoir ils nous trouveront toujours leur bon roi prêt à les gratieuser si par leur fidelité le pourroint mériter ; ou à les châtier aussi s'ils oublient de leur devoir et sortent de leur respect et obéissance que Dieu leur commande de nous poser. Sur ce priant etc.

HENRY,

Potier.

A nos amés et féaux counseillers Mrs. les gens tenants notre cour de parlement de Dijon.

D

THE ARTICLES OF THE LEAGUE WHICH M. DE FERVAQUES PRESENTED TO THE PARLEMENT FOR RECOGNITION

Fonds de Juigné, No. 3. Bib. de la Ville, Dijon.

1. We swear and promise before God and all the Company of Heaven to live and die in the Catholic, Apostolic, and Roman faith, and to employ our lives and goods for its preservation against all who, openly or secretly, attempt any act to its prejudice.

2. The town of Dijon is to be kept in tranquillity and repose.

3. To employ all our resources for the maintenance of religion in all places of the ressort, and indeed in all other ' bonnes villes ' of the Kingdom, and to make open war on the heretics and their ' fauteurs.'

4. To assist and protect all princes, prelates, seigneurs, gentilshommes, towns, villages, and communes which are united in the Holy Union.

5. To maintain the freedom of commerce, traffic, and labour.

6. To permit of no alteration or diminution of the authority and privileges which belong to the three orders of this province.

7. To preserve in its original prestige the parlement and the Chambre des Comptes in this town, according to the agreement made between former Kings and the Estates without allowing these bodies to be transferred elsewhere to their prejudice. And to respect all other jurisdictions which have been of old established in the towns now adhering to the Holy Union.

8. Not to separate one from the other, but to act altogether in concert and to leave no one to his own resources.

9. To report any deeds or words harmful to the Holy Union, which may come to anyone's notice, to the duke of Mayenne or to M. de Fervaques under pain of being regarded as a heretic and disturber of the peace.

10. Neither directly nor indirectly to favour by means of solicitations and prayers those who are opposed to us and who infringe the articles of the Holy Union, no matter to what extent they may be our relatives, connections, or friends.

11. To regard as heretics and disturbers all who refuse to join the Holy Union and to subscribe to the articles.

12. To be obedient to the commands of the Duke of Mayenne, governor of the province, and in his absence to those of M. de Fervaques, Count of Grançay, his lieutenant, from whom we will never separate ourselves no matter whatsoever commands or orders may come from whomsoever person.

13. A general invitation to all classes of folk in the province to join for their mutual safety and assurance one with another.

E

ORDRE DU ROY. TO REGULARISE THE POWERS OF THE PARLEMENT AT FLAVIGNY

Archives du greffe de la Cour d'Appel. Palais de Justice, Dijon.
B 12086, fo. 11.

Henry par la grace de Dieu Roy de France et de Pologne. A nos amés et féaulx les gens tenans la cour de parlement de Bourgogne par nous establie à Flavigny, salut. Par noz lettres-pattentes du mois de mars nous avons interdit la séance de nostre cour de parlement à Dijon et ordonne icelle en nostre Ville de Flavigny, et pour ce que les présidens et conseillers de nostre dicte court sont la plupart retenuz, contre leur volonté, en lad: Ville de Dijon de sorte qu'ilz ne se peuvent rendre aud: Flavigny pour y exercer leurs charges selon noz voulloir et intention, et que par ce moyen pourra advenir que les officiers dud: parlement ne se treuveront au nombre de dix requis pour faire arrest, qui pourroit aporter un grand retardement et dommaige tant à l'expédition de la justice qu'à l'advancement de noz propres affaires, exécutions de noz commissions et lettres patentes que leur pourrions envoier. A ces causes, de l'advis de nostre conseil et de nostre plaine puissance et authorité royalle, avons voullu et ordonné, voulons et ordonnons que les présidens et conseillers jusques au nombre de sept, composé tant des chambres dud: parlement que des resquestes du palais, puissent juger souverainement tout ainsy et avec mesme aucthorité que sy leurs jugements et decretz avoient esté donnés au nombre de dix ou en plus grand nombre; fors que ès procès de plus grande importance selon le reglement gardé en nostre grand conseil pour avoir toutte telle force et auctorité que les arrestz donnés au nombre de dix en toutes les aultres cours souveraines de nostre royaume et en oultre, voullons les jugements et arrestz concluz en la forme et manière qu'il doibt estre en noz cours souveraines.

Donné à Tours 27e de Mars, 1589[1] et de nostre regne le quinziesme. Signé Henry, et plus bas Potier, et scellés en cire jaulne du grand scel à simple queue de parchemin pendant.

F

THE CHEVALIER DE DYO REPORTS THE MURDER OF HENRY III.

Fonds de Juigné, No. 3. Bib. de la Ville, Dijon.
Ancien Fonds 444. 27. Bib. de la Ville, Dijon.

Le Chevalier de Dyo ayant fait entendre par le greffier qu'il desiroit parler à la cour, a été dit qu'il lui sera baillée entrée à la

[1] Registered at Flavigny April 17, 1589.

séance au bureau,[1] où ayant pris sa place a dit qu'il avoit été envoié par M. le duc de Mayenne, lieutenant général et du conseil de l'état royal et couronne de France, pour donner avis à la cour de la miraculeuse déliverance de cet état avenue par la mort du roy et ce par un Jacobin. L'histoire de ceste mort étant telle que le trente et uniesme de jeuillet dernier un jacobin, le plus simple de son couvent, ayant communiqué à aucuns de ses compagnons s'il est permis de tuer un roy hérétique, parlant de l'hérésie du roy et du roy de Navarre, s'est résolu de tuer le roy et après avoir dit sa messe s'en alla à St. Cloud, où il coucha, et s'adressa au procureur général de la Guesle auquel il dit qu'il apportoit des lettres au roy et montra un passeport du comte de Brienne, et qu'il avoit moyen de faire entrer le roy en la ville de Paris par la porte St. Honoré. Incontinant led: jacobin est mené au roy par le S^r. de la Guesle sur les cinq heures du matin, et comme le roy lisoit les lettres qu'il lui avoit données l'une après l'autre il tira un cousteau de sa manche et le lui plongea dans le bas ventre : soudain le roy se jette sur led: jacobin et lui oste le cousteau dont il fit encore blessé à la main, et à l'instant led: jacobin fut tué par les gardes et led : jacobin taillé en morceaux. Le roy mourust à une heure aprés minuit sans parler ni à clerc ni à prestre, et fut sa fin telle qu'avoit été sa vie.[2] Il est mort au tems de l'excommunication contre lui lachée et pendant la feste de la délivrance de St. Pierre aux lions ? (liens) : peut on dire que avons été délivrés du plus grand tiran qui fut au monde, on a dit qu'on vouloit porter son corps à Senlis. Outre ce, a dit que M. du Maine lui a commandé de présenter ses lettres en ceste compagnie qu'il a mises sur le bureau, et a prié la cour de reconnoistre la grande grace que Dieu nous a faitte et que M. du Maine n'a esté meu en ceste part d'aucune ambition, mais d'une bonne et sincère affection qu'il porte à l'église catholique et à l'état. On a déclaré roy le cardinal de Bourbon qui devoit estre proclamé au parlement de Paris samedi dernier ; qu'il est besoing de s'unir tous sous l'obéissance du nouveau roy, et quant à ceulx qui voudrant tenir le parti du roy de Navarre il les faut déclarer hérétiques, et quiconque en parlera il le faut tenir pour tel et le punir comme hérétique. Les lettres du Sr. de Mayenne lues, le Chevalier de Dyo a dit qu'il est besoing de pardonner à tous et oublier le passé.

[1] This event occurred during the *séance* of Aug. 12, 1589.

The *Commandeur* de Dyo, Dion, Diou of the house of Montperroux was of the order of Malta and acted as Mayenne's agent at Rome amongst other things. He was a native of Franche Comté, and consequently a subject of the Empire. An active man, he was too inclined to Spanish interests to entirely please Mayenne.

[2] This is of course the leaguer version, and is false. The official account of Henry's end is to be found annexed in Vol. iii., p. 372, of Estoile's Memoirs.

The original with the autographs of the witnesses is in the Bibliothèque Nationale. MSS F. 10196.

G

THE LETTER OF THE DUKE OF MAYENNE

Fonds de Juigné No. 3. Bib. de la Ville, Dijon.

Messieurs je vous ai déjà donné avis dès le premier de ce mois de la mort du roy avenue le jour d'auparavant, et néantlemoins craignant que le courier n'ait été surpris par le chemin j'ay prié M. le commandeur de Dyo, présent porteur, de vous faire entendre bien particulièrement comme toutes choses se sont passées, et vous conjurer de ma part de tenir soigneusement la main à la conservation de l'état et de la religion catholique et faire que toutes choses se passent avec la tranquillité que je vous ay promise. Je m'asseure que vous y procederes avec votre prudence accoustumée à la précaution qui est necessaire en une occasion sy importante.

Je prie Dieu etc
Vostre entièrement plus affectionné ami
Charles de Lorraine.

de Paris ce 4me d'aoust, 1589.

H

THE BARON DE LUX TO THE CHAMBRE DE LA VILLE.

Archives Municipales. Chambre de la Ville. Hôtel de Ville, Dijon. B 457, fo. 64.

Messieurs, Il y a toujours esté ma volonté de ne me deservir du parti des catholiques pour l'estre aultant que aucun geantilhomme de France. Mais du vivant du feu roy je pansois en le servant satisfaire à tous les points de mon debvoir et rachepter par ce moien la liberté de monseigneur de Lyon,[1] ou pour le moins ne mestre point sa vie en doubte, quy m' a toujours esté et est encore plus cherie et recommandable que la mienne propre. Mais maintenant que le roy est mort et celui que je dois beaucoup honorer en liberté, je me suis par ses deux evenemens resolu de mourir à mon debvoir quy est d'ayder et maintenir la religion catholique sous le commandement de Monr. le duc de Mayenne, et de Monsieur de Senecy en ceste province, affin de satisfaire au contentement de ma consciance et rendre à ma patrie et à cest estat le debvoir et le service qu'en ce temps elle doit attendre de tous les jeans de bien. Je ne vous feray point de protestation par escrit ny par parolle de la fidellité que je porte de bien servir entrant en ce parti, mais bien mes effaictz en donneront tant d'assurance qu'un chascun m'en louera ; ce sera aise à croire à ceulx quy auront connu mon naturel quy est ennemi de toute tromperie. J'ay deux bons respondans de ce que je dis encore qu'ils ne m'en failli point,

[1] The uncle of de Lux.

quy sont Messrs. de Lyon et de Senecy mes oncles, ausquelz particullièrement j'ay donné ma parolle. A vous messieurs je jure et prometz de vivre et mourir avec vous pour maintenir nostre religion C.A.R. et le légitime successeur de ceste couronne quy sera catholique, en ceste affection que je vous supplié croire m'estre inviolable.

Je fais prière à Dieu messieurs etc

De Malain.

du Chasteau de Malain ce xx^me^ de janvier 1590.

I

MAYENNE TO THE CHAMBRE DE LA VILLE. IVRY.

Arch. Mun. Hôtel de Ville, Dijon. B 457. 78.

Messieurs, Je pensois vous despecher le S^r^ Carrelet[1] il y a huit ou dix jours mais certaines occasions m'en dissuadoient. Il vous dira ce qui s'est faict ces jours passés et comme à ceste dernière rencontre nous n'avons pas heu du meilleur: Touttefois le mal n'est pas si grand, Dieu mercy, que bien tost je ne me voie assisté de plus grandes forces et suffisantes pour rendre un nouveau combat à noz ennemis, ou j'espère que Dieu nous assistera de ses graces nous ayant a ce coup voulu faire parestre son courroux pour noz démerittes. Vous aurez souvent de nos nouvelles. Sur ce priant, etc, vostre entièrement affectionné et parfaict amy

Charles de Lorraine.

du camp de St Denis ce xix^e^ mars 1590

J

MAYENNE'S ORDINANCE AGAINST OUTRAGES

Ancien Fonds 444. Bib. de la Ville, Dijon.

De par le duc de Mayenne:

Déffense exprès à un chascun des gens de guerre de saisir et rançonner laboureurs, fermiers, et paysants inermes fut ce même ès terres de ceux du contraire party, et d'aultant que la violance des présents troubles a passé si avant que d'exercer la rigueur de la guerre à l'endroit de toutes personnes indifférement, ce qui repugne à toutes bonnes moeurs et honnêteté qu'a toujours été gardé entre les Chrestiens: pareillement déffend mond: S^r^ qu'on n'ait à prendre prisonniers aulcuns s'yls ne sont trouvés en combats les armes à la main, et pareillement aucunes femmes ou filles de quelque age qu'elles soient, ny les

[1] Carrelet was an échevin of Dijon.

This is a typical form of official or cooked *communiqué*, common in all warfare. No one would suppose that Mayenne was referring to his complete rout at Ivry.

enfans males audessous de seize ans, ny aucuns d'iceux rançonner ou aultrement outrager sur peine d'estre punis rigoreusement; et en cas de force et violance faitte à une femme ou fille pour en abuser celuy ou iceux qui se trouveront coupables seront pendus et estranglés sur le champ. Et parceque plusieurs méprisants la révérance deue aux lieus sacrés, qui doivent être regardés comme des lieux de prières et d'oraison, se servent des eglises pour logis et même pour écuries, puisqu'ils y mettent leurs chevaux et s'en servent pour exercer toutes sortes de voleries, larcins, meutres, rançonnements, et autres excès, chose indigne que mond: S^r. veut et ordonne que ceux qui tomberont en de pareilles impiétés soient tenus et reputés pour voleurs publics et comme tels châtiés et punis par la justice, dont il charge les marguilliers des paroisses de faire les poursuittes et aux procureurs généraux d'y tenir la main. Enjoignant très expressément aux grands prévôts de France et prévôts de son armée et à touts aultres officiers et justiciers qu'il appartiendra qu'ils ayent, chascun en son endroit, à tenir la main et procéder à l'exécution et entière observance des choses ci dessus contenues et ordonnees sur peine de privation de leurs employs et autres plus grandes s'il y échet.[1]

à Soissons ce XXVII^e de décembre, 1590.

CHARLES DE LORRAINE,
Baudouin pour Monseigneur.

K

MAYENNE TO THE CHAMBRE DE LA VILLE

THE MURDER OF BRISSON

MESSIEURS, Vous avez déjà esté advertiz de ce qui a esté violentement attenté et exécuté contre les sieurs président Brisson et le Con^ser. Larcher par certains particuliers, contre tout ordre et forme de justice dont j'ay senti autant de déplaisir que de malheur à ce qui soit arrivé il y a longtemps, vous laissant à juger combien tel acte doivt estre odieux à tous les gens de bien qui ont en horreur la cruauté, et en respect et révérance l'auctorité de cette compaignie, la première du royaume. Je suis venu par deça pour y pourveoir et empescher désormais que toute license n'ait plus de lieu, et j'espère d'y restablir la dignité de la justice de façon qu'elle soit obéye et honorée, et que

[1] For Mayenne's discipline see also *Davila*, vol. i., p. 377.
This order has a special interest after our experience of *civilised* warfare in the twentieth century. We know that neither leaguer nor royalist army necessarily carried out its terms, but still the order was made in the name of Christian morals and usages of civilisation: nor was it issued by one of the exceptionally noble characters of the day, but by a man so notoriously immoral and irrilegious as Mayenne.

chascun se contiendra ès bornes de son debvoir, affin que par ce moyen ceste ville puisse reprendre sa première splendeur. Je ne feray ceste plus longue si ce n'est pour prier Dieu, etc.

CHARLES DE LORRAINE
Baudouyn.

de Paris ce VII[e] de Decembre 1591.
a M[rs] les maire et eschevins de la ville de Dijon.

MESSIEURS, depuis mon arrivée aiant esté informé au vray que les exécutions ci dessus avoient esté faictes soubs couleur de quelques conspirations contre la ville, dont il ne s'est trouvé aucune preuve, et que par ce prétexte ils s'estoient servis de la simplicité d'aucuns du peuple, lesquels ont receu très grand déplaisir d'avoir esté ainsi circonvenus et encore aussi reconnu que l'on tenoit des conseils pour attenter aux premiers magistratz et remuer sans dessus dessous l'estat de la ville, j'ay esté contrainct, à mon plus grand regret, de faire chastier quatre des principaux auteurs de si meschans conseils et actes. Je partiray dans deux ou trois jours, Dieu aydant, pour m'en retourner en l'armée et me joindre avec Mons le duc de Parme, pour en la plus grande dilligence que nous pourrons nous avancer au secours de Rouen que le roy de Navarre tient assiegée, faisant tous ses efforts et mandant de tous costez ses amis et y estant grandement assisté de la royne d'Angleterre, soit d'hommes, vivres, d'artillerie, et munitions de guerre. De ma part je n'oublie à mander tous ceux de nostre party, recongnoissant l'importance de la conservation d'une si bonne ville et de tant de gens de bien qui s'y sont employés.

L

THE PRÉVÔT DES MARCHANDS TO THE CHAMBRE DE LA VILLE.

Arch. Mun. Hôtel de Ville, Dijon. B. 457. 193.

MESSIEURS, Nous ne doubtons point que la présence de M. Bernard, maire de vostre ville, ne vous soit très desirée comme de personnage très utile ; mais aussy est il necessaire pardeça pour le bien général et pour les affaires importantes qui se traitent, ausquels il est si dignement employé que nous pouvons dire avec verité que la France luy en aura obligation. Ce que estant recognu par ung chacun il a esté prié de continuer ses bons offices ; vous prions fort affectueusement donner ce contentement au publicq et ne presser tellement son retour que vous et nous serons frustres du bien que nous attendons du séjour qu'il fera par deça pendant la tenure des estats et conférences en cet endroit. Priant Dieu, etc.

Vos plus humbles et affectueux frères pour vous servir, les prévôt des marchans et échevins de Paris.

L'huillier, Lemoyne, Langlois, Nicols.

de Paris Ce xxii[e] de may 1593.

M

HISTOIRE DE LA PRISE DES VILLE ET CHASTEAU DE BEAUNE par M. le maréschal de Biron déffandus par le S[r] de Montmoyen[1] pour M le duc de Mayenne, chef de la ligue, jour de pasques fleury de l'année 1595.

Anciens Fonds 444.

M[r.] le duc de Mayenne avoit regardé la ville de Beaune comme un poste très important à ses desseins. C'estoit en effect une très bonne place munie de bons remparts faits à la moderne et bien revestue, entourée d'un fossé à fond de cuve et remply d'eau à nivelle par tout et qui avoit plus de cent pas de largeur. Il y avoit un bon chasteau basti sur le modèle de chasteau de Milan par les plus habiles ingénieurs ; et y avoit dans ce chasteau cinq gros bastions bien revestus, il avoit son entrée par la ville et une sortie par le dehors. Le S[r.] de Rineau, de la maison de Damas, homme qui avoit longtems servi dans les troupes, en estoit gouverneur, mais depuis que M. du Maine eut commencé de remuer en Burgoyne ny luy ny les gens de son party ne purent s'en accomoder, et il y demeura jusques au traité d'Epernay que le roy voulut faire avec les ligueurs. Il leur donna la ville de Beaune pour place de seureté en Bourgogne et remit le gouvernement au duc du Maine avec ordre exprès d'en sortir aud : S[r.] de Rineau incessament. Celuycy ne voulut pourtant pas remettre cette place au D de M que après en avoir receu un ordre exprès de la propre bouche du roy à Paris où il avoit été pour cela. Le D de M mis en sa place pour gouverner le S[r] de Montmoyen, natif de Dijon, mais plus affectionné à l'interest de son maître qu'à celuy de son pays. Les habitants avant qu'il entrât dans ce chasteau voulurent faire un traité secret avec luy et luy donnèrent pour cela une grosse somme. Il ne fit pas grand scruple de les tromper. Il retint prisonniers dans le chasteau plusieurs habitants et leur avoit fait souffrir des duretés infinies, et quand les habitants traitèrent avec luy ils n'exigèrent point d'autre seureté que sa parole. Luy qui vouloit les tromper pour donner plus de poids au serment et leur y faire prendre plus de confiance, il leur dit qu'il vouloit faire avec eux ses pasques et qu'en les faisant il jureroit sur le corps de Jesus Christ qu'il exécuteroit ses promesses. Mais il crut pouvoir éluder son serment en ordonnant au prestre, qui le devoit communier, de ne point consacrer l'hostie qu'il luy donneroit,

[1] Edmond Regnier, baron de Montmoyen.

abusant ainsy du St Sacrement de l'autel et de la confiance qu'on devoit prendre à un serment si solennel. Je laisse à penser quelle opinion on put avoir de luy après une telle profanation ; tout le monde n'attendoit qu'une occasion favourable pour se venger de sa perfidie et pour secouer le joug, (Le Belin, maire, Richard, S^r. de Bligny, autres échevins, les doyens, et chanoines, et chapitre de Notre Dame s'étoient commes ligués entre eux et contre led : S^r de Montmoyen) mais tous ces engagements ne durèrent car trois jours après il fit visiter la ville et la citadelle par le S^r Carlo et ses ingénieurs qui la jugèrent capable d'une bonne déffense. Il fit démolir les fauxbourgs de St. Jean, la Magdelaine, de la Bretonnière, de St Martin, de St Nicolas, sans épargner mème les eglises, ce qui a porté un dommaige de plus de cinquante mil d'escus aux habitants qui avoient leurs pressoirs, leurs granges, et leurs jardins. Il fit commencer des esperons et bastions du costé de la Magdelaine et establit la garde des portes entre les habitans et les soldats de la garnison. Cela fait, croyant avoir pris toutes les seuretés, il se retira à Dijon. Le peuple de Beaune gemissoit, sous l'oppression et crut que l'occasion étoit favorable par l'approche de l'armée de M^r le maréschal de Biron dont ils eurent avis. Sur cela ils députarent vers le S^r de Vaugrenan,[1] qui commandoit pour le roy à St. Jean de Lasone,[2] auquel ils avoient créance pour un homme très fidèle au roy, et ils le chargent d'aller à M le M de B et le luy appendre la disposition où ils sont de remettre la ville au roy et d'y contribuer au péril de leurs vies. Led: S^r. de Vaugrenan va exprès chercher M. le M de B, qui assiégoit le chasteau de Moutier St. Jean, et reçoit pour réponse qu'il se rendra aux portes de Beaune dimenche cinq febvrier, (1595). Cepandant M le M de B feroit marcher l'armée contre Chasteauneuf comme s'il en vouloit faire le siège et de là tourneroit à eux. Le D de M, soit qu'il eut esté adverti de cette delibération ou qu'il fut entré en quelque défiance contre ceste ville, part de Dijon avec son fils le premier de fevrier et s'en vint coucher à Beaune accompagné de Guillerme qui étoit le commandant de Seurre et quelques autres personnes. Le lendemain, 2 février, le D de M, après avoir donné ses ordres, partit de Beaune avec son fils et Guillerme pour s'en aller à Chalon après avoir recommandé toutes choses aud: S^r. de Montmoyen dans les termes les plus forts, jusques à luy dire qu'il aimeroit autant qu'on luy arrachat le cœur du ventre que de luy faire perdre ceste ville. A peine fut il party que M Montillet avec une partie de la compagnie du S^r. de Vienne et les quatre ving soldats par luy ordonnés et mandés entrèrent à la ville. M le D de M estant sur chemin de Chalon au village de Demigny fit halte, et renvoya Guillerme à Beaune avec 50 cavaliers

[1] Philippe Baillet de Vaugrenant. Président aux Requêtes. For his life see *Le président de Vaugrenant* by R. Galmiche.

[2] St. Jean de Losne, a small town 20 miles S.E. of Dijon.

pour faire entendre au cap: Montmoyen ceux des habitans qu'il falloit arrester prisonniers. Guillerme arriva et tint conseil avec Montmoyen après quoy furent prendre ? (pris) en plusieurs maisons les habitans qu'ils croyoient les plus affectionnés au service du roy à scavoir :—Philibert de la Marre, S^r. de Chevigny, Antoine Velles de Tailly, Jacques Bouhin, S^r. du Basquier, Robert le Grenetier, Les sieurs Bouras, père et fils, M^e Jean Grey, et autres jusques au nombre de quatorze qu'ils menèrent prisonniers au Chasteau. Le samedy 4 febvrier il ne se passa rien. Le dimenche des Brandons, cinq de febvrier, jour pris pour l'exécuter, (*i.e.* for Biron's arrival at Beaune) les soldats volurent encore prendre prisonniers et se mettre en devoir désarmer tous les habitans ; ce que le maire ayant veu il tint conseil avec quelqu'uns des eschevins et principaux habitants. Il y fut résolu qu'on previendroit l'heure qui auroit été donnée par M le M de B qu'il falloit courir aux armes avant qu'on les leur eust ostées, on donna incessament le signal par la cloche de l'horloge de la ville, dans le moment le maire parut dans la rue avec son escharpe blanche l'epée nue à la main criant à plaine teste ' Vive le roy ; ' les femmes et les enfans se mirent aussy de leur part de crier ' Vive le roy ' estant sortis de leurs maisons avec tout ce qu'ils avoient pu trouver d'armes. A l'instant Michel Richard, qui commandoit au premier corps de garde à la porte au devant de la ville, fit fermer les portes qui estoint entre son corps de garde et celuy de la garnison en sorte que les soldats de la garnison ne pouvoient plus entrer dans la ville ; en même tems il monta sur les tours les bourgeois armés de fusils et fit tirer sur les soldats qui furent obligés de quitter leur poste et d'y laisser leurs armes en fuyant dans les champs, où ils furent rencontrés par des flots de paysans qui venoient armés des villages à la ville et qui les tuèrent presque touts près de la contrescarpe où ils estoient environ quarante. Le S^r. d'Alixaut, eschevin, alla en même tems donner au logis du cap : Guillerme qui dinoit très paisiblement avec le président de la Bercy, frère de Montmoyen ; il fit enfoncer les portes et ensuite celles de la chambre où dinoit Guillerme et luy tira un coup de pistolet au visage dont il l'attera. Il fit, néantlemoins tout blessé qu'il estoit, quelque résistance car ayant pris son epée il en donna un coup aud: Alixant et luy fit quitter la chambre, mais secoura d'un nouveau renfort de quelques bourgeois bien armés qui survinrent led: Carlo ingenieur de M le D de M qui se trouva la faiblesse ; on se rendit maistre du logis où lesd: Guillerme, Carlo et le président de la Bercy furent pris prisonniers et menés dans la maison de ville où Guillerme mourust le lendemain de ses blessures. Ce Guillerme estoit de Milan grand scélérat s'yl en fut jamais ;[1] il avoit tué de sang froid dans la ville de Seurre plusieurs habitans et soldats prisonniers de guerre, et il avoit esté envoié à Beaune par M le D de M pour en user de même avec

[1] Cf. Document O.

les habitans d'icelle ; le président de Bercy fut mené prisonnier en la maison du S^r. de Druelle. Les soldats ayant perdu leurs officiers ne pouvoient se rassembler et s'en fuyoient par la campagne et étoient tués à mesure qu'on les rencontroit : quelques uns se rassemblèrent dans la rue de Dijon, au nombre d'environ cinquante, mais le S^r. Brunet accompagné du Cap: Monet, suivys de trente habitans, les défirent entièrement et les tuèrent presque touts. Les caps: Soli et Belleville trouvèrent moyen à travers quelques maisons de rejoindre leurs troupes qui estoient logés proche le chasteau ; ils commencèrent une escarmouche le long de la rue des Tonneliers mais ils furent repoussés, en sorte qu'ils furent obligés de se retirer en icelle des Brissons, où étant, par le commandement du S^r. de Montmoyen, ils mirent le feu en plusieurs maisons pour estonner les habitants ; mais cela n'arreta personne, au contraire Richard de Bligny vint donner sur les soldats en cette rue des Brissons d'où après un combat très opiniatre il les obligea de se retirer. Le S^r. Richard fut blessé dans cette action mais il défit les soldats qui ne purent plus s'assembler nulle part ; quant à la compagnie du S^r. de Vienne ils furent touts pris à rançon avec leur cap: Montillet. Les habitans s'estant randus maîtres de toute la ville, à l'exception de la rue de Belle Croix qui est proche du chasteau où ils s'etoient rangés sous le feu de l'artillerie et celuy des mousquetaires, les maire et eschevins après avoir fait barricades tout à l'entour de ceste rue, ils les avoit bien garnies d'arquebusiers, ils s'en allerent avec les serruriers et autres ouvriers à toutes les portes qu'ils firent rompre et enfoncer. Ces portes estant ouvertes ils firent tirer le canon de dessus les remparts pour advertir M le M de B qu'ils étoient aux mains et luy despechèrent des couriers pour luy apprendre l'estat des choses. Les couriers se trouvèrent à demie lieue de la ville, M le M de B averty s'avança le plus qu'il put et fit avancer ses troupes, dont les maire et eschevins ayant été advertis envoyèrent audevant de luy le cap: Mounet pour le supplier que la ville ne fut point pillée, ce qu'il promit et ce qu'il a bien tenu. Un moment après il se présenta à la porte de la ville où il fut receu avec grande joie ; dèsqu'il fut entré on alla à l'eglise rendre graces à Dieu des services de ceste expédition. Après quoy, M le M de B fit entrer un détachement d'environ trois cent mousquetaires pour aller attaquer les troupes qui s'étoient retranchées le long de la rue de Belle Croix ; mais dès quils parurent les troupes, quoique retranchées sous le feu du Chasteau, demander(?) à capituler. La composition qu'on leur fit qu'ils sortiraient de la ville leurs armes et bagues sauves, l'un de leurs drapeaus plié, mis, et laissé entre les mains de M le M de B en signe de reconnoissance qu'ils ne s'étoient retirés qu'en suite de la capitulation. Cela fait, M le M de B fit avancer toutes les troupes, cavalerie et infanterie ; il logea l'infanterie tout au tour du chasteau qui par la se trouva investi. D'abord en échange des quatorze habitans qui avoient esté imprisonnés

que Montmoyen renvoya, on relaschat de la part de la ville le président de Bercy. Ceste nuit la même, le cap: Ligaut avec six ou sept personnes ne se laissa pas entrer dans le chasteau ; il avoit apris à Puys tout ce qui s'étoit passé et sur cela il n'estoit venu. Audinan, grand prévôt de M le D de M, ne fut pas si heureux que luy, au moins il ne fut pas si bien averti, il arriva sur les onze heures du soir la garde déjà posée sur les murailles, il étoit envoyé de Chalon par le D de M avec une liste de plusieurs habitans de la ville qu'il ordonnoit qu'on feroit prendre, et il vouloit que tout ce qu'il y avoit de gens de considération à la ville qui ne seroient ny exécutés à mort ny emprisonnés en fussent au moings chassés. Chargé de ces ordres Audinant se vint présenter à la porte de la Bretonnière, accompagné des gardes de M le D de M, disant bien haut qu'on luy ouvrit et qu'il venoit de la part du D de M son maître vers le S^r. de Montmoyen. On luy ouvrit dans le moment; il fut receu avec grande joie mais il fut bien estonné de voir la sienne changée, il ne connoissoit personne parmy ceux qui estoient changés, de la garde de cette porte, il voyoit les escharpes noires et rouges changées en escharpes blanches,[1] il voyoit des Gascons et Bourguignons au lieu de soldats Lorrains qu'il avoit lassé dans la place ; on luy prit tous les ordres dont M le D de M l'avoit charge, ces listes de proscrits, ses mémoires, ses lettres, et on l'emena loger en prison: quelque tems après on le conduisit à M le M de B auquel on avoit remis les listes de proscrits, entre autres celles des habitans de Dijon, qu'il envoya à Dijon par un courier exprès pour apprendre aux habitans de ceste ville quel estoit le caractère de l'homme auquel ils s'étoient livrés. Cet Audinant étoit un scélérat digne d'estre le prévost du D de M. Le lendemain lundy M le M de B commença à se retrancher contre le chasteau, il fit venir les suisses et les canons pour le faire battre. Les canons arrivés ils furent mis en batterie. Montmoyen commença à demander de capituler ; on voulut bien l'écouter, mais il demanda des conditions si outrées qu'il n'y eut pas moyen de les écouter. Il demandoit trente mil escus que la ville de Beaune payeroit, touttes ses dettes, et qu'on le feroit payer de toutes les contributions qui luy estoient dues. Surquoy M le M de B, pourtant de l'avis des habitans, luy fit offrir quinze mil escus qu'il refusa ; secrètement pendant ce il trouva le moyen d'avertir le D de M de tout ce qui s'étoit passé et de recevoir ses ordres. Il fit même entrer dans le chasteau pendant la nuit le cap: des gardes du fils du D de M et le cap: Marnay. Les demandes de Montmoyen ayant ete rejettées, celuycy recommença à faire tirer le canon sur les tranchées où il y eut quelques soldats blessés et il fit loger les canons sur les tours pour de la tirer sur les maisons de la ville, dont il y eut quelquesunes endommagées. M le M de B accompagné de plusieurs seigneurs et gentilshommes de la province,

[1] Red and black were the Lorraine colours ; white the Bourbon.

parmy lesquels étoient M le marquis de Mirebeau,[1] M^r. de Chiverny fils de M^r. le Chancelier,[2] M^r. le baron de Lux, M^r. de Vaugrenan, M^r. de Tavannes, M^r. de Cypierre,[3] M^r. de Ragny,[4] qui par l'ordre du roy le vinrent trouver en Bourgogne de Paris où ils étoient touts. Ce chasteau tenoit bon sur l'espérance des secours que le D de M faisoit espérer de jour à l'autre à Montmoyen. Il luy promettoit que M^r. de Nemours luy fourniroit six ou sept mille hommes, et que M^r. de Savoye luy ameneroit aussy un bon nombre de troupes ; mais toutes ses espérances s'étant réduites à rien après avoir tenu six semaines, scavoir depuis le dimenche des Brandons jusques au dimenche de pasques fleury,[5] et avoir essuyé pendant ce tems la plus de 3000 coups de canon qui avoient fait une bresche au chateau pour entrer trente hommes de front tout prest à estre forcé par assaut, Montmoyen se rendit enfin à composition à M le M de B. Les conditions furent qu'ils sortiroient armes et baggages sauves, les enseignes ployées, les mêches esteintes, le tambour sour, moyennant quinze mil livres qu'ils payeroient pour les dames qui étoient dans le chasteau quasi toutes parentes et cousines dud: S^r. de Montmoyen, scavoir les demoiselles d'Arouney, d'Equilly, Madame des Trèves, et autres. Cette capitulation a été exécutée très fidellement. La prise de ceste ville et chasteau n'a couté la vie qu'a trois habitans de Beaune, deux desquels furent tués par les habitans même pour être ligueurs. Le S^r. de Vaugrenan y fut blessé d'une arquebussade à la jambe dans la tranchée dont il guérit bientost après. M le M de B envoya aussitôt un courrier au roy pour l'avertir de la prise du chasteau, et S. M en eut tant de joye qu'il envoya dans le moment annoncer ceste prise à Paris. Ceste prise fit tromper absolument le party du D de M et de la Ligue en Bourgogne, (la prise) de Beaune coupant la communication entre Dijon et Chalon qui tenoient encore pour luy mais qui ne tinrent pas longtems despuis la réduction de ceste place.

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'L'AUTRE JOURNAL' DE CE QUI S'EST PASSÉ À LA RÉDUCTION DE LA VILLE DE DIJON À L'OBÉISSANCE DU ROY HENRI IV^me 1595.

Bib. de la Ville, Dijon. Fonds Baudot 139, p. 291 *seq.*

Le samedy, 27 may, 1595, le corps de la ville ayant pris la résolution de se remettre à l'obéissance du roy, furent députés du corps de lad: ville trois personnes signalées pour parlementer avec M^r. le Maréschal

[1] Jacques Chabot. [2] Henri Hurault.

[3] Imbert de Marcilly. [4] François de la Magdelaine.

[5] Dimanche des Brandons, Sunday after Candlemas. Pasques Fleury = Les Rameaux (Palm Sunday).

de Biron, gouverneur pour S. M. en Bourgogne, et ayant asseurance de leurs personnes par le rapport du trompette montèrent en coche et sortirent par la porte d'Ouche pour aller trouver led: S^r. de Biron et se trouvèrent touts en une maison appellée Chamaillot [1] proche de la ville ; et ayant asseurance des articles présentes de la part des députés ils retournèrent à la ville led: jour pour rendre responce à tout le corps de la ville, à scavoir, le S^r. Arviset, Chanoine de la Ste Chapelle du roy à Dijon, pour M^rs. les ecclésiastiques, le S^r. Brenot, Con^ser. au parlement, pour tout le collège du parlement et des comptes, et le S^r. Collin, greffier de la Chancellerie et eschevin, pour M^rs. de la Chambre de Ville : de quoy indigné le S^r. Vicomte de Tavannes se retira au chasteau et de là à Talant.[2] Le S^r. de Franchesse, gouverneur du chasteau, envoya ses soldats, conduits par le cap: Ratelier, de la ville, lesquels servirent en garde au coin du Miroir et furent assistés de Pignalet, cap: des murailles avec 40 ou 50 hommes de son guet, habitans, lesquels il avoit conduit sous promesses d'espérance de secours et se saissirent de M^rs. Brulard et Mérelès, avocats, qui tenoient pour le party du roy, et par la negligence des habitans se saissirent aussy de la maison forte des Chartreux appellée le coin du miroir,[3] et y demeurent jusques dix heures du soir seulement, parceque ils n'avoient aucuns vivres ny munitions de guerre, et qu'ils se voyoient investis et menacés par les habitans et hors d'espérance d'estre secourus là dedans. Le cap: Ratelier et ses adhérents se retirent au chasteau, comme aussy les caps: Daudin, Bouchard, Fussey, Bernard, gardes du M^r. le Vicomte de Tavannes, comme aussy plusieurs autres habitans qui estoient du party de M^onsig. le duc du Maine. Le dimanche, 28 may, il y eut une trève entre le gouverneur du chasteau et de la ville jusques à midy parcequ'il falloit faire la procession de la Ste Hostie. Ce qu'étant fait et la messe ditte, chacun se remit en armes parceque le cap: Pignalet [4] se saisit de la tour proche la porte d'Ouche,

[1] All accounts mention this Chamaillot, *une maison distante de Dijon d'environ deux portées d'arquebuze*, (Violet's journal) but there is some confusion as to the deputies who were sent ; both Breunot and M. Drouot's *relation*, whilst agreeing as to two of the deputies with 'l'autre journal,' give the third as Drouhin Vincent. It would seem that Arviset, whose name figures in the original list of the deputies, May 26 (Archives de Dijon, B 222, fo. 270), to be sent to the King, was not one of the three who actually went to Biron at Champmaillot. Champmaillot is a park a few hundred yards E. of Dijon.

[2] M^r. le vicomte de Tavannes ayant apris que M. le Maréschal étoit reçu dans dans la ville prend l'épouvante et se retire avec 5 ou 6 personnes au chasteau, et de là à Talant où il est. (Breunot).

[3] Coin du Miroir was a spot near a convent of that name at the angle of the rue du Bourg and the rue de la Liberté.

[4] Le capitaine Pignalet une heure avant l'entrée du M de B s'étoit emparé de la tour de la porte d'Ouche en laquelle il y avoit grandes provisions, mais ayant entandu que M le M de B venoit pour le forcer il se sauva avec ceux qui voullurent le suivre au château pardessus les murailles (B). Breunot's date for this, and apparently for the departure of Tavannes, is May 29.

de laquelle il avoit les clefs, où il mit les habitans qu'il avoit à sa dévotion ; puis il s'empara de la tour de reyne et de la tour de porte Guillaume où ils pillèrent et ravagèrent plusieurs maisons, dequoy les habitans indignés resolurent de les chasser. Ce qu'ils firent en effet, car environ deux heures on fit quitter la tour d'Ouche à ceux qui y estoient, et une heure après on fit quitter la tour de reyne aud: Pignalet, lequel se retira à la porte Guillaume où il fut tirés plusieurs coups d'arquebussades par les habitans et un coup de canon depuis le chasteau qui emportat la cuisse à un nommé Odet La Verne, homme fort courageux, dont il mourust peu après, et un nommé Philippe Vorteret, tailleur, qui receut trois ou quatre arquebussades dont il mourut le jeudy après : mais enfin ils poursuivrent si bien que Pignalet et les siens se retirèrent au chasteau qui pilloient ; cepandant en lad: rue mirent le feu en quelques maisons, mais par le bon secours qu'on y employa il n'y eut de brulé fors une petite maison dans un jardin proche du chasteau. Pendant ces efforts M^r. le maire, Fleutelot, envoya des messagers vers M le M de B pour le faire advertir avec 4 ou 500 chevaux et les clefs de la porte St Pierre avec procureur Baudouin, sindic, accompagné des habitans de la paroisse de St Medard, comme portiers ordinaires de la garde de lad: porte, le tout secrèttement toutefois de peur que ceux du chasteau comme désespérés ne missent le feu avant que se retirer, parcequ'ils faisoient de grands efforts pour regagner le miroir. M le M de B arriva à la ville sur les cinq heures du soir[1] avec grande force de cavalerie par la porte St. Pierre, et accourut à la maison du miroir où étoient encore ceux de la ville, et à l'entour d'icelle ceux du chasteau lesquels ayant entendu le bruit gagnèrent au plus vite le chasteau, et il y eut seullement un nomme Jean Joleur (?) de la ville qui fut blessé d'une arque-

[1] Petit me mande sur les cinq heures que led: S^r. de Biron le charge de me prier d'être à la porte St. Pierre lorsqu'il entrera. Le canon du château commence à tirer. M le M. accompagné de touts les seigneurs entre à pied et m'ayant aperçu m'embrasse ; dit il, *eh bien M. Brenot me voicy !* je luy répondis, *ouy M^rs. nous vous tenons à la bonne heure il faut avancer parcequ'on dit que M le maire est aux prises avec ceux du château en la rue St. Jean.* Il me dit, *suives moy et courrons touts.* M le M court tête baisse, l'epée au poing, sautant les barricades à la place St Jean et de là au miroir criant *allons noblesse, allons mes amis !* Le peuple crie partout vive le roy. M le M ayant forcé les barricades va jusques sur le fossé du château où M^r. Odebert tua un garde de M^r. de Mayenne. (B.) The account in M. Violet's journal contradicts an evidently current idea that the mayor and his party were hard pressed in the rue St. Jean, for the author says : ' Voilà au vrai la reddition de Dijon sous l'obéissance de S.M par le bon ordre de M^r. le maire et M^rs. de la ville ont aporté, quoique ceux qui ont voulu dire que lorsque le maréschal entra les habitans étoient reduits en toute extrémité en un coin de lad: rue,. . . mais l'on pourra ajouter foi à ce que dessus parceque l'auteur de ce discours en a été témoin oculaire.' This witness glorifies the mayor's part in the business but Breunot's account of the marshal's haste clearly proves that matters were critical somewhere. ' L'autre journal ' seems to indicate that the dangerous point was the miroir, but at the place St Jean the mayor and his men were well placed and indeed had little to do but to go *audevant* the marshal.

bussade dont il mourut, et furent tirés beaucoup de coups de canon sur la ville en ruine mais avec peu de dommages et sans perte de personne. Quoy fait, M le M de B retourna à la place St. Jean où Mr. le maire Fleutelot vint au devant luy avec l'escharpe blanche pour le recevoir comme gouverneur et crier d'un commun accord 'Vive le roy.' Mr. le maire étoit accompagné d'environ cinq cent arquebusiers, bons habitans et bien affectionnés au party du roy, comme quasy tout le peuple de la ville, lesquels touts à l'instant prirent escharpes blanches et mirent des bannières blanches par toutes les rues devant les maisons, excepté quelques particuliers qui se retirèrent au chasteau dont ils se sont repentis tout à loisir, et pour empescher que personne du chasteau ne fit tort aux habitans M le M de B, ayant fait quitter les barricades aux caps: Ratelier et Bernard, mit les soldats ès rues et barricades contre le chasteau et puis s'en alla rendre graces à Dieu. Comme aussy tout le corps du parlement fit publier à son de tromp et par arrest que chacun eut à reconnoistre le roy, étant bien certain et assuré de la sincère conversion du roy, avec déffenses à toutes personnes de quelque qualité et condition quelles fussent de dire le contraire à peine de la vie, et qu'en mémoire de la délivrance de la ville annuellement ou feroit procession générale le même jour, 28 may, à laquelle assisteront touts Mrs. de la cour du parlement en robes rouges, Mrs. des comptes du Bãage et de la ville, avec tout le clerge, et le peuple. Le soir du même jour fut chanté un Te Deun en lad: Chapelle où assistèrent (the above) avec grande affluence de noblesse et de peuple,[1] et à la sortie furent tirez ving cinq mortiers par les barons gratuitement. M le M de B se logea en la maison du président Fremyot derrière Notre Dame, Mr. le comte de Thorigny en la maison du président Jeannin, Mr. le Marquis de Mirebeau en la maison dud: seigneur, (Mirebeau) et touts les autres Srs. ès maisons bourgeoises par la ville,[2] et le reste de l'armée comme ausy les Carabins ès fauxbourgs et villages circonvoisins. Le lundy, 29 de may, ceux du chasteau firent une sortie et furent tués de part et d'autre aucuns soldats, le jeune avocat, Vellepelle,[3] et un du chasteau nommé Guérin. Pendant ce tems M le M de B alla aux barricades et commanda à faire les tranchées; ceux du chasteau ne cessèrent de tirer force cannonades contre les

[1] On attend longtemps M le maréschal mais enfin il mande qu'il ne peut venir, étant empesché pour donner ordre à quelque sortie qu'on disoit que le château vouloit faire. Le plus avisés disent qu'il ne s'y étoit trouvé parceque nous n'étions parlement ayant été interdits et n'étant encore rétablis (B).

[2] This is substantially the same in sense, but not in form, as the account of Breunot but a day earlier in date.

[3] Nothing of this in Breunot, and Vellepelle is described by him as having retired with others into the castle, but instead we read :—' Le même jour trois conseillers et plusieurs autres refugiés de St Jean de Losne retournèrent à Dijon. Mr. le président Fremyot, Picardet, procureur général, M de la Croix, maire d'Auxonne, arrivent de Semur.

eglises de St. Benigne, Notre Dame et autres maisons privées, où il a fait de grands dégâts. Le mardy, 30 may, la grosse cloche et les deux gloriolles de Notre Dame, qu'avoit faict faire le S^r. Grégoire, furent frappées et rompues par le canon du chasteau.[1] Le jeudy, premier de juing, arriva le colonel des suisses nomme Balersach,(?) colonel de la garde du roy, avec ung régiment composé de cinq compagnies de 300 hommes chacune, qui furent logés au faubourg St. Nicolas où estoit leur rendezvous. Le samedy, 3 de juin, arriva le comte de Tavannes avec sept à huit cents chevaux et un régiment de deux mil cinq cent suisses[2] qui conduisoient l'artillerie consistant en trois grosses pièces et autres moins grandes lesquels furent conduit et menés par lesd: suisses en la place St Jean avec tout l'attirail et boulets, et iceulx logés par billets à la ville.[3] Le même jour M^r. le baron de Lux et ses troupes, M^rs. les eschevins et députés, partirent pour aller au devant du roy[4] qui estoit logé à Ste Seine en l'abbaye, lequel entendit fort humainement les plaintes du pauvre peuple. Le dimanche matin, 4 de juin,[5, 6] touts les habitants de la ville par commandement de M^r. le maire furent en armes pour aller audevant du roy et furent conduits selon l'ordre des paroisses par leurs capitaines en bel ordre ; m^r. le maire et plusieurs eschevins furent audevant du roy et luy portèrent les clefs de la ville. Le roy entra avec toute sa cavallerie par la porte St. Pierre environ les dix heures du matin, et on tira à douze coups de canon tant du bulevart St Pierre que de la porte d'Ouche aux plusieurs mortiers et autres feux de joie. Au coin des quatre rues de St. Pierre, proche ches Grangier l'apoticaire, étoit dressé un arc de triomphe ou estoit le portrait du roy, ses armes, et un tableau dessous où estoit inscripts les vers et titres suivans, et d'un costé étoient les armes de M le M de B et de l'autre celles de la ville.

'Au très chrestien, clément, et victorieux Henry IV de France et de Navarre.

[1] Nothing of this in Breunot. The entry for the day is occupied with a long debate in the palais about provisions, etc., for Biron's army.

[2] Breunot says nothing about the Swiss but records a sortie from the castle, and the expected arrival of Tavannes, and the artillery from Beaune.

[3] No mention of the actual arrival of these troops in Breunot.

[4] Breunot mentions this deputation, but says that it was conducted by Thorigny.

[5] Breunot's account of this day is not very different but says nothing about the decorations and is much occupied with the King's reception of himself, and what Henry said to him.

[6] Entry for June 5, in Breunot.

Le château tire toujours en ruine sur la ville et sur les tranchées, les ruines des maisons blessent plusieurs personnes. En même temps les gens du roy tombent sur la garnison de Talant et en ont tués trente ou quarante ; le roy leur crioit, 'tues touts ces coquins là.' This last sentence is very difficult to understand because the 'relation' published by M. Drouot states that the King left Dijon at four o'clock in the morning for the rendezvous which he appointed at Lux, and on this day took place the battle of Fontaine Française.

'Sire, Votre Dijon eschappé du naufrage et tiré du péril ibernois se remet au pieds de V.M.' Et là fut crié par grande assistance des habitans, femmes et enfans, 'Vive le roy': de là fut conduit par touts les habitans et les gardes devant lad: ste Chapelle où il (*i.e.* Henry) descendit, y entrat et y entendit la messe, puis s'en alla au logis du roy devant portail (?) duquel y avoit cette inscription:—

'Au tres Chrestien etc.

'Grand monarque du Lys, miracle de la nature, seul amour des bons, et l'effroy des meschants, pour offrande prenes nos coeurs, nos voeux, nos chants, car vous êtes de Dieu la vivante figure.'

Le vendredy, 9 juin, le collège des jéssuites de Dijon fut fermé[1] entièrement pour les classes, car le père recteur, nommé Gentil, natif de Dijon, fut mandé par M^r. le Chancelier et luy fait commandement de par le roy de sortir hors de ceste ville et vuider le royaulme suivant l'arrest qui fut rendu à Paris, en 1594, contre le père Jean Guéret, prestre de la société, lequel recteur ayant entendu la résolution dud: S^r. Chancelier demanda temps pour se faire et on luy accorda trois jours, à scavoir, samedy, dimenche, et lundy. Le mardy, 13 juing, environ les cinq heures du matin, lesd: recteur et jésuites sortirent de la ville avec passeports du roy et un de ses trompettes qui les conduisit jusques à Auxonne et de la furent conduits à Dole, et lesd: jésuites rendirent les clefs du collège à M^rs. de la ville. Le jeudy, 15 juin,[2] dès les deux heures du matin, par le commandement du roy on commença à battre le chasteau en ruine depuis la rue des champs et depuis la tour St Nicolas, et furent abbatues les défenses et couvertures dud: chasteau et du premier boulevart; tellement que M^r. de Franchesse fut contraint d'envoyer vers le roy qu'il luy accorda une trève pour douze jours, et en cas qu'il ne fut secourra par M^r. du Maine et l'armée des Espagnols dans led: temps qu'il se remetterait et le chasteau à la volonté du roy, moyennant quoy il auroit Montbard pour sa seureté, et Montfort, et tout son baggage et équipes, armes, et munitions, qu'il emporteroit. Le vendredy, 23 juin,[3] après souper, entre sept et huit heures, le roy et toute la cour furent en l'eglise St Jean, et de là le roy vint mettre la feu à la foulière(?) où il y avoit quatre étages où étoient, à chaque étage, beaucoup de lames à feu qui durèrent fort longtems, clairants, et faisants grand

[1] There is no mention whatever of the departure of the Jesuits in Breunot.

[2] June 15 is blank in the 'journal de Breunot,' but the following entry is made for June 7, the day after the King's return to Dijon: 'Le château est sommé par le roy, le capitaine répond à coups de canon qu'il fait tirer contre le logis du roy et ébranle une grande corniche de la gallerie haute. Enfin le château se rendit, le 27 juin, avec une composition fort honorable et M de Franchesse quitte le château avec toutes ses troupes.' M. Drouot's 'relation' states that the capitulation took place on the last day of June. M. Drouot's 'relation' for the 14th is very similar to that of 'l'autre journal' for the 15th.

[3] Breunot's journal ends on the 21st. The last twelve days are almost entirely filled with the work of reinstating the deprived members of the *parlement*.

bruit ; aux quatre coins de la foulière étoient quatre grandes pelles pleines de feu d'artifices sur quatre grands quarrés de bois et grande quantité de fusées et tapereaux qui voloient en l'air et parterre où le roy prit grand plaisir ; au partir de là ou luy amena un capitaine lequel avoit pris de l'argent du roy et puis s'alla rendre à l'espagnol et ayant receu cent escus des espagnols il s'en vint derechef à Dijon pour tromper le roy ; (pour cette évasion ?) le roy le fit pendre à l'heure même audessus du Bourg en une potence qui y fut dressée.

Le samedy, 2 de juillet, par ordonnance du roy et par arrest du parlement fut faite une procession générale en laquelle on porta la Ste Hostie accompagnée de tout le clergé et des musiciens du roy ; à laquelle assista le roy, avec ses deux ordres à son col,[1] touts les princes, seigneurs, et chevaliers de l'ordre, M^r^ le connestable de Montmorency, M^r^ de Guise, M^r^ le Chancelier, et autres de la cour du roy, et tout son conseil privé ou de l'estat, le parlement, la chambre des comptes, le Bãage, les magistrats de la ville, et suivoit comme chef de l'eglise M^onsgr^ d'Escarts,[2] evesque de Langres, avec l'habit épiscopal, la mitre en tête, et tout le clergé revestu de chappes qui alloit encore devant et après la Ste Hostie.

There are three other accounts existing of the reduction of Dijon. Breunot's journal (published 1866). A second in the library of Dijon. Fonds Baudot 139 (unpublished). This also contains an account of the events leading up to its reduction, amongst them another 'relation' of the taking of Beaune; all of it is interesting. A third Fonds Français, No. 17282 Bib. Nat., which was edited and published 1912 by M. Drouot in the *Mémoires de la Société Bourguignonne de Géographie et d'Histoire*, tome xxvii. Breunot's journal remains our primary source of information for the events in Dijon from January 1594 to mid June 1595, but M. Drouot's 'relation' is very interesting, and it alone contains an account of the surrender of the castle by Franchesse. It differs also in other respects from the rest, for it throws some light on the motives which led to the sudden conversion of the townsfolk from Leaguers into Royalists in the course of a few days. I have thought it well to give some extracts and comments from all these by the side of 'l'autre journal,' which is published here for the first time. This journal is peculiar in giving several facts which do not appear at all in the other three and is vivid in the description of the general confusion which reigned in Dijon before Biron's entry. On the other hand, spectacular events alone seemed to appeal to its author and there is not a trace of interest in following or of ability to describe the motives which underlay these events. Some trivial occurrences such as the

[1] St. Michel and the St. Esprit.

[2] *Chef de l'eglise*, a curious expression, the Ordinary. Dijon was not an episcopal see until 1731.

processions, fire works and decorations for Henry's entry find a place equally with important events such as the expulsion of the Jesuits. The writing of the manuscript is that of the middle seventeenth century.

'L'autre journal' does not appear to be a variant or an abbreviation of Breunot's because of the marked differences which have been noted between the two; it must have had an independent origin. The local touches such as the annoyance of Tavannes at the Champmaillot conferences, the fire works, the episode of the man who received the King's money and then went to the Spaniards and returned to deceive him, the King wearing his two orders, in themselves of but little importance, give the impression that the story is that of some one who was present, but there is nothing to enable us to suggest a possible author.

O

'CE GUILLERME ESTOIT DE MILAN GRAND SCÉLÉRAT S'YL EN FUT JAMAIS'

A Letter from Guillerme Governor of Seurre to Fervaques

Arch. Mun. Hôtel de Ville, Dijon. B. 458. 229.

Monsieur,

Par le présant porteur iay entandu que ilia une entreprinse sur ceste vile, et que sa esté un gentiliome de monseigneur de nemors qui la fait venir tout exprès pour porter ceste avertesimant; ie desirois bien, monsieur, scavoir que cest parce que amoy on ne m'envoie le letre de vous ne de celuy gentiliome, si non ce que le porteur eut ma dict; nous faisons ases buone garde et ancor que touiours avons quelque petite alarme selon le tans, jusques as teure tout va ases bien que sera la fin après avoir baisé les mains priant dieu etc;

De seurre ce 22 mars 1589.

Vostre très tresomble Gulierme Frize?

A monsieur de fervasque lieutenant gñal pour moseig: dumaine en borgogna.

The name, if rightly spelled—and the letter is almost illegible—does not sound particularly Italian, but the author of the letter is clearly not a Frenchman and the 'Histoire de la prise' seems to know all about him. There was a far better known condottiere, Girolamo Rossi, who was called La Fortune, at one time governor of Seurre. There were many other soldiers of fortune, Italians, such as Gasparo da Piacenza, and Jacopo Luporini; Lorrainers, such as Audinant, and the regiment of Tremblecourt: all these have left, like Gulierme, a deplorable record behind them. Cf. *Les capitaines de la Sainte Union.* (Charles Muteau.)

M. Drouot, in his *Notes sur la Ligue en Bourgogne*, prints a letter of Du Vergier, leaguer commandant of Nuits, in which Fervaques is informed of the danger of a similar *entreprinse* at that town. The letter has no date, but M. Drouot surmises that it cannot be later than March 1589: the letter of Gulierme, of which M. Drouot may be ignorant, makes the date of the end of March almost a certainty.

Many professional captains were mistakenly regarded as Italians, as Franchesse, or Spaniards as Dyo. M. Drouot has conclusively proved that the defender of Dijon was a certain Jacques de Boyaux, the owner of a small seigneury, Franchesse, in the Bourbonnais.

P

ORDER FOR THE DESTRUCTION OF LEAGUER RECORDS

Fonds Saverot. Bib. de la Ville, Dijon. No. 3, vol. iii., p. 208.

La cour ordonne que tous arrêts, jugements, délibérations, plaidoyers, remonstrances, et requisitions faittes au palais prétendu conseil de prétandue Ste Union, société de rebelles et criminels, prétandues jurisdictions de ce ressort, prétandue chambre de la ville de Dijon, et ès élus séants en lad: ville despuis le mois de decembre, 1588, jusqu'au jour du restablissement en icelle, tant contre l'honneur et authorité du roy Henry III dernier décédé et du roy Henry IV^{me} de ce nom, à présent regnant, que contre l'estat et couronne de France au préjudice des Loix fondamentales du royaume et des bons et fidèles sujects de Sa Maj: seront biffés et rayés sur les registres, ensemble les minuttes et les extraicts qui en ont été délivrés. Déffend au greffier de lad: cour, ses commis et clercs, d'en plus expédier sans permission expresse de lad: cour, et à touttes personnes d'en retenir aucun. Ordonne que les copies qui ont été envoyées, et publiées par les bailliages et villes de ce ressort seront pareillement rayées et biffées par les baillis ou leurs lieutenants, chacun en droit, auxquels lad: cour enjoint d'y tenir la main et en certiffier icelle dans un mois. A cet effect leur sera le présent arrest envoyé à la diligence du Proc: Gen: pour estre procédé incontinant à la publication et exécution d'iceluy selon sa forme et teneur.

A Dijon en parlement le 4 de juillet 1595.

Q

HENRY III. TO THE PARLEMENT OF AIX

Peiresc collection. Carpentras. Fol. 210. Méjanes library, Aix en Provence. Actes et mémoires. Vol. i., 94, 95.

De par le Roy Comte de Provence :—

Chers et bien amés, Vous entendres du S^{r}. de la Valette les occasions qui nous ont meu de partir de ñre ville de paris le treiziesme

de ce mois, et vous verres par la présente que c'a esté avec tous les regretz et desplaisirs qu'un prince, qui a tant rendu de preuve de sa bonté et de son affection envers ses subjetz comme nous avons faict, peut sentir et supporter ; non tant encores pour les resgretz de ñre absence et esloignement et de la façon de laquelle les choses sont passées, que pour avoir recongneu et esprouvé, véritablement contre mon attente, la raison et la vérité qu'aucuns ayent en pouvoir d'imprimer au coeur des habitants de la ville de paris que nous ayons volonté de leur donner de garnisons estrangères, et que nous croyons entrer en doubte de la fidéllité des bons bourgeois d'icelle. Car c'est choze que n'entra jamais en nostre pensée, n'ayant oncques creu et estimé que domination et puissance vraye et naturelle establie sy legitimement et de si longue main que la notre, et dont nos subiects ont en tout temps receu tant de bon traictement et gratification comme les roys nos prédescesseurs et nous avons faict preuve sy notable de la loyauté et dévotion, eust besoing d'estre fortiffiée et appuyée pour estre maintenue et conservé, comme il appartient, d'autres forces et colomnes que icelles de la piété et justice, et de la bien veillance et constance publicque dont nos prédescesseurs roys et nous avons tousiours faict plus de fondement que de touttes autres hores quelles soint. Et comme l'on a aussy entamé ce dessein par la principale et cappitale ville de ñre royaulme sans avoir esgard à ñre personne, et ny mettre en considération et balancer les grands biens faicts que les habitans de lad: ville, tant en général qu'en particulier, ont receu de nous, nous craignons que la concussion (?) encores estandre aux autres villes de ñre royaulme à mesmes fins et intentions, cest pourquoy nous vous faisons la présente par laquelle nous vous admonestons d'en adjouster[1] foy à telles inventions et inductions, ainsi au contraire les réputer et condemner comme ennemies de la vérité, de ñre proper bien, et pareillement de ñre Ste religion. cath. apost. et Rom. D'aultant que nostre vraye intention est de rien innover ni changer en la garde de ñre ville de ce que a esté faict et observé jusques à pñt, et de vous monstrer plus de confiance que jamais, que telles inventions ne peuvent servir que diviser les citoyens et bons bourgeois de ñre dicte ville, les plonger en craintes et deffiances immortelles, et establir des authorités et puissances extérieures, que ne leur peuvent apporter ny à présent ny à la fine que toutte ruyne et désolation. C'est proprement et directement faire les affaires des hérétiques et de toutte sorte de factions comme nous n'avons que trop esprouvé despuis le commancement de ces dernieres guerres, par le moyen desquelles nos subiectz catholicques ont vescu et vivent encores en telle crainte et division qu'au lieu de ruyner les hérétiques ils ont acquis plus de forces estrangères et autres maux innombrables qu'ils ont enduré à ñre grand regret et désplaisir, combien que nous ayons

[1] de n'en ?

faict tout ce que nous a esté possible jusques à souffrir et accorder plusieurs choses contre nostre dignité, et engager tous ensemble à embrasser de poursuivre avec nous d'une vraye, sincère, et bonne intelligence et union la guerre contre les hérétiques. Pour laquelle nous avons sy souvent et encores recentment en la route dernière de ceste puissente armée estrangère exposé sy heureusement ñre propre personne. Au moyen de quoy nous vous prions et exortons derechef de ne donner aucun lieu aus susd : impressements et artiffices, vous tenir fermes et unis pour nous rendre l'obéissance que vous nous debvey et nous donner plus de moyen de vous traicter heureusement et favorablement comme nous avons bonne volonté de faire, et à ceste fin embrasser et affectuer tout ce que nous connoistrons que pourra servir à advancer l'honneur et gloire de dieu et le bien et soulagement et union de tout ñre peuple et subjectz, aultant voire plus que nous n'avons jamais faict ; comme nous chargons led: S^r. de la Valette vous faire plus particulièrement entendre de ñre part et connoistre par vrays effectz. Donné à Chartre le 17 may, 1588.[1]

HENRY,
de Neufville.

R

LA VALETTE TO THE PARLEMENT OF AIX

Fol. 387. Carpentras. Méjanes, vol. i., 34. Also two previous letters on the same subject.

MESSIEURS,

J'ay veu par le vostre que n'estes encores bien informés de l'intention du roy, que me faict vous envoyer une coppie de la lettre que sa maj: m'a escript depuis les evènemants de Blois par laquelle vous verres son intention bien esloignée de ce que l'on vous figure ; nonobstant laquelle j'ay faict les offres que je vous ay mandé jà par l'affection que j'ay au bien de ses affaires et à vostre repos et soulagement, et sur l'espérance aussy que j'avois que chascun poussé de mesme zèle embrasseroit mon intention. Encores une autre que je vous envoye qu'il a escript à ceux de ceste ville sur son parlement comme il a faict aussy à tous autres ; par la vous verres comme le roy a apreuvé ce qui s'est faict de delà.

vótre affectionné serviteur,
LA VALETTE.
de pertuics 25 febvrier, 1589.

A M^rs. de la cour du parlement de provence à Aix.

[1] A good example of the involved style of the day and we must avoid being over certain as to the meaning of any long letter, either English or French, of the XVI. century. The recipients themselves were often misled. Cf. below R.

Messieurs je vous diray encore que sy vous aves quelque commandement du roy particulier duquel il ne me soit point apparent jusque icy, en me le faisant voir je me resoulx dy obéir entièrement comme je doibs. Je vous envoye coppie desd: lettres pattentes que les S^rs. de Pontcarré et Ste Marie ont apportées en ce pais à M^rs les depputez des communes estant assemblez à la ville d'Aix.

S

MAYENNE TO THE PARLEMENT OF AIX

Fol. 363. Carpentras. Méjanes, vol. i., 320.

Messieurs,

Ayant veu le zèle et la prudence avec laquelle vous establisses la religion des catholiques en vostre province, à la ruine des ennemies de dieu de son esglise et du général bien, j'ay estimé que je doibve vous en remercier par mes lettres et vous offrir l'affection que j'ay tousiours eue de vous honorer et randre graces pour vostre méritte envers le public et particulièrement envers nostre maire(?).[1] Je vous supplie très humblement, M^rs. de vouloir tousiours continuer en ceste sainte et bonne résolution que vous aves prise, qui est aujourdhuy suivie et adsisté du consentement presque universel de toute la Chrétienneté. En mon particulier je doibs ma vie à la juste vengeance des miens tuez inhumenement pour la seule cause de la relligion. Tous les gens de bien et moy avec eulx la devons aussy à la relligion. Les conseils fermes et généreux tendent et visent dans seul but à la ruyne de nos ennemis. Je suis exempt de toute mauvaise passion et vous affectionne à vous rendre service. En ceste volonté je vous baise très humblement les mains et prie dieu, messieurs, vous tenir en sa sainte et digne garde.

De Rouan ce troisiesme jour de mars, 1589. Vostre plus humble et très affectionné à vous faire service.

Charles de Loraine

M^rs les gens tenants la cour de parlement de provence.

T

MAYENNE TO THE DUKE OF SAVOY

Fol. 364 V. Carpentras. Méjanes, vol. i., 323.

M^r le bon et grand secours qu'il a pleu à vre altesse donner aux catholiques de provence et d'alphyné à leur grand besoing, a faict recongnoistre à tous les gens de bien de ce royaulme vre st zèlle à la conservation de ñre religion, vre générosité en la déffence de vos

[1] Clearly not. Can Mayenne mean 'Mère,' i.e. l'Eglise ?

voisins, et vre libéralité en la subvention que vous leur avez faite de vos deniers, aussy confessent ilz vous en estre infinimant redevables et moy principallement.

Je ne seray jamais contant si je ne luy aye rendu tesmoignage de la volonté et sincère affection que j'ay de luy rendre tout fidelle et asseuré service comme la grandeur et l'obligation que luy doibt led: estat la mérite. Je ne cesseray de la supplier, très humblement, ne se lasser èz bénéfices accomencés èz provinces affligées, affinque l'honneur de leur conservation soulz l'obéissance de leur roy catholique soit totallement deubre à vre altesse, et à laquelle, ne désirant de ce que ce passe de par deça rien celler, je diray que le roy de Navarre ayant surprins Vandosme en parlementant va encores assiéger le comte de Brissac. Je y avois envoyé avec quelques trouppes pour se remettre dedans n'y pouvant entrer tailler en pièces les raistres qui estoint venus aud: service et en envoya aussy tost trois cornettes, la quatriesme s'estant saulvée à la faitte avecq 300 chevaulx; despuis l'ennemy ne fit grand progrès. Et je faics, en attandant le légat, tout ce que je puis pour nettoyer ceste province pour aller trouver le roy de Navarre là, parcequ'il y sera affin de donner une fin a ce trouble : de ce que surviendra je ne failleray en tenir vre altesse adverti. A laquelle baisant très humblement les mains, je prierai Dieu, ets,

CHARLES DE LORAINE

de Paris ce xix x^bre. 1589.

U

MEYRARGUES TO THE PARLEMENT OF AIX

Méjanes, vol. i., 333.

MESSEIGNEURS,

Nous donnames ces jours passés advis à Mon^sr. le comte de Martinengue et à madame la comtesse de la descente que le Colonel Alphonse prépare de faire au vigairat de Tarascon avec des grandes forces des trouppes du comte de Tournoy et d'une partie des Huguenots du Dauphiné, qui se doivent joindre avec led: S^r. de la Valette à St Paul d'un lieux prèz de St Esprit viennent trouver M^r. de Montmorency et se rend à Beaucaire, (où il) a faict assembler grand nombre de ses forces aux environs dud: Beauquaire. Led: Colonnel a faict dessendre de Valence deux doubles canons et quantité de munitions de guerre, et fait estat de mettre en compagne trois ou quatre mil arquebusiers, XII m^res,[1] et six canons de batterie; (ce que) fait courir bruit qu'ilz veulent prendre tous les lieux du viguarait de Tarascon et enlever les fruitz qui sont à la compagne et les remettre à Tarascon, et aux lieux que pourroit prendre. M^rs. de St. Marcelin,

[1] Maîtres, *i.e.* gunners. (The word is sometimes used for engineers.)

d'Oustan, de Bidou, et aultres se sont offerts librement de se jetter dans les places pour les déffendre pourveu que, outre la cavallerie et l'infanterie que pourions avoir de par deça, l'on faict couler encores au viguairat six ou sept cens arquebusiers et deux cens m^res. d'avantage ; avec cella ilz estiment faire quelque signalé service au pais. Nous avons escript à M^r. le comte et madame la comtesse pour les mander en toute dilligence. Le s^r. demerargue ira faire ung passage pour visitter tous ces lieulx, affin que y puisse prévoir de faire tout ce que sera necessaire et leur baillera vos lettres et faira les despescher qui seront (?)[1] au necessaire. Priant Dieu, messeigneurs, vous donner en santé très heureuse et longue vie,

d'avignon le cinquiesme jullet, 1591, et demeurans à jamais voz très humbles servitteurs la Fare, Merargues.

Messeigneurs, M. les gens Tenants la cour de parlement de provence ayant le gouvernement èz mains.

[1] serviront ?

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s'opposer à ceux qui veulent par tous moyens subvertir la religion catholique et tout l'Etat, à Péronne le 29 mars 1585. Reims. The names of the chief leaguers are given . This is an important piece, for it is the manifesto of the League. Reprinted vol. i., Mémoires de Nevers, p. 641.

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de Malziou, Marvèges, et Peire en août et septembre 1586 écrit par un gentilhomme de l'armée dud : Seigneur à un sien ami. Paris. Patisson.

1586. Règlement que le roi veut être observé par les baillis et sénéchaux ou leurs lieutenants pour l'exécution de l'Edit de S.M. pour la réunion de ses sujets à l'Église C.A.R.

1587. Le guidon des catholiques sur l'édit du roi publié en sa cour de parlement pour la réunion de ses sujets, etc. Paris. du Coudret.

1587. Avertissement à tous vous et loyaux sujets du roi Ecclésiastiques Nobles et du Tiers pour n'être surpris ni circonvenus par les propositions colorées impostures suggestions et suppositions des conspirateurs partisans et adhérans à la pernicieuse et damnée entreprise faite et machiné contre le roi et son Etat. Paris. de Roigny.

1587. Avertissement fait au Roy de la part du Roy de Navarre et de M. le prince de Condé touchant la dernière déclaration de guerre. La Rochelle. Protost.

1587. Harangue sur les causes de la guerre entreprise contre les rebelles et séditieux du royaume envoyée à M. le duc de Guise et à toute la noblesse catholique ce 4 octobre 1587 par un évêque de l'Eglise C.A.R. Paris.

1587. De evellendarum heresiae ratione declamationes contrariae, auctore Laurentio Burceretio marchianae scholae classico. Parisiis. a Prato. By Bourceret of Dijon.

1587. Advertissement aux François sur l'état des affaires de France au mois d'aoust 1587. Reims.

1587. Discours de la défaite des Rochellois par M. le duc de Joyeuse le 1er aoust 1587. Lyon. Pillehotte.

1587. Discours de ce qui s'est passé en l'armée estrangère envoyée par M. de Chastillon au roi de Navarre en 1587. MS. Catalogue of Library de Thou. p. 473. By the Count of Châtillon.

1587. Discours au vrai de la prinse et réddition de la ville de Rocquecroix par M. le duc de Guise. Paris. Linouier.

1587. La descente des Reistres par M. le duc d'Espernon ensemble tous ceux qui ont été tués. Attande qu'il soit fait. Small pamphlet. By Blancy.

1587. Plaintes faites contre le roy Henry III. par les chefs de la Ligue en 1587 pendant qu'ils furent assemblés à Meaux où la royne mère fut les trouver. Mémoires de Nevers, p. 702.

1587. Lettre d'un gentilhomme catholique françois à MM. de Sorbonne de Paris sur la nouvelle victoire obtenue par le roi de Navarre contre M. de Joyeuse à Coutras le mardi 20 Octobre 1587. Without name of town or printer.

1587. Remonstrance à la France sur les maux qu'elle souffre et les remèdes qui y sont nécessaires faite après la bataille de Coutras. By Philippe de Mornay.

1587. Discours de la guerre civile de la France en 1587. By Claude de la Chastre.

1587. Les sept livres des honnêtes loisirs de M. de la Mothe Messemé ou discours en forme de chronologie des plus notables occurrences de nos guerres civiles et des divers accidents de l'auteur avec differentes poèmes. Paris.

1587. Discours de l'enterprise sur la ville d'Avranches par ceux de la Religion P.R. et de la découverte et prinze d'iceux le 17 décembre 1587. Paris. Velu.

1587. Copie d'une lettre envoyée de l'armée du roi contenant ce qui s'y est passé depuis le partement de S. Maj. de la Ville de Paris jusqu'à la déroute des reistres. Paris.

1587. Du passage et route que tiennent les reistres et allemands estant repoussés par le duc de Lorraine. Lyon.

1587. Discours de la défaite des Suisses en Dauphiné par M. de la Valette contenant l'histoire de la prinse et reprise de la ville de Montlimar. Paris. By J. Robelin.

1587. La défaite des reistres par le Duc de Guise ensemble l'état de ce qui s'est passé en son armée depuis 20 Octobre jusqu'au 26 ensuivant. Paris.

1587. Discours de la défaite des reistres près Montargis par le duc de Guise. Paris.

1587. Ample discours de la défaite de vingt et une cornettes de reistres fait à Vimory en Gâtinois près Montargis le 26 octobre par les ducs de Guise et du Maine. Lyon.

1587. La défaite nouvelle des Suisses par les Albanais qui sont de la suite de M. le duc de Guise. (10 Nov.). Paris. 'Albanais' are Croats and Slovenes.

1587. Le vrai discours sur la déroute et déconfiture des reistres advenues par la vertu du duc de Guise le 22 novembre. Paris.

1587. Lettres écrites par M. le duc de Guise touchant la défaite des reistres près le chasteau d'Aulneau du 22 novembre. Lyon. Pillehotte.

1587. Discours véritable de la défaite des reistres Protestants à Aulneau par M. le duc de Guise. Paris. Bichon.

1587. La déroute générale des reistres avec l'ordre nombre de gens de guerre et artillerie qui étoient au camp des reistres : ensemble *Te Deum* qui fut chanté à Notre Dame rendant graces à Dieu. Paris.

1587. La dernière défaite des reistres par le duc de Guise exécutée entre Nancy et Blasmont le 3 du mois de decembre ; ensemble un petit discours des défaites précédentes. Paris. Millot.

1587. Copie des lettres du Duc de Nevers contenant le retour des Suisses venus en France pour les Huguenots et la fuite de huit cornettes de reistres sur le chemin de Nogent à la Bussière par le duc de Guise. Lyon.

1587. La rendition et protestation de 12,000 Suisses au roi qui s'ètoient acheminés contre Sa Maj. avec un Sommaire de tout ce qui s'est passé depuis la venue des reistres jusqu' à présent. Lyon. Paris. Linocier.

1587. Du passage et route que tinrent les reistres allemans estant repoussés par le duc de Lorraine avec le nombre des gens d'ordonnance de leur gendarmerie. Paris. Buffet.

1587. Journal de toutes les actions et conseils du dernier voyage de guerre fait en France par les reistres pour le secours de ceux de la Religion en 1587 conduits par le baron Dona. MS. of the Colbert Library at the Bibl. Nat.

1587. Mémoires envoyés en divers lieux de ce qui se passa le 24 aoust que le roi de Navarre sortit de La Rochelle jusqu'à la bataille de Coutras. By Philippe de Mornay. Mem. vol. i., p. 754.

1587. Remonstrance faite au roy et à la royne mère par MM. les Cardinaux de Bourbon et de Guise assistés de MM. de Guise de Rets de Joyeuse sur les plaintes et doléances de troubles de ce royaume. Paris. Blochet.

1587. Litéarchie contre les pernicieux escripts, calomnies et apologies faites par aucuns hérétiques ennemis de Dieu du Roy pour la conversion des dévoyés restitution de l'état et assoupissement de ses troubles. Revue par les Docteurs de Sorbonne. Paris.

1587. Ejusdem declaratio (Henrici Navarraei regis) causarum quibus externum militem conscribere coactus est. Rupellae. [La Rochelle.]

1587. Histoire de l'Europe depuis l'an 1559 jusqu'en 1587 et jugement sur icelle. MS. Lib. of Chancelier Seguier, No. 664. By Jacques de Montagne.

1587. Réponse à un ligueur masqué du nom de catholique anglois par un vrai catholique bon François.

1587. Avertissement des avertissements au peuple très Chrétien. Reims. A sermon by Jean de Caumont, Canon of Reims.

1587. Rélation de la bataille de Coutras. MS. Lib. of Président de Mesme, p. 292.

1588. Chant sur la défaite des reistres à l'imitation du psaume *Quand Israel* —par F. B. Auxonnois. Probably by Filibert Bertin.

1588. Réjouissance Chrétienne des vrais et naturels François pour la rendition générale des reistres ensemble leur dernière défaite par M. le duc de Guise entre Nancy et Blasmont le 3 decembre. Rouen. Courant.

1588. Action de grâces des catholiques sur la miraculeuse victoire obtenue a Vilmory et Aulneau contre l'épouvantable armée des Allemands et hérétiques en novembre 1587. Paris. Benoist.

1588. Discours de ce qui s'est passé en la ville d'Estampes et ès environs depuis le 23 Octobre jusqu'au 5 décembre 1587. Paris.

1588. Congratulation à la France sur les victoires obtenues par le roi contre les étrangers et son retour en la ville de Paris, le 23 decembre 1587. Lyon. Rigaud.

1588. Accord et capitulation faits entre le roi de Navarre et le duc Cazimir pour la levée de l'armée des reistres venus en France 1587. Strasbourg. Porché.

1588. Commentaire et remarques chrétiennes sur l'édit de 1588 où est le devoir d'un vrai catholique contre les politiques de notre temps. Paris.

1588. Lettres patentes du roi déclarations des droits privilèges et prérogatives de M. le Cardinal de Bourbon données à Chartres le 17 aoust 1588 et publiées au parlement le 26 du même. Paris.

1588. Description de l'homme politique de ce temps avec sa foi et sa religion qui est un catalogue de plusieurs hérésies et athéismes où tombent ceux qui prefèrent l'état humain à la religion catholique. Paris. Bichon.

1588. Articles de la Sainte Union des Catholiques François. Paris.

1588. Discours politique d'un gentilhomme François contre ceux de la Ligue qui tâchoient de persuader au roi de rompre l'alliance avec l'Angleterre. Paris.

1588. Discours de la mort du prince de Condé à St Jean d'Angely le 8 de mars 1588. La Rochelle.

1588. Remonstrance faite à M. d'Espernon entrant à l'église cathédrale de Rouen le 3 mai 1588 par le penitencier dud : lieu. Paris.

1588. Discours véritable de ce qui est arrivé à Paris le 12 mars 1588 par lequel clairement on connoit les mensonges et impostures des ennemis du repos public à l'encontre de M. le duc de Guise propagateur de l'église catholique. Paris. Millot.

1588. Lettre envoyée de la ville du Mans par un homme d'honneur et digne de foi en date du 18 Julhet 1588 à un sien ami demeurant à Paris contenant les cruautés exercées par les troupes d'Espernon au pays du Maine : le tout bien avéré comme il appert par les informations faites sur les lieux. Paris. Bichon.

1588. Nouvelle lettre écrite à d'Espernon sur les misères de la France par un sien ami étant en son gouvernement de Metz par laquelle il lui est remonstré que lui seul est l'auteur de la ruine totale de la France. Verses. Paris.

1588. Histoire contenant les plus mémorables faits advenus en 1587 tant en l'armée commandée par le duc de Guise que celle des Huguenots commandée par le duc de Bouillon envoyée par un gentilhomme françois à la royne d'Angleterre. Paris. By Claude de Chastre.

1588. Congratulations au roi Henri III. sur sa victoire contre l'estranger. Paris. L'Angelier. By Etienne Pâquier.

1588. Le discours et tumulte fait à Paris le jeudi 12 du mois de mai, le tout assoupi par M. le duc de Guise. Paris. Viveret.

1588. Avertissement de l'armée que dresse le roi de France contre les hérétiques du pays de Poitou, ensemble ce qui s'est passé en la ville d'Angoulême entre les habitants et le duc d'Espernon. Paris. Deshayes.

1588. Discours véritable de ce qui s'est passé dans la ville d'Angoulême entre les habitants et le duc d'Espernon le 14 aoust 1588. Paris. Roffet.

1588. De l'autorité du roi et des crimes de lèse majesté qui se commettent par Ligués designation de successeur et libelles écrits contre la personne et dignité du roi. By Pierre de Belloy.

1588. Réponse à un livre de Belloy plein de faussetés et de calomnies sous cet excellent titre : de l'autorité du roi. Paris. Bichon. By some leaguer, perhaps Louis Dorléans.

1588. Des guerres de la ligue. Latin poem. Cited in Mémoires de l'abbé de Marolles, p. 169. By Antoine Mornai, S.J.

1588. Déclarations de François de la Noue pour la prise d'armes pour la juste défense de Sedan et de Jamets Frontières du royaume et sous la protection de Sa. Maj. Verdun. Marchand.

1588. Discours sur l'entreprise du duc de Guise sur la ville de Paris pour y prendre le roi.

1588. La foi et la religion des politiques de ce temps contenant la réfutation de leurs hérésies. Paris. Bichon. D.R.A.R.B.L. By Dom. Robert Arroux religieux Bénédictin Lorrain.

1588. Copie d'une lettre écrite au roi et extrait d'une autre aux princes et seigneurs françois le 17 mai dernier par M. le duc de Guise. Paris. Millot.

1588. Histoire particulière de ce qui s'est passe à Paris au jour des barricades et aux suivans en Mai 1588. MS. Dupuy. Bib. Nat.

1588. Histoire de la ligue en 1588. MS. in Lib. of Chancelier Seguier afterwards in the abbey of St. Germain des Près.

1588. Nouvelle de la France ou lettre du roi écrite le 17 mai au Sieur de Mandelot (governor of Lyon) contenant l'histoire de la sédition de Paris et les entreprises du duc de Guise contre le roi.

1588. Mémoires du capitaine Guis en 1588. MS. Register 66, vol. i. Manuscripts of Peiresc. Carpentras.

1588. Déclaration du duc de Guise avec les copies des lettres par lui écrites tant au roi qu'aux habitants des villes capitales du royaume. Paris.

1588. Exhortation aux vrais et entiers catholiques en laquelle est ensemble demonstré que ce qui est dernièrement arrivé à Paris n'est acte de rebelion contre la majesté du roi. Paris. Bichon.

1588. Lettre de M. de Villeroy au Roi de Navarre pour l'induire à chercher la bonne grace du roi et penser à la perte qu'il fit de l'état sur les émotions advenues en icelui le 12 mai. Paris. Recueil de Launel 1623.

1588. La merveilleuse complainte de la paix pardevant notre Dieu contre les inventifs et procureurs de la guerre, plus le huictain au lecteur sur le temps présent de la guerre. Paris. Velu. Huitain, probably a poem of eight verses and not the weekly news.

1588. La complainte de Guerimonie des pauvres laboureurs sur la calamité de ce temps présent. Paris. Le Clerc.

1588. Requête présentée au roi Henri III. par les Cardinaux Princes, Seigneurs et Députez de la ville de Paris et autres villes catholiques associez et unis pour la défense de la religion. Anvers. Trognes. Paris. Bichon.

1588. Discours fait dedié à M. le duc de Guise. By Michel Guilian Breton.

1588. La Harangue et proposition faites au roy sur l'union de toute la noblesse catholique de France présentées au roi le 22 juillet 1588. Paris. By Renaud de Beaune, archbishop of Bourges.

1588. Remonstrances des habitants de la ville de Paris avec la réponse du roy sur icelles en traictant de l'union du 5 juillet. Mémoires de Nevers, vol. i., p. 733.

1588. Bref discours sur la défaite des Huguenots advenue le 10 juin 1588 au pays et comté de la Haute Marche et comme M. de Charon et autres capitaines les ont assiégés ensemble le nombre des morts et blessés et détenus prisonniers. Paris. Plumion.

1588. Déclaration de la volonté du roi faite depuis son département de Paris donnée à Chartres au mois de mai. Paris. Sallé.

1588. Exhortation pour la paix et la réunion des catholiques. Paris. Mesnier.

1588. Propos tenus au roi par les deputez de Paris à la présentation de cette requête. Paris. Nivelle.

1588. Suite des remonstrances et articles présentés au roi depuis la dernière requête de MM. les Cardinaux et princes catholiques. Rouen.

1588. Au roi mon maître pour les affaires expresses de Sa. Maj. By Chicot.

1588. Réponse à une lettre envoyée par un gentilhomme de Basse Bretagne à un sien ami étant à la suite de la cour sur la misère de ce temps trouveé à Rouen à la porte de Martainville. Rouen. Brioche.

1588. La description de politique de notre temps faite par un gentilhomme françois. Paris. Plumion. A satire against the *avocat général* de Belloy.

1588. Requête des Etats de France à MM. du conseil. Paris.

1588. La confession et repentance d'Espernon des maux qu'il a faits contre les catholiques envoyée par Zwinglius Antonius gentilhomme Lyonnois à M. son cousin de Linon. Prose and verse. Epernay. Tarabat de Francfort.

1588. La harangue faite au roi par la noblesse de la France sur les guerres et troubles de son royaume à Rouen en juin 1588. Paris.

1588. Harangue au roi très chrétien faite à Chartres par Monseigneur Don Bernardin de Mendoça ambassadeur pour le roi d'Espagne vers sa Majesté.

1588. Edit du roi sur l'union de Sa Maj avec les princes et seigneurs catholiques ensemble les articles sur ce fait du 18 juillet 1588. Paris. Gerard.

1588. Avertissement et advis à MM. les députés des Etats Généraux pour cette année. Paris.

1588. La vraie harangue faite par le roi Henri III. de ce nom roi de France et Pologne à l'ouverture de l'assemblée des trois Etats de son royaume en sa ville de Blois le 16 octobre. Probably by Cardinal du Perron.

1588. La harangue faite au roi par le Prévôt des Marchands de Paris en l'assemblée des Etats le 17 octobre. Paris. Jouin.

1588. Remonstrance très humble faite à Henri III. par Messire René Comte de Sausay Vicomte de Poictou deputé de la noblesse dud : pays aux Etats sur la réformation de tous les ordres extirpation de l'hérésie et poursuite contre les hérétiques rebelles. Lyon. Rigaud.

1588. Cagasanga Reistro Suysso Lansquettorum per magistrum Joan-Baptistum Lichiardum recatholicatum Spaliporcinum Poetam. Parisiis. Richer. In Macaronic verse. By Jean-Baptiste Richard of Dijon.

1588. Le siège de Sarlat en 1587 par l'armée Huguenote conduite par le Vicomte de Turenne. Bordeaux.

1588. Discours véritable de la malheureuse conspiration et attentat contre la personne de M. le duc d'Espernon par François Normand dit Puigrelier maire de la ville d'Angoulême et ses complices en septembre 1588. Angoulême. Mimières.

1588. Histoire tragique et memorable de Pierre Gaveston gentilhomme Gascon jadis mignon d'Edouard II. roi d'Angleterre tirée des chroniques de Thomas Walsingham et tournée de latin en françois dediée au duc d'Espernon ; avec la requête sur les etats généraux de France.

1588. Réplique à l'Antigaverston ou réponse faite à l'histoire de Gaverston par le duc d'Espernon. Not the real author.

1588. Le restaurateur de l'etat françois où sont traitées plusieurs notables questions sur la police la justice et la religion. A Huguenot pamphlet.

1588. Mémoires à ceux qui vont aux Etats. By Pierre du Four-Lévesque.

1588. Nouvelles de la cour escrites de Blois le 10 octobre contenant l'élection de ceux qui présiderent aux Etats ainsi que le commencement de la disgrace de M. d'Espernon. Paris. Millot.

1588. Ample discours sur le fait des quatre Etats du royaume de France composé par J. D. R. A. Paris. Leblanc.

1588. La découverte des deniers salés dédiée au roi et à Messieurs de l'Etat de Blois avis très utile et nécessaire pour le recouvrement de notables sommes de Finances sur les partisans du sel. Paris. Duval. The tax on salt was much disliked.

1588. Le replique à la réponse aux deniers salés. Paris. Duval.

1588. La prise de la ville et château de Montaigu par le duc de Nevers avec la capitulation. Paris.

1588. Exploits d'armes faits par le roi de Navarre sur ceux de la ligue en Bas-Poitou pendant l'assemblée de Blois.

1588. Responsio ad praecipua capita Apologiae quae falso catholica inscribitur pro successione Henrici Navarreni Francorum regnans auctore Francesco Romulo. Romae 1588. Cracoviae 1591.

1588. The same reply to de Belloy in a French translation. Both attributed to Cardinal Bellarmin.

1588. Panégyrique de l'Henoticon ou Edit du roi sur la réunion de ses sujets de l'Eglise C.A.R. avec une sommaire Exposition d'icelui et ample discours des moyens de purger les royaumes d'hérésies schismes et séditions. Paris. By Honoré de Laurens.

1588. Remonstrance très humble au roi par un sien officier sur les désordres et misères de ce royaume et moyens d'y pourvoir. Possibly by Cayet.

1588. Réponse des vrais catholiques françois à l'avertissement des catholiques anglois pour l'exclusion du roi de Navarre contre les déclarations et apologie dud : roi de Navarre et autres livrets des hérétiques traduites du latin. Most probably by Denis Bouthillier.

1588. Remonstrances au roi tenant ses Etats en sa ville de Blois par les officiers de Sa Maj. Paris. Montr'oeil.

1588. Ad nobilis cujusdam Germani literas super Germanorum auxiliaribus copiis nuper fusis et coesis clarissimi viri responsis. Parisiis. Bichon. The work of some leaguer.

1588. Harangue prononcée devant le roi séant en ses États généraux à Blois par messire Pierre d'Espinac archevesque de Lyon au nom de l'Etat Ecclesiastique de France. Paris. Metayer.

1588. Mémoires semés par quelques politics aux états qui se tiennent dans la ville de Blois avec la réponse catholique à iceux. Paris.

1588. Harangue faite au roi par un député particulier de Rouen dans son cabinet à Blois le 27 octobre 1588. Paris V^ve^ d'Allier.

1588. Remonstrance faite par M. le Garde des Sceaux de France [*i.e.* François de Montholon] en l'assemblée des Etats [à Blois].

1588. Mandement du roi pour la convocation des états généraux de ce Royaume en la ville de Blois au 15 septembre. Paris. Morel.

[?] Mémoires secrets envoyés de Blois.

1588. Bon avis et nécessaire remonstrance pour le soulagement des pauvres du Tiers Etats.

1589. Discours véritable de ce qui est advenu aux états généraux tenus à Blois en l'année 1588 pour être envoyé par toute la Chretienté. Paris.

1589. Remonstrance au roi Henri III. et aux états généraux à Blois faite par le sieur de Sindré l'un des députés de la noblesse du Bourbonnois. Lyon. Pillehotte.

1589. Exhortations aux Parisiens très catholiques et ceux qui veulent exposer corps et biens pour l'édification et défense de l'eglise C.A.R.

1589. Le carême et meoeurs du politique où il est amplement discouru de la manière de vivre de son état et religion par P.V.B.C. Paris. Deshayes.

1589. Réponse du P. Dom Bernard doyen des religieux Feuillantins lès Paris à une lettre que lui a écrite Henri de Valois en laquelle réponse il lui remontre chrétiennement et charitablement ses fautes et l'exhorte à la pénitence. By Dom Bernard de Montgaillard.
Feuillantins, a reformed branch of Cîteaux from the name of a village in Languedoc. Dom B. was an obstinate rebel.

1589. Extrait des régistres de l'hôtel de Ville de Paris touchant ce qui a été délibéré en l'assemblée publique de cette ville les 30 et derniers jours de decembre 1588 pour la sûreté avec l'arrêt de la cour de Parlement. Paris. Nivelle.

1589. Particularités notables concernant l'assassinat et massacre de M. le duc de Guise et Monseigneur le cardinal son frère. Chaalons. du Bois.

1589. Discours déplorable du meutre et assassinat traditoirement commis en la ville de Blois les Etats tenans de très haut très puissant et très catholique feu Henri de Lorraine duc de Guise pair et grand maître de France le vendredi 23 decembre, 1588. Paris.

1589. Lettres du roi de Navarre renvoyées au roi sur la cruelle mort de M. le duc de Guise et la déclaration de la défiance qu'il a du roi. Wholly imaginary.

1589. L'Athéisme du roi Henri de Valois où il est montré le vrai but de ses dissimulations et cruautés. Paris. Deshayes.

1589. La recompence du Tyran de la France et porte bannière d'Angleterre Henri de Valois envers le cardinal et duc de Guise pour leur bons services avec le loyer que led : tyran peut esperer et attendre pour ses faits inhumains. Paris. Jouin.

1589. Histoire véritable de la plus sainte partie de la Vie de Henri de Valois jadis roi de France. Paris. Michel.

1589. Histoire admirable des faits et gestes de Henri de Valois. Paris.

1589. Les impostures et calomnies des Huguenots Politiques et Athéistes pour colorer le massacre commis ès personnes du cardinal et duc de Guise par Henri de Valois ; avec la réfutation d'icelles et comme l'on se doit comporter contre l'inhumanité des massacreurs et tyrans et de la punition necéssaire d'iceux. Paris.

1589. Considérations sur le meurtre commis en la personne de feu M. le duc de Guise. Paris. Bichon.

1589. Mandement du chapitre de l'eglise de Reims à l'occasion du massacre du cardinal et du duc de Guise, du lundi 20 mars 1589. By Guériot. MS. in Bibl. Jardel.

1589. Le martyre des deux frères contenant au vrai les particularités plus notables des massacres commis ès personnes du Cardinal et du duc de Guise par Henri de Valois à la face des états de Blois. Paris.

1589. La double tragédie du duc et cardinal de Guise. Paris. des Monceaux.

1589. Guisiade tragédie nouvelle en laquelle au vrai et sans passion est représenté le massacre du duc de Guise. Lyon. By Pierre Matthieu.

1589. Epitaphes des deux frères martyrs par un gentilhomme angevin et vers adressés a Madame de Montpensier. Paris. Millot.

1589. Discours véritable et dernier propos de M. de Guise ensemble son tombeau. Paris. Marquan.

1589. Nullité de la prétendue innocence et justification des massacres de Henri de Valois contre la déclaration envoyée par les villes de France pour être publiée. Paris.

1589. Réponse des catholiques zélés et unis pour la conservation de la religion chrétienne à la déclaration de Henri III. sur la mort des feux cardinal et duc de Guise. Paris. Parant.

1589. Réponse faite à Henri de Valois sur son innocence preténdue sur la mort de MM. de Guise. Paris.

1589. Discours en forme d'oraison funèbre sur le massacre et parricide de Messeigneurs les duc et Cardinal de Guise. Paris. Varangue.

1589. Les cruautés sanguinaires exercées envers feu Monseigneur le cardinal de Guise etc. et les moyens tenus pour emprisonner le prince de Ginville [Joinville] et les seigneurs catholiques tant ecclésiastiques que autres pendent les états à Blois : avec la remonstrance faite au roi par Madame de Nemours sur le massacre de ses enfans. Paris.

1589. La vie et innocence des deux frères contenant un ample discours par lequel on pourra aisement rembarrer ceux qui tâchent à éteindre leur renom. Paris. Dubreuil.

1589. Regrets lamentables des habitants de la ville de Reims sur la mort de feu M. le Cardinal de Guise ensemble son tombeau. Reims. Verses.

1589. Oraison funèbre prononcée aux obsèques de Loys [duc] de Lorraine Cardinal et de Henri duc de Guise son frère. Senlis. By A. Muldrac. The Cardinal was Louis de Lorraine but not Duke.

1589. Tombeau sur le trépas et assassinat commis aux personnes de Messeigneurs de Guise à Blois le 23 et 24 decembre. Verses. Paris. Guérin.

1589. Regrets et soupirs lamentables de la France sur le trépas de très haut très valeureux seigneur M. le duc de Guise. Verses. Paris. Velu.

1589. Histoire au vrai du meutre proditoirement commis en la personne de M. le duc de Guise protecteur et défenseur de l'eglise catholique et du royaume de France ensemble du massacre aussi perpetré en la personne du cardinal son frère sacré et dédié à Dieu : où sont balancés les services de ses prédécesseurs et les siens avec une tant inhumaine cruauté et engrate rémuneration ; avec les figures des massacres desd: sieurs. Paris.

1589. Pourtrait et description du massacre proditoirement commis au cabinet et par l'autorité du roi pendant les états à Blois en la personne de Henri de Lorraine magnanime duc de Guise protecteur et défenseur de l'eglise catholique et du royaume de France. Paris.

1589. Le faux visage découvert du fin Renard de la France à tous catholiques unis et saintement ligués pour la défense et tuition de l'eglise C.A.R. contre l'ennemi de Dieu ouvert et couvert ensemble quelques anagrammes et sonnets propres pour la saison d'aujourd'hui.

1589. La mort du duc et du cardinal de Guise décrite en vers italiens par Raphael de Toscane et comment ensuite Henri III. fut massacré. MS. Vatican Library.

1589. Déclaration du roi sur la mort des ducs et cardinal de Guise, du 31 decembre 1588. Blois.

1589. Discours de ce qui advint à Blois jusque'à la mort du duc de Guise et du cardinal de Lorraine. By Etienne Bernard of Dijon.

1589. Informations sur la mort du Cardinal de Guise. MS. Bibl. du Roi. Fonds de Fontainieu.

1589. Pleurs et soupirs de Madame de Guise sur la mort et assassinat du Duc de Guise. Paris.

1589. Lettre du roi sur la convocation du ban et arrière ban de la gendarmerie. Tours.

1589. De justa Henrici tertii abdicatione. Paris. By Jean Boucher. It was written to justify the Sorbonne's action with regard to Henry III. and appeared about the time of the King's murder. It completely justifies tyrannicide. "Liber rarissimus combustus" has been written by some one in the copy in the Royal Library at Windsor.

1590. De justa reipublicae Christianae in reges impios auctoritate. By Rossaeus. Without any proof attributed to Guillaume Rose.

1590. Anti-Sixtus. By Michel Hurault. Also an English translation. A violent royalist riposte to the foregoing and against the attitude of the Pope towards Henry III.'s murder.

1590. Sermon funèbre pour l'anniversaire de Henri et Louis de Lorraine. Nantes.

1591. Le tombeau de M. le Cardinal et duc de Guise avec plusieurs sonnets (36) en forme de regrets et autres poèmes sur le même sujet plus un hymne de la sainte ligue des catholiques unis. par R.G.A.D.F. Paris.

1592. Le Guisien ou perfidie tyrannique commis ès personnes du cardinal Louis de Lorraine et Henri de Lorraine. Troyes. By Simon Belyard.

1594. Relatione del negotiato da monsignor (Ambrosio) Lomellino sopra l'assolutione di Henrico IV. MS. Bibl. du roi 8948 p. 420.

1594. Le franc et libre discours sur l'état de la France 1591-1593. By Michel Hurault.

1594. Lettre du Cardinal de Plaisance (Filippo de Sega) legat du Pape au royaume de France à tous les catholiques du même royaume par laquelle est déclarée l'intention de sa Sainteté touchant ce qui s'est naguères passé à Rome. Paris. Thierry.

1594. Eadem litterae latinae. Parisiis.

1594. Discours de la legation du duc de Nevers par Henri IV. vers le pape Clément VIII. en 1593. Paris. Métayer. Nevers, 1595.

1594. Acta legationis Ludovici Gonzagae ducis Nivernensis pro Henrico IV. ad Clementem VIII. pontificem romanum. Francofurti.

1594. De justa et canonica absolutione Henrici IV. regis. Parisiis. Patisson. By Petrus Pithaeus. Pierre Pithou of the Satyre.

1594. Actes et mémoires de la conversion et absolution du roi Henri IV. MS. Dupuy. Bibl. Nat.

1594. La première face du Janus françois contenant les troubles de France depuis l'an 1584 jusqu'en 1589, extrait des centuries et commentaires de Michel Nostradamus. Lyon 1594. Paris 1596. By Jacques de Chavigny.

1594. Panegyricus Henrico IV. dictus. Parisiis. By Chopinus Renatus.

1594. Les Triomphes de Henri IV. Paris. Morel. By Jean Godard.

1594. Sur la conversion au catholicisme de Henri IV. Statements on, by René Benoist, curé of St. Eustache ; Claude de Movennes, curé of St. Merry ; Claude d'Angennes, bishop of Le Mans.

1594. Raisons et preuves démonstratives contre les calomnies publiées pour rendre la conversion du roi Henri IV. feinte suspecte et odieuse et autres pièces touchant cette conversion. MS. Bibl. du roi, ms. 9214.

1595. Traité de la juste et canonique absolution de Henri IV. Paris.

1595. Pyramide élevée devant la porte du palais à Paris. Reference to the attempt on Henry IV. by Chastel.

1595. Procedure faite contre Jean Chastel.

1595. Responsio canonica ad scriptum nuper editum in Causa Henrici Borbonii quo illius Fautores persuadere nituntur Episcopos in Francia jure illum absolvere potuisse ab excommunicatione in casu sedi apostolicae reservato. Romae. By Francesco Pegna.

1595. Les trois visions de Childéric IV. roi de France pronosties des guerres civiles de ce Royaume et la prophétie de Basine sa femme sur les victoires de Henri de Bourbon roi de France et sur le rencontre faite à Fontaine Françoise.

1595. Dialogue fort plaisant entre Henri IV. et 2 vignerons de Besançon qui se sont adressés à Sa Maj. au temps qu'elle étoit en la Comté en 1595 : avec le réjouissement de Lay-Démanteleuse de Tailau par Porrens de Lay-Marche vigneron de Pluemeire à M. de Lay-Frondreire, le tout en vers bourguignons. MS. Bible. Jardel at Braine.

1595. Le triomphe de la liberté royale et la prise de Beaune avec un cantique à N.S.J.C. pour préserver le roi des assassins. à M. de Biron maréchal de France et gouverneur de Bourgogne. Paris. Morel. By P. Boton.

1595. Discours de la prise de la ville et Château de Beaune. Paris. Richer. Beaune. Simonot 1682.

1595. Réduction de la ville et Château de Beaune en l'année 1595. MS. Not the version in Memoirs of the League. Autre rélation de la réduction de cette ville. MS. Bibl. Fevret de Fontette.

1595. Receueils de la ligue en 1593, 1594, 1595. MS. Bibl. Colbert.

1595. Mémoires pour l'histoire des années 1593-4-5. MS. cited in Catalogue Bibl. de Thou. Apparently by Villars-Houdan.

1595. Mémoires de la guerre de Luxembourg par le Maréchal de Bouillon.

1595. Amnistie et oubliance des maux faits et reçus pendant les troubles et à l'occasion d'iceux. Paris. Langelier. By Antoine Loisel.

1595. Articles convenus et accordés pour le rétablissement de la neutralité des Comtés. Langres.

1595. Discours de la prise et réduction de Vienne le 24 avril 1595. Paris. Huby.

1595. La prise de la Ville d'Autun en Bourgogne par le maréchal de Biron. Paris.

1595. Discours sur l'exécution [that is in effigy] du duc d'Aumale.

1595. Le bon François pour Henri IV. contre les conspirateurs du roi d'Espagne et des Rebelles en France. Also Les occasions. By Aubert de Massoignes.

1595. Au roi discours de congratulations de la décadence de la ligue et pacification de Paris Rouen Amiens Lyon et meilleures villes de son royaume. Verses. Paris. Depré.

1595. Homoncée ou l'accord et union des sujets du roi sous son obéissance. Paris.

1595. La sextessenie diablactique et potentielle tirée d'une nouvelle façon d'alambiques suivant les préceptes de la sainte magie et invocations tant pour guérir l'hémmorragie playes tumeurs et ulcères vénériennes de la France que pour changer les choses plus nuisibles en bonnes et utiles. Paris. Prevosteau. By Demous a *conseiller* at the *siège présidial* of Amiens.

1595. Manifeste et déclaration de la noblesse de Provence contenant les causes qui l'ont mue de prendre les armes contre le sieur d'Espernon avec une lettre d'un gentilhomme provençal sur le manifeste du 3 novembre 1595. By Castellane de Besaudun. Afterwards murdered at Lambesc at the instigation of Epernon.

1595. Lettres et patentes aux consuls et eschevins de Lyon, sur la réduction de Rouen.

1595. Articles accordés par le roi pour la trêve générale du royaume. 23 sept 1595. Reims. Paris.

1595. Avis donné au Pape par le cardinal légat des propos passés entre le duc de Mayenne et lui sur la proposition faite par le duc de Feria pour le marriage de l'infante d'Espagne. Lyon.

1595. Discours de la prise de la ville de Ham défaite des Espagnols et de la réduction du Château à l'obéissance du roi. Paris Lenoir.

1596. Mémoires de ce qui s'est passé au pays d'artois au mois d'aoust sous la conduite du maréschal de Biron. MS. cited in Cat. Bibl. de Thou.

1596. Brevis narratio quomodo Henricus IV. ex heretico catholicus factus humiliter apud Clementem VIII. per legatos egerit ac tandem in gratiam Romanae ecclesiae receptus sit, cum figuris a crispino Passaeo sculptis. Coloniae Agrippinae.

1596. Discours au vrai des saintes cérémonies faites à Rome pour la renonciation absolution et bénédiction de Henri IV. avec un autre discours de la route de Siam Bassa. Le tout fidèlement traduit de l'Italien en françois jouxte la copie imprimée à Viterbe. Lyon. Troyes. The translation is by the Seigneur de Trouy.

1596. Lettres du roi sur la prise de Laon et d'Amiens.

1596. Remonstrance et exhortation au roi Henry IV. et constamment la guerre aux hérétiques et schismatiques du 6 sept. 1596. Rouen. Lallemant.

1596. Remonstrances à MM. de l'assemblée tenue à Rouen, en 1596. Rouen. Petitval. Paris. Moreau. By René Benoist.

1596. Discours des premiers troubles advenus à Lyon avec l'apologie de la ville. Lyon. By Pierre de Saisnay. Précenteur et comte de Lyon. Phrase without meaning. Perhaps *percepteur au compte*. Lyon was the centre of a *généralite*, but had no *Cour des Comptes*.

1596. Discours des cérémonies et réjouissances faites à Tolose sur la réduction de cette ville à l'obeissance de Henri IV. Tolose.

1596. Oratio Venetiis habita ad laudem regis Henrici IV. mense julio 1596 a doctore Domenico Museo. MS. Bibl. Jardel at Braine.

Various dates to 1596. Histoire ges guerres civiles de France pendant la ligue depuis l'an 1586 jusqu'en 1596. MS. Bibl. de Prince Eugène de Savoie.

1596. Discours veritable de la prize et reduction de Marseille. Marseille. Paris. Another version. By Etienne Bernard.

1596. Trésor et richesse pour mettre l'état en splendeur. By Bartholomé Laffemas.

1606. Histoire des derniers troubles de France en 4 livres avec un 5me contenant l'histoire des choses mémorables advenues en France sous la regne de Henri IV. jusqu'en 1598 avec un recueil des édits de Henri pour la réunion de ses sujets. Lyon. Paris 1613. By Pierre Matthieu.

1607. Delle historie del mundo ove si narrano le cose auvenute dall'anno 1570 fin all'anno 1596. Venetia.

1608. Histoire de la guerre sous Henri IV. ou Chronologie novennaire 1589-1598. Paris. Richer. By Pierre Palme Cayet.

1614. Mémoires de ce qui s'est passé en la frontière de Champagne depuis l'an 1581 jusqu'à la paix de l'an 1598. Paris. By La Caille.

1616. Historiarum a pace constituta anno 1598 liber primus Caroli Cantoclari libellorum supplicum magistrorum decani. Parisiis. By Charles de Chanteclair died 1620.

1616. Histoire véritable de la réduction de Marseille à l'obéissance du roi Henri IV. Anvers.

1617. Etat des places et deniers ordonnées par Sa Maj. à Nantes pour sureté et ôtâge de ceux de la religion. Montpellier. Gillet.

1623. Recueil de divers mémoires harangues remonstrances et lettres servans à l'histoire de nostre temps. . Paris. Chevalier. Mainly about the League.

1623. Actes concernant l'abolition du roi par Clément VIII. Paris. Lettres du cardinal du Perron.
A legal term signifying the regularising of the past.

1623. Au roi de Navarre, 1585. Paris. Recueil de Lannel.

1624. Lettres de M. de Villeroy à M. de Bellièvre du 17 mars 1596. Mémoires de Villeroy.

1625. Mémoires de Tavannes. Paris. 1st edition.

1625. Continuatione delle revoluzioni di Francia dall'anno 1589 fino al 1598 di Pietro Mattei tradotte da Guglielmo Alessandro de Novillieri Clavelli Francese. Venetia.

1630. Historia delle guerre civile di Francia nelle quali si contengono le operationi di quatro re: Francesco II., Carlo IX., Enrico III., Enrico IV. dall'anno 1559 fin all'anno 1598. Venetia. By Enrico Caterino Davila.

1635. Discours latin de Pompone de Bellièvre en faveur of Henri IV. au sujet de son excommunication. 1585. Paris.

1641. Discours de Guillaume du Vair sur ce qu'après les barricades on propose au parlement de la part de la ville de s'unir au peuple et aviser au bien public de l'Etat. Oeuvres du Vair.

1644. Relation de la mort des Guises par Miron premier médecin du roi Charles IX. Histoire des Cardinaux françois. Paris.

1649. Recit véritable de ce qui s'est passé aux barricades de l'année 1588 depuis le 7 may jusqu'au dernier juin ensuivant. Paris. Mettayer.

1652. Mémoire par lequel il est prouvé que le roi Henri IV. peut être canoniquement et légitimement absous d'hérésie par les eveques de son royaume. Paris. Oeuvres mêlées de Loisel. Mémoire by Pierre Pithou.

1665. Remarques sur l'histoire de Davila. Paris.

1665. Mémoires du duc de Nevers. Paris.

1661. Histoire de Jacques de Matignon Maréchal de France. Paris. Courbé. By J de Caillière.

1662. Actes authentiques et mémoires secrets touchant la ligue et les guerres civiles de France récueillis par Jean du Bouchet. Paris.

1666. Mémoires de Henri de la Tour d'Auvergne duc de Bouillon de 1560 jusqu'au siège de Monsegnr en Auvergne 1586. Paris. Guignard.

1668. Mémoires du duc de Joyeuse. Some of these are by François Rauné Seigneur de Villegomblain.

1679. Relation de la journée de Coutras. Paris.

1683. Histoire de la ligue 1576-1598. Paris. Mâbre Cramoisy. By Louis Maimbourg.

1694. Miroir historique de la ligue. Cologne. F. Constant.

1696. Le plan figuré du siege de la Fère 1596. Paris. Le Clerc. By P. Desprez ingénieur du roi.

1697. Apologie pour la noblesse durant les états de Blois 1588. Paris. By Bouchel. Bibl. du droit français.

1739. Histoire particulière de la ligue en Bretagne. Paris. Clousier.

1741. Journal de Henri IV.

1749. La vie du maréchal de Matignon. Paris. Le Gras.

1767. L'esprit de la ligue ou histoire politique des troubles de France pendant le xvi siècle. Paris. J. Hérissat fils. By M. Auquetil, Chanoine régulier.

1777. Histoire Générale de la Provence. By Papon. Paris.

1811. Histoire de la Diplomatie Française. By Flassan. Paris.

1834. Le testament de la ligue. Chartres. Garnier.

1841. Les prédicateurs de la ligue. Paris. H. Fournier.

1843. Histoire de Henri IV. Paris. Debécourt. By Viscomte de Nogent.
1843. La réforme et la ligue. Paris. Belin. By Capefigue.
1843. Le Balafré. Paris. Magen. By J. Brisset.
1844. Essai sur l'histoire de Digne pendant les troubles de la ligue. Digne. Guichard. By F. Guichard.
1844. Note et documents pour servir à l'histoire de Lyon pendant la ligue. Lyon. By A. Péricaud.
1844. Histoire de la ligue en Bretagne. Paris. Gosselin. By E. Georges.
1850. Histoire des ducs de Guise. Paris. Amyot. By R. de Bouillé.
1852. Journal historique de Pierre Fayet sur les troubles de la ligue publié d'après le manuscrit inédit et autographe. Tours. Ladevêze. Edited with notes by Victor Luzarche.
1854. Les derniers Valois les Guises et Henri IV. Paris. Levy. By the Comte de St. Aulaire.
1854. Histoire de la ligue sous les règnes de Henri III. et IV. Paris. Douniol. By Victor de Chalambert.
1856. La ligue en Anjou. Paris. Durand. By E. Mourin.
1856. Essai sur l'histoire de la ligue à Poitiers. Poitiers. By H. Ouvré.
1856. La ligue en Bretagne. Paris. Dumoulin. By L. J. Grégoire.
1857. Histoire de ce qui s'est passé en Bretagne durant les guerres de la ligue et particulièrement dans le diocèse de Cornouailles. Par le Bastard de Mesmeur. St. Brieuc. Prud'homme. Edited with notes by J. Moreau.
1861. Henri IV. et sa politique. Paris. Didier. By C. Mercier de Lacombe.
1863. Compagne de Henri IV. ou pays de Caux 25 avril—15 mai 1592 d'après les chroniques et plusieurs documents inédits. Rouen. Fleury. By the Abbé Somménil.
1863. Elisabeth et Henri IV. Paris. Levy. By Prévost Paradol.
1864. Correspondence du duc de Mayenne 1590-91. Reims. By Loriquet.
1864. Les héroines de la ligue et les mignons de Henri III. Paris. Amyot. By Capefigue.
1865. De la démocratie chez les predicateurs de la ligue. Paris Joubert. By C. Labitte.
1866. Journal d'un curé ligueur de Paris sous les trois derniers Valois suivi du journal du secrétaire de Philippe du Bec archevêque de Reims publiés pour la première fois. Paris. Didier. Arranged with notes by E. de Barthélemy.
1866. Les Guise les Valois et Philippe II. Paris. Amyot. By J. de Croze.
1867. La ligue en Provence. Paris. Hachette. By L. Legré.
1869. Langres pendant la ligue. Paris. Dumoulin. By P. de St. Ferjeux.
1870. Séjour de Henri III. à Rouen aux mois de Juin Juillet 1588, recueil d'opuscules rares et de documents inédits. Rouen. Boissel. Arranged with notes by Robillard de Beaurepaire.
1873. Essai sur les diplomates du temps de la ligue. Paris. Denty. By E. Frémy.
1874. La ligue à Abbeville. Paris. Dumoulin. By E. Prarond.
1874. Deux ligueurs de Picardie. documents historiques sur un maïeur d'Amiens et un gouverneur de Gerberoy. Paris. Dumoulin.
1875. Documents inédits pour servir à l'histoire de la ligue. Paris. Fischbacker. By J. Loutchitzki.
1875. Les grandes figures de l'histoire. Henri IV. et l'Eglise. Paris. Palmé. By the abbé P. Féret.

1877. Les ducs de Guise et leur époque. Paris. Plon. By H. Forneron.

1879. Henri IV. sa vie son œuvre ses écrits. Paris. Picard. By J. Guadet.

1881. H. de Guise histoire de France 1563-1589. Tours. Mame et fils. By C. Cauvin.

1882. Les capitaines de la Ste. Union, souvenirs de la ligue en Bourgogne. Paris. Picard. By C. Muteau.

1882. Histoire de la ligue en Bourgogne. Auxerre. Chambon. By P. M. Baudouin.

1882. Pièces sur la ligue en Bourgogne. Vie et faits héroiques du maréschal d'Aumont 1591. La prinse de la ville d'Autun par le mareschal de Biron 1595. Réduction de la ville de Reaune 1595 par Lemaidon. Discours sur le combat de Fontaine Françoise 1595. Lettre du roi à MM. du parlement et de la cour des comptes 1595. Paris. Martin. Edited by H. Chevreul.

1883. 2me série. Advis des estats de Bourgogne touchant la résolution prise aux estats de Blois 1588-90. Discours de deux belles deffaites des ennemis exécutées en Champagne et Bourgogne le 23 d'avril 1589. relation de ce qui s'est passé en 1585-86 en la ville d'Auxonne. discours véritable du siège de Montbard. Paris. Martin. By H. Chevreul.

1884. Discours de ce qui s'est passé en la prise de Marseille par Mgr le duc de Guise, lieutenant général en Provence sur l'advis donné par un de la ville même du 18 février 1596. Paris. Martin. Edited by H. Chevreul.

1884. Chronique de Buffet 1580-1588 la ligue à Metz. Paris. Dumoulin. With notes by A. Prost.

1886. Paris et la ligue sous le règne de Henri III. Etude d'histoire municipale et politique. Paris. Hachette. By P. Robiquet.

1887. Les trois Henri. (Valois Guise Béarnais.) Paris. Hachette. By B. Zeller.

1887. Arques et Ivry. Le siège de Paris par Henri IV. Extraits des mémoires du duc d'Angoulême. Paris. Hachette. By B. Zeller.

1887. Les débuts de la ligue 1574-1578. Paris. Hachette. By B. Zeller.

1887. Les Etats de la ligue. Le roi national. Paris. Hachette. By B. Zeller.

1888. Henri IV le Saint Siège et l'Espagne (1594-98). Paris. Hachette. By B. Zeller.

1892. Un ligueur. Le Comte de la Fère. Orléans. Herlinson. By E. Colas de la Noue.

895. Documents pour servir à l'histoire du pays de Gevaudun au temps de la ligue 1585-1595. Paris. Picard. By J. Roncaute.

1895. Les conférences de la Mothe St. Héray entre Henri de Navarre et Catherine de Medici 1582. Paris. Lechwaller. By C. Sauzé.

1896. Le roi de la ligue à Maillezais 6 sept–15 oct. 1589 documents inédits. Paris. Lechwaller. Edited by Edgar Bourloton.

1897. L'economie sociale de la France sous Henri IV. Paris. Hachette. By G. Faguiez.

1898. La presse politique à Lyon pendant la ligue 1589-1594. Lyon. Bernoux et Cumin. By the Abbé C.O. Reure.

1899. Correspondance du duc de Mercœur et des ligueurs Bretons avec l'Espagne. Rennes. Edited by G. de Carné.

1899. Documents inédits pour servir â l'histoire de la ligue en Bretagne. St. Brieuc. Guyon. Archives published by Alain Raison of Cleuzion.

1899. Journal de François Grignart seigneur de Champsavay. St. Brieuc. Guyon. By Alain Raison.

1900. Documents sur la ligue en Bretagne. Correspondance du duc de Mercœur. Rennes. Plihon, Hervé. By G. de Carné

1905. La reine Margot et la fin des Valois. Paris. Plon. By C. Merki.

1905. La société française du XVI. siècle. Paris. Perrin. By V. Du Bled.

i. 410. Revue Historique. Loiseleur. La mort du second prince de Condé.

ii. 490. Rev. Hist. Paillard. D'étournement au profit des Huguenots d'un subside envoyé par Philippe II. à Catherine.

vii. 66. Rev. Hist. Legér. Le siège de Rouen par Henri IV. d'après de documents inédits.

xxi. 91. Rev. Hist. Babeau. La représentation du tiers aux assemblées pour la rédaction des coutumes xvi. siècle.

xxii. 291. Rev. Hist. Dardier.

xxiii. 28. Jean de Serres historiographe du roi, sa vie et ses écrits 1540-98.

xxix. 340. Rev. Hist. Girard. Passerat et la satire Menippée.

xxxvi. 311. Rev. Hist. Hauser. Lettre inédite de la Noue sur la conversion de Henri IV.

xli. 253. Rev. Hist. Zeller. Le mouvement guisard en 1588. Catherine de Medici et la journée des barricades.

xlii. 241. Rev. Hist. Waddington. La France et les protestants allemands sous Charles IX. et Henri III.

liii. 301. Rev. Hist. Hauser. Sur l'authenticité des discours de la Noue.

lxxiii. 64. Rev. Hist. Baguenault de Puchesse. Les idées morales de Catherine de Medici.

xv. 221. Revue des Questions Historiques. Puchesse. Un nouvel historien de la ligue.

xv. 227. Quest. Hist. Étude sur la diplomatie française pendant la ligue.

xxvii. 152. Quest. Hist. La Ligue. La formation.

xxv. 30. Traité de Joinville.

xxx. 460. Mission du Cardinal Caetani 1587.

xxxii. 46. Efforts des ligueurs après la mort de Henri III.

xxxiv. 34. Histoire des derniers jours de la ligue.

1897. 339. Quest. Hist. Puchesse. Catherine de Medici et les conférences de Nerac.

ii. 132. Société de l'histoire de Paris et de l'Ile de France. Tableau représentant la procession de 1590 débouchant de l'arcade St. Jean.

xvi. 119. Idem. Baron de Rublès. Paris en 1572.

24 année. 46. Idem. Bonnardot. La rançon d'un prévôt des marchands de Paris au temps de la ligue.

1835, Jan. 15. Revue des deux Mondes. Critique de Capefigure.

1841, July 15. Revue des deux Mondes. Louandre. Critique de l'étude de Labitte.

1845, Feb.-March. Revue des deux Mondes. Carné. Henri IV.

1847, Oct. 15. Revue des deux Mondes. Labitte. Une chambre parlementaire en 1593.

1848, Feb. 15. Revue des deux Mondes. Garrison. De la politique du Calvinisme en France.

1851, March. Revue des deux Mondes. St. Priest. Les Guises.

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